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Abstract 
How do practices guiding the engagement of the international private sector in fragile 
and conflict-affected states emerge, and who are the important actors and institutions in 
this process? Using a human security framework, this thesis seeks to apply critical 
security studies by taking a closer look at the role of the Turkish private sector in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This thesis argues that the international private sector can be 
a vital tool to enhance human security, in particular economic security, in fragile and 
conflict-affected states. However, without a regulatory environment for the private 
sector to follow “best practices,” it is largely at the discretion of each business to adopt 
measures to enhance human security. In this light, this thesis presents the conditions 
that either enhance or constrain economic security following the intervention of the 
international private sector. The central findings suggest the Turkish private sector 
enhanced certain economic security areas such as infrastructure recovery and 
restoration of access to basic services, the dismantling of a war economy and illegal 
economic networks, and expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills 
development and empowerment. The central findings also suggest the Turkish private 
sector constrained economic security in the areas of job creation or to the establishment 
of public and private sector employment, wage employment and self-employment. The 
impact of the Turkish private sector on public-private relations appeared to have had a 
mixed impact. Moreover, there were some economic security conditions such as basic 
income and poverty alleviation, rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture 
sector, development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees and 
impoverished groups, provision of microfinance opportunities, clarification of property 
rights, macroeconomic development, and provision of well-coordinated, predictable, 
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and multifaceted aid, where the Turkish private sector appeared to have had little impact 
if any at all. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Chapter 1 serves as the introduction to this thesis and provides a brief overview of the 
context of the research project, which will be expanded upon in Chapter 3, titled 
Contextual Framework, and an assessment of the methodological approaches. More 
specifically, Chapter 1, will present the central research question, timeframe, the unit of 
analysis, research methodology, and the structure of the thesis. 
 
Introduction 
This research project concentrates on the diverse forms of engagement of the Turkish 
private sector in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) under Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) from 2004 until 2014. As will be mentioned in the chapter, 
titled Contextual Framework, traditional security perspectives have largely dominated 
analysis of relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
of Iraq. Turkey has historically been concerned about the prospect of a Kurdish nation 
emerging within Turkey, or the materialization of an autonomous Kurdish region on its 
border with Iraq; the relentless fighting between the military and the PKKi; the PKK’s 
apparent safe haven in the Qandil Mountains of the KRI; the internal discontent of its 
own Kurdish population; the insecurity of the Iraqi Turkmen; and, lastly, the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. The termination of the United Nations’ economic sanctions on Iraq, 
and the end of the Ba’athist regime’s internal sanctions on the KRI, along with the 
KRG’s creation of a liberal business environment, particularly for the international 
private sector, after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 unlocked the region to trade 
freely with its neighbors. The formal recognition of the Kurdistan Region in the Iraqi 
Constitution in 2005 was a significant development for Turkey-KRG economic 
relations. The acknowledgement of the KRG as a legitimate governing body allowed 
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Turkish companies to negotiate and sign agreements within the legal framework of 
government agencies in the KRG without the need for approval from the central 
government in Baghdad. The close proximity of the KRI market, consumer demand for 
new goods, and the trans-border mercantile culture of companies in Turkey and the KRI 
contributed to the rapid expansion of Turkey-KRG relations (Olson 2006, Barkey 2005, 
Park 2005, Gorener 2008). The determination of the KRG to establish a liberal business 
and investment climate, coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit of the Turkish private 
sector and the normalization of relations between Ankara and Erbil, have resulted in 
significant economic cooperation that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.  
 
The accomplishments of the peoples of the KRI over the last decade have been 
extraordinary. Transitioning from a period that was mainly focused on protecting and 
defending the KRI during the Saddam regime, to the establishment of a power-sharing 
government, significant economic development, and then a return back to defending the 
region from Daesh, all posed severe human security challenges. However, with the 
courage and commitment of the people of the KRI, a substantial economic security 
framework was created that could be built upon. With the region’s rising young 
population and subsequent high demand for energy, access to high-quality education 
and job creation, will ensure future generations are safeguarded from shocks related to 
economic and humanitarian crises in the region. With the support of key international 
development organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the KRG implemented 
strategies to ensure a streamlined approach to socioeconomic development. A 
constructive partnership with the Turkish business community resulted in the revival 
and manifold enhancements to the physical infrastructure of the KRI. New hospitals, 
water and sanitation projects, reliable electric power-generation, schools, housing 
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complexes, bridges, roads, and international airports propelled the KRI on a trajectory 
to enhance human security. The Turkish private sector exported an array of products 
such as diapers, doors, electronics, food items, and pipes to meet the pent up demands 
of the KRI market. However, despite significant progress in the areas of infrastructure 
and restoration of access to basic services, the almost complete dependence on oil 
related income transfers from Baghdad for revenue and a bloated public sector 
constrained economic security in the KRI. The KRG struggled to attain self-reliance 
and build an independent local private sector to mitigate the possible triggers of conflict 
and human insecurity. It is key for the KRG to overcome challenges and pursue political 
and economic reforms that guarantee an inclusive path to growth and establishing solid 
public good provisions for all citizens of the KRI, including internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees who have sought sanctuary in the region (KRG Central 
Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, World Bank). 
 
The KRI has an incredibly rich history. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the people 
of the KRI began a tumultuous trajectory. Over the last century, the Kurds, as well as 
other groups living within the KRI, such as Arabs, Chaldo-Assyrians, Jews, Mandeans, 
Shabaks, Turkmen, and Yazidis, were the subjects of the grand strategies of outside 
powers. They were denied autonomy, subjected to forced migration, survived the 
destruction of their villages and farmlands, were imprisoned, and subjected to economic 
embargoes and military attacks. The Kurdish Peshmerga, otherwise known as “those 
who confront death,” made several courageous attempts to resist the brutal Saddam 
regime, but were always pushed back by greater forces. In addition to eradicate the 
Peshmerga, the Saddam regime inflicted mass punishments upon the civilian 
population. One of the most horrific human rights violations by the Saddam Hussein 
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regime during the Al-Anfal campaign, which lasted from 1986 to 1989, was the 
chemical and gas attacks at Halabja on March 16, 1988. Those attacks killed an 
estimated 5,000 people, injured thousands, and resulted in thousands more perishing 
from gas-related complications years after the attack (Hiltermann 2007, Mlodoch 2012, 
Fischer-Tahir 2012, Osler and Yahya 2013). Neglect of the infrastructure and 
destruction of the agriculture sector in the KRI began in the 1980s, when Saddam 
Hussein redirected government-spending priorities to pursue his aggressive war against 
Iran from 1980-1988, and suppressed concurrent Kurdish insurrections against his 
government. Mistreatment of the people living in the KRI continued after Saddam’s 
1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 1990-91 war with the United States 
(Alnasrawi 1992, Frank 1992, Malanczuk 1992). In 1990, shortly after Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq to curb the 
development of chemical weapons (Ismael and Ismael 2005). As a means to “punish” 
the Kurds, Saddam Hussein imposed his own internal economic sanctions, thus making 
it even more difficult for the KRG to import essential goods (Alnasrawi 2001, Kosky 
1995). The double embargo had a serious debilitating impact on the economy in the 
KRI. Because of the Ba’athist government’s approach to economic growth and its 
concentration on Iraq’s “productive capacity” of nationalized industries (Looney 2006, 
1), both industrial and agricultural production in the KRI were severely degraded under 
the regime’s sanctions. A United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
report indicated that during the time of the economic sanctions, malnutrition, child-and-
infant mortality, and poverty rates skyrocketed and prices for food items increased 
substantially (McDowall 1996a). Due to the unwarranted suffering of Iraqis, including 
Kurds, under the United Nations sanctions, the Oil-for-Food Programme was 
established to allow Baghdad to sell designated amounts of oil in exchange for critical 
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commodities. Subsequently, Iraqi society became completely reliant on food rations and 
other forms of humanitarian assistance from the United Nations. In part because of the 
crippling effect of the economic embargo, illegal networks along the Iraq-Turkey border 
and a war economy emerged to smuggle goods that were not allowed into Iraq.  
 
The failed Kurdish uprising (1991) against the Iraqi government, the flight of refugees 
to Iran and Turkey (1991-1992), and the cessation of any Iraqi government assistance 
in the form of both financial and human resources to the KRI (1992) further created 
instability in the region. After the end of the Gulf War (1991), the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, in coordination with Turkey, implemented a no-fly zone 
over northern Iraq to deter attacks by the Saddam regime upon the Kurds. Providing a 
safe haven in the region under the guise of UN Security Council Resolution 688 enabled 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), who had fled to the border areas near Turkey, to 
return to their homes. In 1992, the people of the KRI began self-rule and established a 
governing body to administer services, albeit at a subpar level due to the lack of 
infrastructure recovery and human capital, and continued dependence on the central 
government in Baghdad to manage basic resources. This period provided the people of 
the KRI an opportunity to lay the foundations for democratic administration and self-
rule.  
 
Having written my Master’s research paper on Operation Provide Comfort and the KRI 
following the first Gulf War, I wanted to gain a greater understanding of recent 
developments in the region since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 (Sayari 1997, Farouk-
Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, Gunter 1998, Hiltermann 1997, Ofteringer and Backer 1994, 
Frelick 1992). ii After participating in a series of meetings on the challenges facing 
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Turkey-KRG relations, I became intrigued to learn more about the deepening and 
widening of economic cooperation between Ankara-Erbil. It is with heartfelt 
humbleness and respect for my friends from the KRI that I present my research. I hope 
I shed light on the potential positive contributions of the international private sector, in 
this case the Turkish private sector, to enhance economic security and ensure 
sustainable peace in the KRI.  
 
Research methodology 
A comprehensive and integrated study that evaluates the impact of the Turkish private 
sector on economic security in the KRI has yet to be published. In this light, this thesis 
seeks to fill the theoretical gap by examining the conditions that may enhance and/or 
constrain economic security with regard to the engagement of the international private 
sector in a fragile and conflict-affected region. This research project contends that a 
multidimensional economic security framework, one that harnessed the presence of the 
international private sector, has the potential to enhance human security in the KRI. 
This thesis is qualitative and descriptive in nature and employs an inductive approach, 
using two main case studies to draw broader conclusions and recommendations. This 
research project applied qualitative research techniques, such as in-depth interviews, 
participant observation/semi-structured observations, participation in Track II 
diplomacy activities, and collection of written material. Descriptive statistics regarding 
socioeconomic development in the KRI and trade relations between Turkey and Iraq, 
including the KRI, were also utilized to provide a better understanding of the context 
related to the main research questions. The main research question sought to answer to 
what extent the Turkish private sector had an impact on economic security in the KRI. 
The two case studies sought to answer the following sub-questions: What impact has 
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the Turkish construction sector had on economic security in the KRI? What impact have 
the Turkish export sector and other business initiatives had on economic security in the 
KRI? 
 
Central research question  
To what extent can the international private sector – defined as the part of the economy 
that is not state-controlled, and is run for profit – affect human security, particularly 
economic security, in a fragile and conflict-affected state? 
 
Timeframe of the research project 
The timeframe utilized specifically for this research project was the period between 
2004 and 2014. This time period was highly relevant, as it permitted an analysis of the 
rediscovery of the role of the Turkish private sector as an extension of political and 
foreign policy, especially since the election of the AK Party in 2002, its subsequent 
reelections in 2007 and 2011, and the presidential elections of 2014. This timeframe 
highlighted a redirecting of the importance of the Turkey-KRG relationship, historically 
based on state security and territorial concerns, to one of economic and political 
cooperation (Minhac 2012). The KRG swiftly implemented key pieces of legislation to 
attract foreign direct investment, sidestepping the Central Authority in Baghdad, with 
whom it struggled to agree on a power-sharing agreement, particularly over oil and gas 
exports. The last two years of the timeframe, 2013-2014, posed significant challenges 
for the KRG, the people living within the KRI, and Turkish businesses engaged in the 
region. First, the ongoing dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over the legal framework 
over oil production contracts, and revenue sharing over oil exported from the KRI, 
resulted in Baghdad withholding 17 percent of the federal budget, which was the KRG’s 
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share based on the population of the KRI. Secondly, the advance of Daesh, a group of 
radical psychopaths who operated in both Syria and the central and northern parts of 
Iraq, caused a massive exodus of refugees from Syria and Iraqi IDPs (Reach 2014),iii 
many of whom fled to the KRI for refuge. The increase of vulnerable groups to the KRI 
was exacerbated by the financial strain on the KRG due to the government in Baghdad 
withholding the KRG’s share of the federal budget, and the concurrent global drop in 
the price per barrel of oil.  
 
Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis for this research project provided a diverse set of opinions and 
experiences that tied back to the main research question and sub-questions. The central 
aim of this dissertation was to understand the impact of Turkish companies and their 
business practices in the KRI. Therefore, the main empirical data was collected by 
interviewing representatives from the Turkish private sector, most of which were 
undertaken in Turkey. The motive behind choosing the construction sector, export 
sector, and associated business initiatives is that they illuminate the diversity of the 
Turkish business sector and represent some of the most prominent businesses engaged 
in the KRI. More on the selection of the private sector entities that were included in this 
research project can be found in the relevant chapter and index on each sector.  
 
When formal interviews were conducted in 2014, gaining access to senior-level 
executives with experience working in Iraq, particularly the KRI, proved difficult. 
Many private sector representatives expressed that they were uncomfortable with 
discussing business activities in the region. Other representatives only agreed to speak 
on the basis that anonymity was ensured. Respondents noted that they were gravely 
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concerned by the impact of the economic crisis in the KRI, which stemmed, in part, 
from Baghdad’s withholding of the KRG’s portion of the federal budget, the KRG’s 
overdependence on oil exports as a major source of income, and the bleak security 
situation caused by the advance of Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, I committed an 
enormous amount of time reaching out to potential interviewees and I relied heavily on 
personal contacts to secure interviews with representatives from the private sector. Once 
I met with respondents, it was important to reassure them that the purpose of conducting 
interviews was only for an academic research project and that I would make sure to 
obtain their approval on which information I could include in my dissertation.  
 
I also interviewed officials who were affiliated with the KRG, Iraqi Kurdish private 
sector representatives, civil society representatives working in the KRI, and Turkish 
representatives from the policy and security communities (both those currently serving 
and retired), as well as representatives of the U.S. government and journalists based in 
the region. Prior to 2014, I had the privilege to travel to the KRI to conduct interviews 
and observe Turkish business activities. However, by the summer of 2014, I was no 
longer permitted by the University of Warwick to travel to Iraq, including the KRI, due 
to the uncertain security situation with the advance of Daesh in the region. Not being 
able to travel to Iraq severely compromised my ability to analyze developments in the 
KRI the latter half of the project timeline. It would have been beneficial to interview 
individuals effected by the Turkish private sector in the KRI. Still, the overall quality 
of the research project was not jeopardized as interviews were secured with individuals 
connected to private sector activities in the KRI, while I was based in Turkey.  
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In-depth interviews 
This research project is based on qualitative research techniques, with an emphasis on 
in-depth interviews. Thirteen conditions served as the economic security framework, 
which was utilized to gain a deeper understanding of the engagement of the Turkish 
private sector in the KRI (Kaul 1994, United Nations Human Security Unit 2009). 
Considerable thought was given to ensuring that the questions posed concerning the 
economic security spectrum did not lead respondents to provide biased answers and 
instead, provided the theoretical context related to the main research question. It was 
important that respondents understood the main aim of the research project yet, also felt 
comfortable to comment freely on Turkey’s private sector engagement in the area 
governed by the KRG. The formal interviews were conducted from May through 
December 2014.  
 
Participant observation/semi-structured observations 
This research thesis leaned on experience gained from living in Istanbul, Turkey, since 
2005. During that timeframe, I was affiliated with two research centers, the Istanbul 
Policy Center, located at Sabanci University, from 2006-2010, and the Center for 
International and European Studies, located at Kadir Has University, from 2011 up 
through the writing of this dissertation. During my time at each of these institutions, I 
participated in meetings and conferences and spoke at events pertaining to my doctoral 
research.  
 
Track II diplomacy activities  
Part of my motivation behind pursuing a Ph.D. with a focus on the impact of Turkey’s 
private sector on human security in the area governed by the KRG stemmed from a 
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series of private and public meetings I helped organize and participated in while I was 
affiliated with the Istanbul Policy Center. In 2009, the Atlantic Council of the United 
States organized a dialogue initiative, “Confidence Building between Turks and Iraqi 
Kurds,” to “map issues affecting relations between Turks and Iraqi Kurds, and to 
consider how collaboration might be enhanced” (Phillips 2009, 7). Thanks to the 
support of the founding director of the Istanbul Policy Center, Ustun Erguder, I served 
on the organization team that brought together a group of active and retired diplomats, 
business, government, and civil society representatives, as well as journalists, from the 
area governed by the KRG and Turkey to participate in the meeting. Participants came 
together when Ankara-Erbil relations were at an all-time low due to the ongoing 
violence in Iraq, stemming from the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion and PKK attacks, 
which were frequently launched from the KRI into Turkey. A public press conference 
was held, and a series of semi-public meetings were organized after the conclusion of 
the private meetings.  
 
Collection of written material and descriptive statistics  
This research project utilized a diverse collection of written material related to the 
theoretical framework and the main question at hand. An array of academic journals 
and books, government and policy reports, socioeconomic development indexes, and 
peacebuilding and human security strategies made up the bulk of the written material 
that were considered vital to understanding the context of the research topic. Although 
this research project was largely based on qualitative techniques, due to the importance 
given to descriptive data, it also utilized figures related to socioeconomic development 
and trade relations between Turkey and Iraq, as well as Turkey and the area governed 
by the KRG. It was difficult to obtain quantitative data on the area governed by the 
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KRG as: a) the KRI was usually included in countrywide information on Iraq; and b) at 
the time of writing this dissertation, the KRG was still developing the capacity of the 
Kurdistan Regional Statistics Organization (Berry et al. 2012) within the Ministry of 
Planning to monitor and evaluate activities within the KRI.  
 
Structure of thesis 
One of the main motivations behind undertaking this research project was to investigate 
the potential impact of the international private sector to eliminate systemic tensions 
that often lead to armed conflict. Considering that the analysis surrounding Turkey-
KRG relations has largely been framed by a traditional security lens or realist approach, 
Chapter 2 – the main theoretical chapter of the thesis – begins with an overview of 
traditional approaches to security. The chapter then highlights critical approaches to 
security, such as the Copenhagen School, the Welsh School, and the Paris School. The 
chapter presents the concept of human security and highlights the “freedom from want” 
and “freedom from fear” approaches. The seven themes related to human security – 
community security, economic security, food security, environmental security, health 
security, personal security, and political security – are mentioned throughout the 
dissertation in reference to the central research question. Economic security, in 
particular, one of seven strategies to enhance human security, is integrated throughout 
the dissertation, as it is the main pillar that the dissertation rests upon. The theoretical 
agenda is firmly grounded in a broad approach to human security, which argues for the 
right for individuals to live in “freedom from fear and freedom from want” and to live 
a life of dignity. Where the literature on economic security has gaps, the arguments and 
analysis turn to the literatures on development economics, peace economics, and 
peacebuilding. By synthesizing literatures, I aim to widen the discussion on human 
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security, sustainable peace and development and the role of the international private 
sector in fragile and conflict-affected states. 
 
Chapter 3 serves as the main contextual chapter of the thesis. The chapter begins with 
a reflection on the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, since its 
election in 2002. Building on previous government policies of cooperative security and 
multilateralism, the AK Party established a multidimensional foreign policy platform. 
The chapter then provides an overview of Ankara-Baghdad and Ankara-Erbil relations, 
and the sources of tensions and areas of opportunities for cooperation surrounding these 
three poles of power in the region. This thesis challenges traditional security 
perspectives by highlighting the deepening and widening engagement of the Turkish 
private sector in the KRI since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 (Phillips 2009, Shadid 
2011, Balci and Poyraz Dogan 2009). The AK Party’s emphasis on economic 
development in Turkey, in the form of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, relatively 
low inflation rates, fiscal austerity, privatization, and foreign direct investment, coupled 
with Turkish trade and investment in the KRI, was crucial to the initial growth and 
development in the KRI and to Turkey’s own socioeconomic development. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of how the KRG established key government bodies, 
implemented strategies to promote socioeconomic development, and approved key 
investment-related legislation that attracted the international private sector to operate in 
the region. The forthcoming empirical chapters will provide an understanding of the 
impact of deepening economic ties on economic security in the KRI.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter and provides insight into the impact of the 
Turkish construction sector on economic security in the KRI. The Turkish Contractors’ 
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Association (TMB), a nonprofit professional organization, is the main association that 
supports the construction sector in Turkey. Interviews were conducted with two senior 
leaders of the TMB to gain a better understanding of the construction and consulting 
sector in Turkey, how the association supports its members, and how it operates in 
conjunction with the Turkish government and partner organizations in other countries 
where its members might have an interest in doing business (Haluk Buyukbas and 
Cigdem Cinar, TMB, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Upon conducting a comparative 
analysis of the data that was collected from interviews with representatives from the 
Turkish private sector, the following themes related to economic security emerged: the 
importance of strong public-private relations; infrastructure recovery and restoration of 
access to basic services; poverty alleviation; expansion of opportunities through 
training, skills development, and empowerment; clarification of property rights; 
macroeconomic development; and job creation. Each theme and subtheme presented 
varied information and commentary depending on the responses received from 
interviewees.  
 
Chapter 5 is the second empirical chapter of this research project and provides insight 
on the impact of the Turkish export sector and other business initiatives on economic 
security in the KRI. The Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) is the main semi-public 
organization that supports regional exporter unions. An interview was conducted with 
a member of the leadership of the TIM to gain insight into how the organization operates 
and how it supports its members’ activities abroad (Mustafa Mente, TIM, 2014, 
Interview, Istanbul). Upon conducting a comparative analysis of the data that was 
collected from the interviews, the following themes related to economic security 
emerged from the data: the importance of strong public-private relations; infrastructure 
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recovery and restoration of access to basic services; dismantling of a war economy and 
illegal networks; expansion of opportunities through training, skills development, and 
empowerment; the development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, 
and impoverished groups; macroeconomic development; and job creation. Each theme 
and subtheme presented unique insights and commentary depending on the responses 
of the representatives.  
 
Chapter 6 serves as the concluding chapter and provides reflections on the overall 
research project. The economic security spectrum is highlighted alongside the themes 
that emerged from the collection of data taken from interviews with representatives 
from the Turkish private sector. The chapter also provides a comparative analysis of the 
empirical data related to the economic security spectrum. Six additional findings – 
relating to community relations, vulnerable groups, the use of personal security 
detachments, the presence of repatriated Iraqis, the influx of both skilled and unskilled 
labor from the region and abroad, and the expansion of Turkey’s “soft” power in the 
KRI – emerged from interviews with representatives from the construction sector, 
export sector, and other business initiatives, and although not addressed in this thesis, 
would be interesting topics for future research. Lastly, the chapter includes a 
presentation of the additional potential analytical and prescriptive applications of the 
two case studies. By highlighting the impact of the Turkish private sector on economic 
security in the KRI, the dissertation sheds light on the engagement of the international 
private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions.  
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Chapter 2 – Review of the literature  
Introduction 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the Introduction, the debate in the academic literature 
and policy studies surrounding relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) of Iraq has predominantly been framed by a traditional security 
lens or realist approach characterized by concerns over terrorism and territorial integrity 
(Altunisik 2007, Park 2005, Cetinsaya 2006, Aras 2007, Migdalovitz 2002, Barkey 
2005, Gorener 2008, Charountaki 2012). Therefore, this chapter will begin with an 
overview of the literature on traditional security studies before highlighting the 
importance of critical security studies to this research project. I argue that a critical 
stance towards security is the best avenue to understand the engagement of the Turkish 
private sector in the KRI. The chapter will offer a discussion of alternative conceptions 
of security, such as the Paris School, Copenhagen School, and the Welsh School. The 
chapter will highlight the importance of the human security paradigm to this dissertation 
before explaining how economic security was chosen as the theoretical spectrum for 
this research project. As will be expanded on later in this chapter, the thesis unpacks the 
relationship between the presence of the international private sector and the conditions 
in which economic security can either be enhanced or threatened in a fragile and 
conflict-affected state. In addition to the abovementioned literature, the fields of 
development economics, peacebuilding, and peace economics informed the 
understanding of economic security and are interwoven throughout the dissertation.  
 
Traditional approaches to security 
Considering that the traditional field of security studies has influenced newer 
generations of security studies, such as constructivism, critical security studies, and 
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human security studies, a good starting point is to reflect on traditional approaches to 
security before moving to the core theoretical framework of this thesis. During WWII, 
followed by the Cold War, security was largely studied from a realist 
(classical/neorealism) perspective. According to Ken Booth, “traditional security 
thinking, which has dominated the subject for half a century, has been associated with 
the intellectual hegemony of realism” (Booth 1991, 318). Booth further points out that 
traditional security studies “emphasized military threats and the need for strong 
counters; it has been status quo orientated; and it has centered on states” (Booth 1991, 
318). Stephen M. Walt argues that the traditional security studies discipline “explores 
the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force 
affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in 
order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war” (Walt 1991, 212). Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams argue that the traditional camp commanded authority in the field 
by defining security studies as a collection of objective knowledge. They noted that: 
“Supported by this metahistorical and epistemological foundation is a series of 
foundational claims that are now presented as unproblematic facts. The most important 
of these concerns the centrality of the state as the subject of security and provides the 
basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military diplomacy from 
the field” (Krause and Williams 1997, 38). As Krause notes, the aim of the traditional 
security field is to safeguard the modern state as the referent object and to couple the 
protection of citizens with state security (Krause 1998, 301). This approach emboldened 
policy experts and military officials to strategize responses, not only to external threats, 
but also to so-called internal threats. One example of the blurring of the external and 
internal security apparatus and discourse was the blind determination by the Federal 
  
30 
 
Bureau of Investigations in the U.S. in the 1940s to 1950s to track down anyone who 
was perceived to be even remotely sympathetic to communism.  
 
The involvement of civilians in military planning during WWII set the stage for the 
“Golden Age,” or the “first wave,” of security studies (Jervis 1979, Gray 1982). 
According to Bruce Smith and Fred Kaplan, much of the initial research during the 
“Golden Age” was conducted at government-funded think tanks like the RAND 
Corporation, one of the first major policy institutions (Smith 1966, Kaplan 1983). The 
RAND Corporation gathered together a group of scholars to analyze and draft 
recommendations, mainly for the U.S. defense community. This new network gave 
American policy-makers the ability to make swift and relatively knowledgeable 
decisions on strategic questions of national security. Philip Green argues that access to 
information and a supportive institutional setting were key assets, but their close 
relationship with the Defense Department may have encouraged these scholars to view 
national security problems from an excessively military perspective (Green 1966, Green 
1968). The significant increase in funding and expansion of research capacities, not to 
mention the enormous spike in funding for the Defense Department, signaled that 
traditional security issues were a higher priority than non-traditional security concerns 
such as poverty, conservation and migration for the U.S. government (U.S. Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense 2006).  
 
The “Golden Age” of security studies ended in the mid-1960s, and the field entered a 
period of decline. Walt cites three major developments during this period: the field had 
reached a stalemate after having identified key paradigms central to its core; the field 
failed to recruit enough Ph.D. students who would become the new generation of 
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scholars; and the implications the Vietnam War had on the field, in that it had become 
an unpopular international engagement (Walt 1991, 216). The end of the Vietnam War 
sparked a new phase of security studies in the mid-1970s. The Ford Foundation’s 
sponsorship of academic centers in security affairs, and the founding of International 
Security, which became a main scholarly forum for the field, contributed to what Walt 
deemed the development of the “Renaissance” period (Walt 1991, 216-217). Walt 
argues that during this time the field relied more on historical developments, 
experienced an increase in access to relevant archival material and comparative case 
study methods, and benefited from the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Walt 1991, 217-220). 
  
During the Cold War, the American military continued to play a large role in the 
formulation of domestic and foreign policy. The literature at the time tended to ignore 
the political sources of international conflict or the potential role of accommodative 
diplomacy (Trachtenberg 1989). David A. Baldwin argues that, “if military force was 
relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not 
relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics” (Baldwin 1997, 9). 
Walt further notes that, “given that military power is the central focus of the field and 
is subject to political control, this tendency is appropriate” (Walt 1991, 212). This 
narrow approach to security made it difficult for alternative or critical voices to be heard 
within the defense community. Even with the ending of the Cold War, the field only 
broadened its scope to consider certain threats, such as arms control, crisis management, 
and the expansion of the illegal drug industry, albeit with an emphasis on how these 
dangers affected state security. 
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There were severe limitations in security studies because early scholars focused more 
on policy implications rather than on theoretical foundations or the root causes of 
insecurity. Walt notes that the founding literature also promoted a narrow definition of 
the meaning of security, and that “the field tended to ignore nonmilitary sources of 
international tension and to focus solely on military balances” (Walt 1991, 215). Walt 
appears to contradict himself, as he also argues that “expanding the field too broadly 
would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions 
to any of these important problems” (Walt 1991, 213). He then goes on to point out that 
“if future work both builds upon and challenges the results of the recent renaissance, 
that will be convincing evidence of the continued health of the field” (Walt 1991, 232). 
Walt’s seemingly internal struggle, and the ongoing debate within the field as to 
whether and how to expand the concept of security, may frame a new approach for 
traditional security studies in the future.  
 
Constructivism  
Constructivism emerged as a challenge to neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism 
within the field of international relations (Hopf 1998). The materialization of 
constructivism relates to what Ulrich Beck defined as “reflexive modernity” (Beck, 
Bonns and Lau 2003), or “increasing awareness of the inherent limits and ambiguities 
of technical and social progress, an awareness dating back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century” (Guzzini 2000, 151). The emergence of constructivism was also tied 
to ensuing debates in the field of international relations “during the second détente and 
end of the Cold War” (Guzzini 2000, 151). The main pillars of constructivism are: “(1) 
that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
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constructed by these shared ideas rather than given in nature” (Wendt 199, 1). The early 
constructivists sought to challenge the traditional notion that undifferentiated rational 
actors, such as self-interested states whose relations are shaped by the balance of 
material power, dominate the world (Jervis 1999). Constructivism locates “actors in a 
social structure that both constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interaction” 
(Farrell 2002, 50, Onuf 1989). 
 
Arguably, constructivism is firmly situated alongside other mainstream international 
relations theories. Similar to other paradigms, constructivism is divided into several 
variations, between the “thick” or critical approach, and the “thin” or conventional 
approach. There are further variations among each approach of these categories; 
however, for the sake of time and space, this thesis will focus on the two main strands. 
Both the critical and conventional approaches share a common critique of materialism, 
with constructivism being characterized by “its emphasis on the social construction of 
interests, its relationship between structures and agents, and its multiple logics of 
anarchy” (Hurd 2008, 299). Thus, constructivism emphasizes idealism over the 
materialism, individualism, and rationalism advocated by realism and neoliberalism, 
two of the main approaches within traditional security studies. Stefano Guzzini notes 
that “taking a constructivist stance allows us to be critical towards, or at least innovative 
with regard to, the mainstream” (Guzzini 2000, 148). Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and 
Daniel H. Nexon argue that “at the heart of constructivist theory is the idea that 
significant aspects of international relations are socially constructed, that is, historically 
contingent rather than necessary consequences of the nature of international politics” 
(Thaddeus Jackson and Nexon 2002, 81). By only stressing the role of the state – as 
traditional security studies does – one fails to acknowledge and address the needs of 
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individuals and their communities. Similarly, there are modern-day threats to security, 
such as large-scale irregular migration, drug trafficking, economic crises, and 
environmental degradation, which no longer recognize traditional state borders (Vietti 
and Scribner 2013). Therefore, the social constructs of communities must be examined 
in a clearer and broader scope as a way to address the global issues of today.  
 
Critical approaches to security  
As we have seen thus far, attempts to widen the conception of security, and to deepen 
the agenda of security studies, predated the end of the Cold War. However, changes in 
world affairs, sparked by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, inspired many scholars 
to further develop alternative narratives to traditional security studies. Ken Booth notes 
that “there was an understanding, even if imperfectly articulated, that the iron curtain 
and the military confrontation imprisoned us all, east and west, into old thinking about 
the games nations played” (Booth 1994, 2). With the end of the Cold War, the security 
environment evolved from a bi-polar world to a multi-polar one. Subsequently, scholars 
and practitioners who subscribed to the critical security studies field sought further 
recognition and independence apart from the traditional security studies field.  
 
Critical security scholars question the nature of the “threat,” the “object” being secured, 
and the possibilities to reinforce, ameliorate, or even overcome “security dilemmas” 
(Jervis 1978, Glaser 1997). The field challenges traditional definitions of “security” and 
emphasizes the socially constructed nature of state identities and international systems. 
Van Munster argues that what defines “a critical approach to security” is the fact that it 
takes “the concept of security as an object of reflection rather than a given” (Van 
Munster 2007, 235). Thus, the field of critical security studies emphasizes “historically 
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and reflexively constituted practices” (Krause and Williams 1997, 52) and seeks to 
broaden the meaning of the concept of security.  
 
In the next section, we will explore the debates surrounding the three main schools of 
thought that have sought to inform security studies through a critical lens (Waever 
2004). Rooted in a sociological point of engagement, the “Paris School” draws on 
Bourdieu’s notion of the “field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and Foucault’s notion 
of “governmentality” (Foucault 1979, Lemke 2002). The “Copenhagen School” calls 
for a broadening of the concept of “security” and the process of 
“securitization/desecuritization” of political issues. The “Welsh School” builds on 
Marxism and critical theory to establish an activist approach that emphasizes the 
concept of “emancipation,” or the freeing of people from oppressive structures.  
 
The Copenhagen School  
The Copenhagen School was developed in the institutional setting of the Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute and is most known for its theory of securitization, the concept 
of security sectors, and regional security complex theory. The Copenhagen School 
essentially combines Barry Buzan’s notion of sectoral analysis and Ole Waever’s 
concern with “securitization” in an attempt to conceptualize security as a process of 
social construction of threats, which includes securitizing actors who declare certain 
issues as urgent and pose a threat for the survival of the referent object (Buzan, Waever 
and Jaap de Wilde 1998, 36, Waever 1995). Once the audience accepts a threat, it 
legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures for neutralization of the threat. The 
“audience” is “those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional 
procedures because of the specific nature of some issue” (Buzan et al. 1998, 41). Buzan 
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et al. argue, “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of 
the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 23). The Copenhagen School, therefore, aims to distinguish between 
(1) the referent objects of security; (2) the securitizing actors; and (3) the functional 
actors affecting the dynamics of the securitization process (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). In 
order to provide a coherent framework of analysis of actors and referent objects of 
security, the Copenhagen School emphasizes five main levels of analysis: international 
system, international subsystem, unit, subunit, and the individual (Buzan et al. 1998, 6).  
 
In the formation of a critical approach to traditional security studies lies a social 
constructivist perspective that security threats do not exist independently from the 
discourse that labels them as such. Security is conceptualized as an act of speech in the 
securitization theory. Waever argues that security is a “speech act” that “does not refer 
to something more real; the utterance is the act.” He further argues that “something is a 
security problem when elites declare it to be so” (Waever 1995, 55). Relying solely on 
elites to make such significant decisions could create resentment and social unrest in 
society. This could especially become apparent if public opinion does not support the 
policies of the elite. Therefore, one must ask, “Who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security and 
with what effects?” (Buzan et al. 1998, 27). In order for something to become 
securitized, it must be presented as an existential threat and accepted by a significant 
portion of society. A situation could become quite dangerous if one could simply label 
an issue a security threat for it to become one.  
 
The Copenhagen School is influenced by the intellectual arguments of Barry Buzan, 
whose work points to a constructivist perspective, which is unwilling to accept the 
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given. Buzan criticizes the traditional concept of security as being “too narrowly 
founded” (Buzan 1983, 9). Thus, the Copenhagen School emphasizes the need to 
broaden the concept of security to include not only military, but also political, 
economic, societal, and environmental perspectives (Smith 2005). Although Buzan 
accepts neorealism’s claim that “the international political system is an anarchy, which 
is to say that its principal defining characteristic is the absence of overarching 
government” (Buzan 1983, 94), he sees the realist approach to security as being a “the 
struggle for power” (Buzan 1983, 22) as obsolete. Buzan argues that “The search for a 
referent object of security goes hand-in-hand with that of its necessary conditions, a link 
which becomes stronger as we discover that security has many referent objects” (Buzan 
1983, 13). He further notes that there is a “need to explore the referent objects of security 
on several different levels centered on individuals, states and the international system” 
(Buzan 1983, 13). Security is, therefore, “a relative concept,” and the “factors involved 
– life, health, status, wealth, freedom – are far more complicated, not infrequently 
contradictory, and plagued by the distinction between objective and subjective 
evaluation” (Buzan 1983, 18). The Copenhagen School attempts to denaturalize the 
social constructions that often become sediment, and emerge into relatively normal 
practices (Waltz 1959). Karin M. Fierke claims that the task is, therefore, “not only to 
criticize this sedimentation but also to understand how the dynamics of security work 
and thus to change them” (Fierke 2007, 102-103).  
 
Buzan argues that,  
“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability 
of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional 
integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of 
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security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of 
concerns about the conditions of existence. Where this range of concerns ceases 
to merit the urgency of the ‘security’ label and becomes part of everyday 
uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept” (Buzan 1991, 432). 
 
Clearer delineations of what constitutes security threats, the object to be secured, the 
strategies to do the securing, and whether those threats are significant versus 
insignificant might prove the Copenhagen School more applicable to address today’s 
contemporary global issues. Most security issues have a complex set of dynamics, 
which are often interlinked (Stone 2009, 3). Buzan notes that security issues “are woven 
together in a strong web of linkage” (Buzan 1991, 433). For instance, the “military 
sector relates to power relations” (Panic 2009, 31) and can affect all components of the 
state, as well as having an adverse effect on the “layers of social and individual interest” 
(Buzan 1983,119). The political sector can intertwine with authority relations (Panic 
2009, 31) and can be more ambiguous and difficult to identify in relation to military 
threats (Stone 2009, 5). The economic sector relates to economic relations (Panic 2009, 
31), which is often difficult to follow because, as Buzan points out, “the normal 
condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, aggressive competition and 
uncertainty” (Buzan 1983, 120). The environmental sector involves the relation 
between man and nature (Panic 2009, 31). Lastly, the societal sector involves the 
relations between social groups (Panic 2009, 31), which is often difficult to separate 
from the political sector in that societal threats are about identity and the balance (or 
lack thereof) that can be found within any given state (Stone 2009, 5). Addressing 
security dynamics is only a part of managing today’s global challenges. The 
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Copenhagen School fails to provide a coherent answer as to how the root causes of 
insecurity can be addressed and overcome.  
 
Building on the main framework of the Copenhagen School, Lene Hansen argues that 
securitization is only one possible way of distributing identity and difference. 
According to Hansen, processes of identity formation are complex, involving varying 
degrees of difference (Hansen 2006, 269). Hansen moves beyond the Copenhagen 
School’s notion of security as a speech act towards a view of foreign policy as 
intertextually constituted. Rens Van Munster notes that Hansen’s work “is an important 
addition to critical security studies. It draws attention to the fact that foreign policy texts 
are not just speech acts uttered by officials, but entities located within a larger textual 
web of societal discourses upon which they draw and depend” (Van Munster 2007, 
238). Scholars such as Hansen and Van Munster have contributed to the development 
of the Copenhagen School by expanding its framework of security, which includes 
distributing power and decision-making, to a wider cross-selection of society.  
 
Although Buzan agrees that the state may be a source of threat to its citizens, he argues 
that the state is “a necessary condition for individual security because, without the state, 
it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals” (Buzan 2001, 8). 
Therefore, scholars such as Ken Booth criticize the foundation of the Copenhagen 
School’s framework to be “a curious combination of liberal, post-structural and 
neorealist approaches,” which “pile(s) up…a bundle of conceptual problems and 
political issues” (Booth 2005, 271). Anthony Burke argues that “Even if threats are 
credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of 
exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and 
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rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary 
arrest and deportations powers” (Burke 2007, 11). Burke further notes that the 
existential threat to human beings may be real enough, but it should generate very 
different policy logic than that outlined by the Copenhagen School (Burke 2007, 12).  
 
The emphasis on the state as the ontological ground for security, even if there is a 
reservation about the risks involved in securitizing some topics (Williams 2003), 
questions the level of criticism the Copenhagen School extends. Bill McSweeney, one 
of the most renowned critics of the Copenhagen School, argues that Waever et al. offer 
“no basis for criteria on which to adjudicate between competing identify claims” and 
involve “moral judgment(s) to arbitrate between the competing moral decisions which 
underlie all claims to collective identity and all security polices which flow from them” 
(McSweeney 1999, 75). McSweeney claims that Buzan’s insistence that states remain 
the referent object is essentially a realist explanatory model. He further challenges the 
concept of securitization because it is a subjective process and errs on the side of danger 
because of its connection to the state. Furthermore, there is grave concern that citizens 
may acquiesce and sacrifice their civil liberties because political elites argue it is 
necessary for the sake of security. Arguably, the Copenhagen School is one of the least 
critical approaches among the critical security studies field. The influence of Buzan’s 
work on the Copenhagen School gives the impression that its theoretical underpinnings 
are more closely related to traditional approaches to security.  
 
The Welsh School  
The Welsh School draws inspiration from the Frankfurt School, with a focus on the 
individual, community, and identity in an attempt to transcend the state, military, and 
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national security as the core of the political structure in the contemporary global order 
(Wyn Jones 1999). Krause and Williams note that “to understand security from a 
broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the 
perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both 
intellectual and material), have shifted over time” (Krause and Williams 1997, 49). 
Thus, contrary to traditional security studies, including the Copenhagen School, the 
Welsh School avoids focusing on the state as the referent object or an entity to be 
secured and deconstructs prevailing orthodox claims about security. 
 
The Welsh School challenges the definition of security purely in terms of military 
threats to the state, and instead links the study of security to the expansive goal of human 
emancipation. Booth notes that “emancipation, theoretically, is security” (Booth 1991, 
319). The concept of emancipation refers to “the freeing of people (as individuals and 
groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out 
what they would otherwise freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those 
constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. 
Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security” (Booth 1991, 319). 
According to Booth, there are “three roles of true emancipation” (Booth 1999, 42): 
emancipation is a philosophical anchorage; emancipation is a strategic process; and 
emancipation is a tactical goal (Booth 1999, 43-46). Thus, emancipation “offers a theory 
of progress for politics, it provides a politics of hope, and it gives guidance to a politics 
of resistance” (Booth 1999, 46). He further argues that at the current state of the world, 
which is “marked by the interplay of globalization, patriarchy, world capitalism, 
industrialization, population densification, environmental stress, widening disparities 
between haves and have-nots and so on, the growth of a universal human rights culture 
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must be central to emancipatory policies” (Booth 1999, 46). Emancipation is the only 
everlasting hope of overcoming the most pressing contemporary issues, as it is based 
on ethics and social justice. True security cannot be achieved if one’s own security 
deprives another’s means of security. Thus, the Welsh School is positioned within an 
intellectually justice-oriented tradition where critical theory provides a foundational 
notion of emancipation. 
 
Booth later refined his definition, in the broadest of terms, as follows: 
“Emancipation is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to 
freeing people, as individuals and collectives, from contingent and structural 
oppressions. It is a discourse of human self-creation and the politics of trying to 
bring it about. Security and community are guiding principles, and at this stage 
of history the growth of a universal human rights culture is central to 
emancipatory politics. The concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics 
of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope 
for common humanity” (Booth 2005, 181).  
 
Rens Van Munster argues that the volume Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 
which Ken Booth edited, “outlines a theory of security that is structured around the 
conceptual triangle of security-community-emancipation. These three concepts are 
interrelated insofar as the value of security involves the emancipation from oppressive 
social structures and, subsequently, the remaking of community” (Van Munster 2007, 
236). Booth’s comprehensive definition of emancipation sets the bar high for scholars 
pursuing critical security studies. The Welsh School encourages scholars to stand on 
moral high ground in attempting to eradicate social injustices. According to Peoples and 
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Vaughan-Williams, Booth and Wyn Jones argue that “we should study security in order 
to learn more about how individuals can maximize their freedom from threats. The more 
secure people are from the threats of war, poverty, and oppression, the more 
emancipated they will be and vice versa” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 25). 
Booth argues, “Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. 
Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, 
is security” (Booth 1991, 319). 
 
Mohammed Ayoob disputes Booth’s position that security should be connected to 
“emancipation” and argues that “the problem with such semantic jugglery is that by a 
sleight of hand it totally obfuscates the meanings of both the concepts of security and 
emancipation. Booth’s definition refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be 
emancipated without being secure and vice versa” (Ayoob 1997, 126). He further argues 
that “such semantic acrobatics tend to impose a model of contemporary Western polities 
– of national states that have by and large solved their legitimacy problem and possess 
representative and responsive governments, which preside over socially mobile 
populations that are relatively homogenous and usually affluent and free from want – 
that are far removed from Third World realities” (Ayoob 1997, 127). Although Ayoob 
seems to be doubtful as to whether the state will actually ensure the security of its 
citizens, he argues that “an explicitly state-centric definition of security is likely to 
provide an analytical tool of tremendous value that should not be sacrificed at the altar 
of utopian thinking” (Ayoob 1997, 128). He further argues that “to posit emancipation 
as synonymous with security and the panacea for all the ills plaguing Third World states 
can be the height of naiveté” (Ayoob 1997, 127). Ayoob’s belief that the referent object 
should be the state and not the individual – as the Welsh School argues – seems to 
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position him comfortably within the realist school of thought. However, Ayoob also 
argues that “in many places the state is not the guarantor of security but is rather the 
greatest threat to its citizens” (Krause and Williams 1997, 44, Ayoob 1984). Therefore, 
it appears as if Ayoob is uncertain as to which theoretical paradigms he is most content 
with.  
 
The Paris School  
Security is not the opposite of insecurity (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 457). 
The Paris School was initially established by a group of multidisciplinary scholars, 
namely from the fields of sociology, law, criminology, and political theory, who shared 
a common interest in policing as a structural practice, the polarization of societal 
insecurities, and the structuration of internal security fields (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 
449). The Paris School is concerned with the intricacies of the security dynamic and 
seeks to answer questions such as how to define “security,” who is properly equipped 
to “do” security, and how we can move past our preconceived ideas about who should 
be and should not be “secure”. Led by Thierry Balzacq and Didier Bigo, the Paris 
School emphasizes the following: the process of internal and external security merging; 
the transformation of security agencies over time; and the practical side and application 
of discourse (Waever, Ole 2004). When referring to Didier Bigo’s empirical work, Ole 
Waever notes that he has shown “how internal and external security merge as agencies 
compete for the gradually deterritorialized tasks of traditional police, military and 
customs. Also, they jointly produce a new threat image by constantly connecting 
immigration, organized crime and terror. Insecurity is largely a product of security 
discourses and security policy” (Waever 2004, 9). The Paris School points to the 
relatively recent development of a transnational space in which a variety of actors 
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engage in risk management across borders and societies, which at times has blended the 
spheres of internal and external security. 
 
The second main focus of the Paris School is the transformation of security agencies. 
In the United States, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of 
Defense, and the National Security Agency were largely responsible for external 
security, whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation was the agency responsible for 
internal security. However, after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, 
the security field exploded into a multibillion-dollar sector, with numerous private 
sector companies winning contracts to provide both internal and external security-type 
services for the U.S. government. Now, more hard-security agencies – not agencies such 
as the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Institute 
for Peace – are at the “center of the security field because their productive power seems 
to be best suited to alleviating contemporary challenges” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 
459). This is concerning because it presents a danger of the “emergence and 
consolidation of professional networks of security agencies that try to monopolize the 
truth about danger and unease through the power-knowledge nexus” (C.A.S.E. 
Collective 2006, 457). Therefore, securitization might become more about “the capacity 
to control borders, to manage threats, to define endangered identities and to delineate 
the spheres of orders” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 457). The emphasis on hard-security 
perspectives reinforces a securitization of all issues, including those related to human 
security.  
 
Bigo, in particular, talks about the field of security professionals who encompass the 
security network. He stresses that the environment of security associates functions as a 
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“field of force, or magnetic field” (Bigo, 2008, 22), which creates a homogeneity of 
interests and threats, and does not stress individuality or impartiality. However, due to 
domestic constraints and global events, this type of conformity is difficult to enforce, 
thus creating a “field of struggles” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 458). Lastly, “the field 
of (in)security professionals is a transversal field, the trajectory of which reconfigures 
formerly autonomous social universes and shifts the borders of these former realms to 
include them totally or partially in the new field” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 458). The 
Paris School does not address the broader processes of political, economic, and social 
change that might impact identity.  
 
The Paris School poses the most significant challenge to the main concept of 
securitization found in the Copenhagen School (Balzacq 2005, Waever 1995). 
Securitization is defined as the process “in which the socially and politically successful 
‘speech act’ of labeling an issue a ‘security issue’ removes it from the realm of normal 
day-to-day politics, casting it as an ‘existential threat’ calling for and justifying extreme 
measures” (Williams 1998, 435). Balzacq points to how the combination of the 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary “constitutes the total speech act situation” 
(Balzacq 2005, 175). Jurgen Habermas summed this triadic characterization as the 
following: “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something 
through acting in saying something” (Habermas 1984, 289). The Paris School is also 
concerned with the practical side and application of discourse and purposes to establish 
a more strategic or pragmatic approach to addressing security.  
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Balzacq writes:  
“The speech act model is, therefore, born out of an attempt to propose the idea 
that securitization is a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target 
audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a 
specific development (oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an 
immediate policy to alleviate it. In this regard, the revision I propose here is to 
recast the speech act model of security. By integrating strategic purposes into the 
equation, my approach elevates securitization above its normative setting and, in 
so doing, ensconces it in the social context, a field of power struggles in which 
securitizing actors align on a security issue to swing the audience’s support 
toward a policy or course of action” (Balzacq 2005, 173).  
 
Balzacq further argues that if security is defined by just a simple speech act, it is reduced 
to a conventional procedure, that which he likens to marriage (Balzacq 2005, 176). The 
reshaping of the concept of (in)security needs to be analyzed from all of its intricate 
angles, and not just from the mainstream security-political nexus. Perhaps it is not so 
uncommon that when one is faced with a security dilemma, the more one tries to 
securitize the environment as a means to establish “security,” and the more one creates, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, a feeling of insecurity (C.A.S.E. Collective 
2006, 461). It is important to not fall into a security trap and to remember that 
“desecuritization, via reassuring discourses or different techniques of protection such 
as video cameras, does not always reduce insecurity or increase confidence in the 
political” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 457). This includes challenging the notion that the 
security field is “constituted by groups and institutions that authorize themselves and 
that are authorized to state what security is” (Bigo 2000, 195). One might argue that 
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citizens who live in a relatively democratic society would be more eager to demand 
their civil and human rights when compared to individuals who are living under tyranny, 
or who are experiencing a threat from abroad. However, on the contrary, the 
overemphasis of the security-political nexus might prevent democratic societies from 
demanding civil liberties and freedom. For instance, after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
on September 11, 2001, Americans witnessed a squeezing of civil liberties with the 
passing of the Patriot Act and an increase in personal threats to Americans from the 
blowback caused by the two U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. 
 
Although the early critics of traditional security studies found it difficult to rally around 
one specific definition of the concept of security, they sought to broaden the conception 
of security with a wider agenda and changed practice. Krause notes, “Scholarship that 
has challenged the unchanging nature of the security dilemma has not been met with 
open arms by the traditional literature” (Krause 1996, 19). Therefore, the test faced by 
proponents of the field is “to present a coherent and intellectually robust research 
agenda that generates interesting debates and insights into the complexities and 
potentials of contemporary (and past) security issues” (Krause 1996, 11). As we will 
see in the next section, the human security paradigm aims to fill the gap in the literature 
by broadening the notion of security and the referent object to be secured, and by 
providing an awareness of the conditions that impact human security.  
 
Human security  
The human security paradigm developed during a time when scholars and practitioners 
began to question whether traditional approaches to security were appropriate for a 
world that was becoming more interconnected and interdependent. Jolly and Basu Ray 
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argue that the post-Cold War era presented an even more fundamental challenge to the 
supremacy and efficacy of an international state-based system (Jolly and Basu Ray 
2007). Krause notes, “With the war in Kosovo, the genocide in Rwanda and the collapse 
of state authority in places such as Somalia, many advocates and analysts began to argue 
that the international community could no longer tolerate abuses of human rights on a 
massive scale, standing by as thousands of lives were placed at risk in the name of the 
abstract principle of sovereignty or non-intervention” (Krause 2008, 73). In contrast to 
traditional security studies, human security emphasizes the individual as the referent 
object to be secured (Liotta and Owen 2006, 38). Human security strives to address the 
structural causes of insecurity, which were largely ignored by government institutions 
in the past, bringing them to the forefront of the global agenda. The human security 
paradigm creates space for non-Western discourses on security, and reconfigures the 
global socioeconomic system to empower communities so they may have more control 
over their resources and decision-making capabilities. Thus, transnational, intra-state 
factors, and socioeconomic conditions demanded far greater consideration within the 
security calculus. The importance on the security and empowerment of the individual 
has significant implications on the changing nature of security discourses and how 
policy practices are understood and analyzed (Chandler and Hyrek 2011).  
 
Human security, however, remains a contested subject. On the one hand, the concept of 
human security is regarded as a progressive and even radical paradigm; yet it is also 
perceived as being tainted by association with the imposition of neoliberal practices and 
values on non-Western spaces, or as legitimizing attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Chandler and Hyrek 2011). The human security paradigm has been slow to make a 
substantial theoretical impact, namely, because it has been difficult to develop it into 
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more than just a policy-oriented discourse. Critics argue that many of the existing 
theoretical foundations of human security have not been able to transition human 
security into an intellectually autonomous, critical investigation (Chandler and Hyrek 
2011). Therefore, human security remains heavily criticized as an approach created by 
the policy community for the policy community. This research project seeks to address 
the argument that the field is too policy-oriented, through applying a human security 
spectrum that particularly highlights the conditions that either enhance or threaten 
economic security following the intervention of the international private sector in fragile 
and conflict-affected states. Furthermore, applicable theoretical perspectives, namely 
peace economics, peacebuilding, and development economics, are woven throughout 
this dissertation.  
 
The two main approaches to the human security paradigm often seem at odds with each 
other. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initially put forth a broad 
definition of human security – “freedom from want and freedom from fear” – in 1993 
(United Nations Development Programme 1993, Bosold 2011, Chandler and Hyrek 
2011). The concept was further polished by the UNDP in 1994, and was elaborated 
upon by the Commission on Human Security in 2003 (Ogata and Sen 2003). The narrow 
definition of human security – “freedom from fear” – was promoted by the Canadian 
(Axworthy 1997) and Norwegian governments, and later utilized as a reference by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, for the creation of the 
concept of the “right to protect” (R2P).  
 
In negotiating the Landmine Ban Convention (1997) and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998), Canada followed a narrower approach, “because 
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we believe this is where the concept of human security has the greatest value added – 
when it complements existing international agendas already focused on promoting 
national security, human rights and human development” (Canada 2000, 3). Caroline 
Thomas notes that the two strands are “inextricably interrelated” (Thomas 2004, 353), 
yet the nature and extent of threats that comprise human security may differ (Croft 2008, 
509). The section below offers a discussion surrounding the two approaches to human 
security.  
Table 1: Main Concepts of Human Security (Bajpai 2000, 48) 
  
Broad approach to human security  
The broad approach to human security combines the concepts of “freedom from want 
and freedom from fear.” One of the key scholars of the broad approach to human 
security, Ramesh Thakur, argues for security to be “stretched horizontally, to embrace 
issues beyond just the military; vertically, moving up to embrace regional and global 
structures, and down to local and individual identities” (Thakur 2006, 1). He further 
notes that “human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical life-
threatening dangers, regardless of whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic 
 Human Security  
Security for whom 
(referent object) 
Primarily individuals 
Values at stake 
(security of what values) 
Personal safety and individual freedom 
Security from what 
(threats and risks) 
Non-traditional and traditional 
Security by what means Force as a secondary instrument, to be used 
primarily for cosmopolitan ends, and collectively; 
sanctions, human development, and human 
governance as key instruments of individual-
centered security 
Balance of power is of limited utility; soft power 
is increasingly important 
Cooperation between states, international 
organizations, and NGOs can be effective and 
sustained 
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activities or natural events, whether they lie within or outside states, and whether they 
are direct or structural. It is ‘human-centered’ in that its principal focus is on people 
both as individuals and as communal groups. It is ‘security oriented’ in that the focus is 
on freedom from fear, danger and threat” (Thakur 2004, 348).  
 
Rising concerns about contemporary global issues, such as famine, protracted conflicts, 
and migration, increasingly gained the attention of scholars and practitioners of 
international relations at the end of the Cold War. The UNDP’s 1993 Human 
Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 1993) introduced the 
concept of human security as a shift from the security of the state, with its focus on the 
military protection of a country’s borders, to the security of people by a variety of 
measures, with a focus on protecting people from a diversity of threats. The report 
asserted, “New concepts of human security must stress the security of people, not only 
of nations” (United Nations Development Programme 1993, 2). Ryerson Christie points 
out that the concept of human security was formulated by “liberal scholars and 
policymakers, and that critical scholars subsequently embraced a framework that by 
then had acquired significant conceptual and political baggage. Despite claims of its 
inherent fuzziness as a concept, many of the articulations of human security have largely 
been consistent with broader international processes of global interventionism to 
alleviate poverty and resolve the causes of conflict” (Ryerson 2010, 171). Thus, at the 
outset, the human security paradigm was constructed to address a broad set of global 
security issues. According to Mike Bourne, “Human security is no disparate list of ‘bad 
things that can happen,’ but the inheritor of peace research’s interdisciplinary concern 
for human welfare and the recognition that academic and practical divisions of the world 
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into social, economic and political spheres tends to neglect the violence done by 
structures and processes beyond war” (Bourne 2013, 189). 
Table 2: Possible Types of Human Security Threats (UNDP 1994, UN 2009)  
 
The subsequent UNDP Human Development Report, published in 1994, builds on the 
previous 1993 edition. The report contends that human security should be expanded to 
include seven major threats to human security: community, economic, environment, 
food, health, personal, and political. Arguably, both the 1993 and 1994 Human 
Development Reports are comfortably positioned within the broad approach to human 
security (United Nations Development Programme 1994, 23). The 1994 report further 
argues that human security is “the safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease 
and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities” (United Nations Development 
Programme 1999, 36). The report not only addresses a broad array of human security 
threats, but also calls for a new framework to tackle these threats. The main contributors 
quickly gained global notoriety because of their determination to promote an approach 
that would address “freedom from fear and freedom from want” for all individuals. The 
report became the seminal text that spawned widespread usage by governments, UN 
officials, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and academics (Macfarlane and 
Type of Security Examples of Main Threats 
Community security  Inter-ethnic, religious, and other identity-based 
tensions  
Economic security  Persistent poverty, unemployment  
Environment security Environmental degradation, resource depletion, 
natural disasters, pollution  
Food security Hunger, famine  
Health security  Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, 
lack of access to basic health care  
Personal security Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic 
violence, child labor 
Political security  Political repression, human rights abuses 
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Foong Khong 2006). Marlies Glasius points out that “this document introduced many 
of the associations that have become central to our understanding of human security: 
the opposition to state security, the argument that human security is indivisible (and 
therefore the global rich have not just a moral but also a practical interest in the security 
of the poor), and the return to Roosevelt’s classic ‘freedom from fear / freedom from 
want’ formula to capture the two primary elements of human security” (Glasius 2008, 
32). 
 
Under the leadership of the UN Secretary General of the Commission on Human 
Security, a group of scholars and practitioners joined forces to establish a human 
security framework entitled Human Security Now in 2003. The Report on the 
Commission of Human Security argues, “The international community urgently needs 
a new paradigm of security” (Ogata and Sen 2003, 2).  
The report further argues,  
“The security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state 
security advocated in the 17th century. According to that traditional idea, the 
state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens. State power 
and state security would be established and expanded to sustain order and peace. 
However, in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors 
have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of 
security. Yet, it often fails to fulfill its security obligations – and at times has 
even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must 
now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – to human 
security” (Ogata and Sen 2003, 2).  
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The report continues to claim that, “Human security complements state security, 
enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people 
against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower 
them to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to forge a global alliance to strengthen the 
institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the state with a global 
world. Human security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, 
of development” (Ogata and Sen 2003, 2, 4). The Human Security Now report further 
declared that adopting a human security approach requires five essential policies: 
placing human security on the security agenda; strengthening humanitarian action; 
respecting human rights and humanitarian law; disarming people and fighting crime; 
and preventing conflict and respecting citizenship (Ogata and Sen 2003, 24). Human 
security is concerned with “downside risks,” or the “insecurities that threaten human 
survival or the safety of daily life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or 
expose human beings to the uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable 
people to abrupt penury related to economic downturns demand that special attention 
be paid to the dangers of sudden deprivation. Human security demands protection from 
these dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with – and when 
possible overcome – these hazards” (Ogata and Sen 2003, 8).  
 
Oftentimes, due to budgetary, institutional, and policy constraints, development and 
humanitarian aid agencies focus on providing a first tier of support, such as the 
provision of education or food aid in fragile and conflict-affected environments. 
However, without addressing the root causes of societal ills, human suffering will likely 
continue. A human security approach emphasizes the importance of tackling the 
fundamental triggers of insecurity and developing the capacity for communities to 
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mitigate conflict indicators in order to build sustainable paths to peace. For instance, a 
human security development project would ensure that vulnerable groups such as “child 
soldiers or street children received some basic education that might assist in enabling 
them to move away from violence and crime as their sole sources of sustenance” 
(Glasius 2008, 35), or address the challenges farmers face in securing a good yield for 
both consumption and to sell on the market.  
 
The broad approach to human security has a strong link to Johan Galtung’s concept of 
“positive peace,” the notion that systemic issues must be tackled in order to eradicate 
tensions that lead to conflict (Galtung 1969). Furthermore, “positive peace” refers to a 
“social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated and in which there 
is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural 
violence. It denotes the continuing presence of an equitable and just social order, as well 
as ecological harmony” (Barash and Webel 2009, 7). In contrast, “negative peace” is 
essentially the absence of war or armed conflict.  
 
David Roberts notes that the UNDP’s 2005 Human Development Report (HDR) links 
the human condition, globally, with “development” via institutions and processes. 
Building on previous editions – the first one dates back to 1993 – the report determines 
that unless the security nexus is tackled, equitable development and universal security 
are unattainable. The HDR ties together human security, peace studies, and the Welsh 
School’s emphasis on emancipation. Chapter Two notes that “extreme inequalities in 
opportunity and life chance have a direct bearing on what people can be and what they 
can do – that is, on human capabilities” (United Nations Development Programme 
2005, 52). Thus, the report supports the broad approach to human security, which takes 
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a social justice approach to international relations. Chapter Five could act as a bridge 
between the broad and narrow strands of human security as it focuses on violent 
conflict, and examines the socioeconomic impact of war on the economies and peoples 
of states (Roberts 2006, 256). By analyzing both the financial and social impacts of war 
on society, the HDR provides important insight into the systemic effects of violence 
and conflict.  
 
Narrow approach to human security  
The narrow school limits the parameters of human security to focus on violent threats 
against the individual. According to Mack, greater analytical value can be attained by 
focusing only on “freedom from fear” (Kerr 2007, 95). He argues, “If the term 
‘insecurity’ embraces almost all forms of harm to individuals – from affronts to dignity 
to genocide – it loses any real descriptive power” (Mack 2004, 367). MacFarlane 
counters this argument by noting that “violence is only one threat among many facing 
individuals. Protection from violence gives little solace to the starving or those 
threatened by potentially fatal preventable diseases or when individuals lack the 
resources to control their lives” (Macfarlane 2004, 369). A narrow approach to ensuring 
security fails to acknowledge the interconnectedness of the structural causes of 
insecurity, such as poverty and inequality, that often exacerbate conflict.  
 
The narrow approach to human security gained more attention when representatives of 
11 governments met in Lysoen, Norway, in 1998, to establish the Human Security 
Network, where members agreed on a common security agenda (Small 2001, Ogata 
1999, Axworthy 2001). The aim of the network was to combat poverty, contribute to 
sustainable development and sustained broad income growth, promote respect for 
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human rights and international humanitarian law, and strengthen the rule of law and 
good governance. The HSN further sought to foster cultures of peace and peaceful 
conflict resolution, control instruments of violence, and end international impunity for 
gross violations of international law. In practice, the HSN focused on the freedom from 
fear aspects of human security and through working together in the HSN, four of the 
key members, Norway, Canada, Switzerland, and Austria, began to lobby international 
institutions to ban anti-personnel landmines and address issues such as small arms and 
light weapons, human rights, refugees, and internally displaced persons, among other 
global challenges. The HSN also promoted certain targets – civilian protection and R2P 
– to enhance human security. Mohammed Ayoob appears to criticize the concept of 
R2P by noting, “realist considerations usually have to be dressed up in moral garb in 
order to assuage skeptics, silence critics, and provide emotional comfort both to the 
government decision makers and to the leaders of the international community, who 
may have to endorse such decisions or at least live with their consequences” (Ayoob 
2003, 27).  
 
The Human Security Report, produced by the Human Security Centre, discusses war 
and peace in the 21st century, and provides a framework for the narrow approach to 
human security (Human Security Centre 2005). David Roberts notes that “many 
traditionalists may well lean towards Mack’s report, which identifies its subject area in 
terms of fairly fixed political violence, with both ‘political’ and ‘violence’ quite 
narrowly defined” (Roberts 2006, 249). For “pragmatic and methodological reasons,” 
the report is in line with the “narrow” approach since, according to Mack, the broader 
approach to human security has limited value for policy analyses. The report provides 
an incredible amount of quantitative research on “the incidence, severity, causes and 
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consequences of global violence” (Human Security Centre 2005, viii). It further claims 
that there was a significant decline in overall armed political violence since the early 
1990s, and largely attributes this finding to the work of the United Nations in managing 
and mitigating large-scale conflict. Peter Schwab questions the report’s findings by 
arguing that if one were to include the numbers of civilians dying from wars and 
“apprentices – famine, hunger and disease” (Schwab 2001, 3), the figures would be 
different. By not including an in-depth study of the indirect costs, including the human 
costs of war, Mack loses an opportunity to provide a more holistic understanding of the 
structural causes of violence and the detrimental effects of armed conflict on societies 
and communities.  
 
Challenges facing human security  
The most unexplored potential of the human security paradigm is how to strengthen a 
combined “freedom from want and fear” approach in one structure. Christie argues that 
“human security has been able to work for, and to justify, development and security 
policies” (Christie 2010, 174). However, in practice, the security-development nexus is 
a sensitive and contested debate. Marlies Glasius notes, “There is a legacy of suspicion 
and competition between the developmental and military realms, both at the policy-
design level and on the ground” (Glasius 2008, 38). The most suitable response for 
international organizations, governments, the military, and the humanitarian and NGO 
community is one that many scholars and practitioners spend a considerable amount of 
time discussing and writing about (Stern and Ojendal 2010). One example of the 
seemingly opposing cultures can be seen with the engagement of U.S. government in 
Iraq after 2003. U.S. provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq were tasked with 
developing relations with local community leaders and empowering provincial 
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governments to administer services and follow good governance practices.  The 
reconstruction teams consisted of an array of development, diplomatic, and military 
perspectives, which provided key expertise to implement reconstruction projects. 
However, the seemingly opposing professional cultures oftentimes prevented in-depth 
understanding and cooperation among members and their counterparts in Iraq. Tension 
and misunderstanding between the security apparatus and the development community 
about their modus operandi are often elevated during conflict and disaster situations 
(Gilmore 2011). 
 
P.H. Liotta and Kyle Grayson express concern that human security could be used to 
justify state actions that might run counter to the aspirations of human security (Liotta 
2002, Grayson 2003). The 2000 White House National Security Strategy emphasized 
U.S. engagement in the areas of “encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade 
and sustainable development” (The White House 2000, Macrae and Leader 2000). 
However, as a means to carrying out the “Global War on Terror” – led by former U.S. 
President George W. Bush – the U.S. government blurred the lines between domestic 
and international security policy after 9/11. An emphasis on traditional security 
discourse was first expressed in President Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002, 
and in the National Security Strategy of 2002. A continuing emphasis on “hard” power 
resulted in two major invasions and subsequent occupations overseas: Afghanistan, in 
2001-2014; and Iraq, in 2003-2011. Jonathan Gilmore articulates that there is a fine line 
between traditional concepts of security, development, and a holistic approach to human 
security. Upon reflection on U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, Gilmore notes, 
“The use of human security-like principles and the concern for local engagement and 
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cultural sensitivity do not automatically equate to the genuine empowerment of local 
populations in shaping the future of their country” (Gilmore 2011, 22).  
 
Human security emerged as a challenger to the traditional concepts of security. Based 
on two main paradigms, the broad school (freedom from want and fear) and the narrow 
school (freedom from fear), human security continues its struggle to present a coherent 
analytical narrative. Despite having been established by a group of non-traditional 
scholars and practitioners, human security still struggles for legitimacy within the 
critical security studies field. Therefore, one may ask how relevant human security is to 
critical security studies given the amount of criticism it has received from critical 
security scholars. Keith Krause called the broad school “nothing more than a shopping 
list; it involves slapping the label of human security on a wide range of issues that have 
no necessary link” (Krause 2004, 367). Andrew Mack asserts that “a concept that 
aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing” (Mack 2004, 367). In 
reference to human security, Barry Buzan asserts that “the cost to be paid is loss of 
analytical purchase on collective actors, both as the main agents of security provision 
and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right” (Buzan 2004, 370). Perhaps 
the field of human security would gain more acceptance if human security scholars were 
to focus more on the development of theoretical frameworks, rather than policy-oriented 
ones. Arguably, this change in focus would help the human security paradigm to gain 
more legitimacy within the field of academia. 
 
Keith Krause points out that many scholars from the global South are concerned that 
the idea of human security promotes an expanded agenda that could give rise to an 
unfettered right of intervention in the internal affairs of states (Krause 2008, 73). Critics 
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are further skeptical about the emphasis on themes that protect the safety of individuals 
over states, such as “just cause,” or the responsibility to protect (R2P), as individuals 
are usually governed by states which are oftentimes more concerned with their own 
national interests. However, according to advocates of the narrow school, it is the 
responsibility of international institutions to intervene and protect people who are under 
threat or attack. For instance, interventionists argue that the international coalition to 
topple Saddam Hussein freed Iraqis from an authoritarian dictator who had oppressed 
his people. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty notes 
that human protection can only be considered when there is “serious and irreparable 
harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of large-scale loss of 
life, actual or apprehend” (Evans and Sahnoun 2001, xii.). The United Nations further 
emphasizes the responsibility to protect concept as the following: “Each individual state 
has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means” 
(United Nations World Summit 2005, 138). The United Nations is obliged to protect 
people from heinous acts and when peaceful means are inadequate, urges the 
international community to take stronger measures, through Chapter VII measures 
under the UN Charter, including, but not limited to, the collective use of force 
authorized by the Security Council (United Nations World Summit 2005, 138-139). 
When “national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (United Nations World 
Summit 2005, 139), the United Nations must take the appropriate action to protect 
civilians.  
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Caroline Thomas argues that “the two key aspects of human security are not mutually 
exclusive; indeed, neither aspect is sufficient for the enjoyment of human security and 
each depends on the existence of the other for its own full realization. An individual 
and his/her community must be free from fear to reliably enjoy freedom from want, and 
without freedom from want there can be no freedom from fear” (Thomas 2007, 115). 
She thus argues for a blended approach to human security, noting that “the protection 
of the vulnerable via the reduction of risk provides the common core, along with a 
holistic understanding of the constitution of vulnerability in our world” (Thomas 2004, 
353). International conflict analysis data sets indicate that all seven dimensions of 
human security are increasingly inseparable, especially in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. The assurance of economic security, in particular, is crucial for communities that 
have experienced conflict, as they are disproportionately affected by poverty and 
hunger, environmental degradation, inequality, economic crisis, and unemployment. By 
addressing both monetary and non-monetary factors, economic security provides an 
integrated approach to mitigating the structural causes of insecurity and armed conflict 
and builds the resilience of societies to absorb threats to human security. The next 
section will provide an overview of the economic security spectrum and the conditions 
that enhance and threaten economic security following the intervention of the 
international private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions.  
 
Economic security – synthesizing literatures  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, human security is a conglomeration of seven key 
pillars to combat human insecurities (community security, economic security, 
environmental security, food security, health security, personal security, and political 
security). Considering the uncertainty of human security during the timeframe of this 
research project and taking into consideration that most respondents were uninterested 
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in commenting on other facets of human security, I choose to investigate a combination 
of the macro and micro conditions that impact economic security. A multidimensional 
approach to economic security presented a holistic picture of the environment in the 
KRI. Furthermore, I was able to evaluate the circumstances related to economic security 
in detail by highlighting just one dimension of human security. Economic security, 
which is closely linked to the other human security dimensions, adds value to the study 
of human security by acknowledging the importance of both monetary and non-
monetary inputs – such as labor, good governance, public-private partnerships, social 
capital, and natural resources – to socioeconomic growth. In addition to the literature 
on human security, the economic security spectrum utilized to collect empirical data 
was informed by the literature on development economics, peacebuilding, and peace 
economics. The second half of this chapter will provide an in-depth outline of the 
conditions that may either enhance or threaten economic security following the 
intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-affected region 
or state. The empirical chapters will present a summary of the findings on the impact of 
the Turkish private sector, in particular the construction and export sectors and 
associated business activities, on economic security in the KRI.  
 
Development economics  
The earliest Western theory of development economics appeared with the concept of 
mercantilism in the 17th century. The most recent iterations of development economics 
emerged as reactions to the failure of previous theories to impact international 
development and to the narrowly defined neoclassical theories, such as the Washington 
consensus, which argued for a competitive free-market approach to development (Brett 
1993, Adelman and Thorbecke 1989, Cameron 2000, Harris et al. 1997). According to 
Sanat Kumar Saha, development economics is the “area where vital issues relating to 
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externalities and increasing returns to scale along with the logic of government 
intervention with its quality and quantity may be explored with reason and fact” (Kumar 
Saha 1994, 262). Development economics pursues a multidimensional approach to 
economic development, through monitoring non-monetary factors, such as access to 
education, infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services, equality 
of income distribution, macroeconomic policies, and good governance (Stiglitz 1998a, 
Stiglitz 1998b, Stiglitz 1999, Kumar Saha 1994). International indexes such as the 
World Development Report (Yusuf 2009), the Millennium Development Goals (Sachs 
and McArther 2005, Pogge 2005), and the more recent Sustainable Development Goals 
(Sachs 2015) provide strategies to reduce poverty and ensure global socioeconomic 
development.  
 
Peace economics and peacebuilding  
According to Raul Caruso, “The positive ‘side’ of peace economics emphasizes the 
study of conflict, which is interpreted as a strategic destructive interaction between 
rational agents. The normative ‘side’ of peace economics is the study of economic 
policies intended to minimize the unproductive components within economics, thereby 
also reducing the risk of outbreak of actual conflicts” (Caruso 2010, 10). Scholars such 
as Paul Collier have written extensively on the economic consequences of civil war, and 
the deterrence theory of encouraging the private sector to pressure governments and 
non-state actors to pursue peace and stability to ensure the protection of the market 
(Collier 1999). The development of international indexes, such as the Peace Dividend, 
that monitor “positive peace” and “negative peace” and predict an escalation of conflict 
or violence can dramatically improve a society’s ability to address and defuse a conflict 
(Collier 1995, Fontanel Samson and Spalanzani 1995, McCandless 2012). Structured 
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institutional mechanisms, such as national, district, and local peace councils; national 
peace platforms; a designated government department or ministry of peace building; 
and the implementation of legislation that supports peace building efforts can strengthen 
the resilience of a society to absorb internal and external threats to human security. 
Societies need strong coping, adaptive, and transformative capacities to strengthen 
resilient social structures (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013, United Nations Development 
Programme 2011). 
 
The Global Peace Index (GPI), established by the Institute for Economics and Peace 
(IEP) and the Vision of Humanity, was the first study to rank the nations of the world 
by their peacefulness (Institute for Economics and Peace 2010, McConaghy 2012, 
Brauer and Tepper-Marlin 2009, Fischer and Hanke 2009). The GPI defines peace as 
the “absence of violence or fear of violence” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015), 
a concept referred to as “negative peace” (Galtung 1964, Galtung and Fischer 2013, 12, 
Van der Wusten 1996). The 23 GPI indicators are broken into three domains – ongoing 
conflict, societal safety, and security and militarization – and measure several key areas 
to define the status of peace, such as perceived criminality in society, security officers 
and police, homicides, access to weapons, organized internal conflict, political 
instability, political terror, displaced people, the electoral process, the functioning of 
government, civil liberties, and corruption perceptions (Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2014). In 2014, Iraq ranked 159th out of 162 countries, with a score of 3.377 on 
the GPI (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014b, 6). In 2015, out of 162 countries, 
Iraq fell to 161st place, with a score of 3.444 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015a, 
9).  
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The IEP also analyzes the economic costs of violence and containment spending, which 
is defined as “economic activity that is related to the consequences or prevention of 
violence where the violence is directed against people or property” (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014a, 4). Iraq, and in particular the KRI, experienced the 
devastation associated with a continuation of conflict since the nation invaded Iran in 
1980 under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds in what is 
known as the Al-Anfal campaign, followed by armed conflict between the two main 
Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK. The region was further distressed economically due 
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1990, the subsequent international sanctions on the 
country, Saddam’s sanctions on the KRI, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, and the most 
recent sectarian fighting and ongoing battle with Daesh. GDP per capita equaled $5,374 
in 1980, $3,200 in 1985, and fell to $1,253 in 1991 and further to $485 in 1993; and it 
increased to $2,400 in 2002 (Yousif 2012, Alnasrawi 1994, 152, Ghareeb and 
Dougherty 2004, 65, Wim, Santos-Paulino, and McGillivray 2011). In 2012, the IEP 
indicated that the per capita expenditure on violence containment in Iraq totaled $26,835 
billion, or 14.9 percent of GDP, with the cost per capita equal to $815. The IEP indicated 
that the overwhelming majority of violence containment expenditures were a result of 
military spending, at $389 per capita, trailed by the cost of homicides at $143; GDP 
losses from conflict, $110; internal security, $93; terrorism, $43; deaths from internal 
conflict, $18; private security, $8; IDPs and refugees, $4; incarceration, $4; and fear, $2 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2014a, 20). The exorbitant amount spent on aspects 
of “negative peace” highlighted not only the moral imperative, but also the financial 
incentives to end the conflict and support sustainable peace in the country (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014a, 14).  
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Due to criticism over its emphasis on “negative peace,” the IEP pursued a more 
ambitious conceptualization for “positive peace” (Galtung 1996), defined as “the 
attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies” 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2015c, 2). Attitudes describe relationships, beliefs, 
norms, and preferences within society and affect how people and groups cooperate in 
society. Manners and opinions that are present within a society and the structures that 
define them influence the way institutions – the formal bodies created by governments 
or other groups – operate. Structures that contribute to peaceful societies can be both 
formal and informal and serve as a shared social code that is broadly applicable to most 
individuals in society. The IEP argues, “Informally, it could be as simple as the protocol 
for queuing or formally, as complex as tax law. Interactions are often governed by 
informal rules and structures, such as politeness, societal views on morality or the 
acceptance or rejection of other’s behaviours” (Institute for Economics and Peace 
2015b, 11). The IEP has defined eight positive peace factors, known as the Pillars of 
Peace, that create peaceful societies: “[a] sound business environment, good relations 
with neighbors, high levels of human capital, acceptance of the rights of others, low 
levels of corruption, well-functioning government, free flow of information, and 
equitable distribution of resources” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015b). 
Furthermore, the cycle of peace requires progress in “positive peace,” so that “[there is] 
less violence and more nonviolent resolution of grievances, society creates stronger 
business environments, better functioning government and higher social cohesion, more 
resources [are] freed to invest in Positive Peace, [and] society reaches higher levels of 
well being, is more productive and wealthier” (Institute for Economics and Peace 
2015b). Positive peace is more favorable, as countries with “higher levels of positive 
peace have less variability in their changes in peace, resulting in a more predictable 
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environment and demonstrating their resilience” (Institute for Economics and Peace 
2015b, 14). The Pillars of Peace is an effective tool to analyze human security, as it 
leans on more than 900 different indices, data sets, and attitudinal surveys to understand 
the factors that impact conflict, peace, and resilience.  
 
This study does not ignore the premise that the private sector has, in some conflict and 
post-conflict environments, instigated violence by ensuring that power and wealth 
remains in the hands of elites, by extracting natural resources, exploiting workers, 
failing to provide fair compensation to the masses, and enslaving people to perform 
tasks in servitude-type situations. Oftentimes, globalization and increased flows of labor 
and commodities have exacerbated the private sector’s unwillingness to contribute to 
long-term socioeconomic development. For instance, the World Bank’s strict 
liberalization regulations on low-income and developing countries, such as Haiti, stifled 
the growth of the local private sector. The flooding of the country with inexpensive 
imports crippled the local private sector, in particular the agriculture sector, in part 
because it was cheaper to purchase imported goods than locally grown products. The 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report and the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business Index highlight the argument that peaceful countries often have 
sound regulatory environments, coupled with high levels of competitiveness and 
economic freedom. However, it is key that stakeholders, including local governments, 
unions, private sector, and civil society organizations, harness the presence of the 
international private sector to contribute to sustainable development and peace.  
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Economic security spectrum 
The following section provides an in-depth discussion of the spectrum of conditions 
that affect human security by either enhancing or constraining economic security in a 
fragile and conflict-affected state (FCS). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a broad 
definition of human security (freedom from fear and freedom from want) guides the 
understanding and analysis of the empirical data. Furthermore, throughout this 
dissertation, I emphasize the importance of the freedom to live in dignity within the 
context of human security. An array of crosscutting issues and concepts, such as 
development economics, peace economics, and peacebuilding, inform the 
understanding of economic security in this research project. Specifically, the notion of 
“positive peace” is woven throughout the spectrum of conditions that affect economic 
security. The concept of positive peace emphasizes how to sustain peaceful societies: 
business competitiveness and entrepreneurialism, foundations of well-being, social 
cohesion and capital, gender equality, youth development, environmental protection, 
and poverty alleviation. Positive peace is closely linked with human security, as it gives 
importance to the ability of society to mitigate the effects of violence and conflict and 
to transition towards sustainable peace. Whereas risks, threats, and vulnerability are 
negative ways of examining human agency, a more positive approach to human agency 
is to emphasize the resilience of people or that which enables communities to be active 
agents in providing solutions to their own human security problems.  
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1. Public-private relations 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, strong public-private relations can enhance economic security.  
Effective cooperation and consensus between the government and the international 
private sector are key to establishing a clear understanding in which the private sector 
can operate in a free and fair business environment. Strengthening the lines of 
communication between relevant ministries and representatives from the government 
and the private sector can play a pivotal role in public-private relations. Several key 
international human security indexes, including the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, indicate that a well-functioning government strengthens 
development and improves living standards (World Bank 2015c, Freedom House 2015, 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2014, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009, Kaufmann and 
Mastruzzi 2009). Clyde McConaghy notes, “Effective governments provide a quality 
of public service that gives societies the capacity to deal with violence in a way that 
does not threaten the societal structure” (McConaghy, 2012, 8). Political stability and 
institutional effectiveness are key attractors of foreign capital and investment, which, if 
harnessed properly, contribute to the creation of local jobs and the development of the 
local private sector. The ease of opening and registering a business, and an integrated 
planning process across relevant government ministries, can enhance economic 
security. In addition, a sound business environment, strong economic conditions, 
economic productivity, the existence of formal institutions that support the operation of 
the private sector, business competitiveness, a clear and internationally based tender 
process, the presence of regulatory systems, and an international legal framework for 
contracts and standards are conducive to business operations (Institute for Economics 
and Peace, 2015b, 10). A well-functioning government that delivers high-quality public 
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and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability, and 
upholds the rule of law can enhance human security. Other important conditions include 
strong local institutions that operate fairly and impartially, adequate organizational 
resources, public sector reform, influential leaders, normative convergence, and the 
existence of policies that support distributive justice. The implementation of effective 
governance strategies and capacities is also crucial to mitigate and reduce the risks 
posed by conflict and natural disasters.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, weak public-private relations can constrain economic security.  
Cultural misunderstandings and the absence of adequate lines of communication 
between government and the private sector can strain relations between the main parties 
involved. The presence of an inexperienced or self-absorbed intermediary, such as a 
consulting firm, between the government and the private sector can further exacerbate 
tensions and misperceptions between the main stakeholders. A poorly functioning 
government, weak or partial institutions, and inadequate integrated planning processes 
across government ministries can constrain economic security. Likewise, an overall 
substandard business environment – for example, due to bureaucratic obstacles and 
challenges, the absence of an international legal framework of contracts and standards 
and adequate regulatory structures, the lack of standardized project timelines, and/or a 
burdensome and time-consuming process to open and register a new business – will 
likely dissuade entrepreneurs and the private sector from operating in the market. The 
absence of applicable governance strategies to address and lower risks from conflict and 
natural disasters can severely compromise human security.  
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2. Basic income and poverty alleviation 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, assured access to basic income and poverty alleviation can enhance 
economic security.  
Legal provisions that require the international private sector to employ robust numbers 
of locals in their business activities can ensure access to employment in the formal 
economy. The establishment and implementation of strong labor laws are fundamental 
to ensuring that local communities have access to safe employment opportunities with 
a fair minimum wage. Having a well-trained and qualified government staff to 
administer labor laws is key to ensuring employees are not exploited by their employers. 
An inclusive, independent, and modern social security program that guarantees workers 
financial and institutional support, such as medical care, is crucial to ensure they do not 
become destitute upon a disability or retirement. Governments must make sure that 
international private sector employers pay into the social security program for their local 
employees. Building trust between potential employees and employers is important to 
encourage employment in the formal economy. Meanwhile, proper educational 
opportunities to increase the professional and technical knowledge of the local labor 
force are crucial to reducing the skill gaps between what is required by the private sector 
and the actual capabilities of the local workforce. Although not a guarantee, education 
often expands employment opportunities for communities, particularly for those from 
the lower economic strata of society (Mourshed Farrell and Barton 2012, Nussbaum 
2004, Brown 2003).  
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Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of assured access to basic income and poverty alleviation 
can constrain economic security.  
Allowing the international private sector free rein for companies to operate solely on 
their own discretion is problematic. Without incentives or legal provisions to hire at 
least a certain proportion of local staff, the overwhelming majority of foreign companies 
relocate managerial staff from their home countries and recruit low-skilled workers 
from developing countries, albeit with substandard wages. Without legal frameworks 
and proper implementation of minimum wage and social security requirements, 
employers set their own benchmarks for salaries and benefits. The absence of labor laws 
to protect employees creates space for employers to exploit and take advantage of their 
workers. The lack of a robust social security program can decrease trust regarding 
employment security with the international private sector and encourage potential job 
seekers to depend on the public sector to provide employment. Furthermore, without 
the provision of a free and fair education system that matches the skill sets required for 
employment in the private sector, the likelihood of the international private sector to 
seek both non-skilled and skilled employees from abroad will likely increase. Without 
gender-mainstreaming strategies that ensure basic income and poverty alleviation, 
vulnerable groups such as women are more likely to experience poverty and remain 
outside of the formal economy and labor market. 
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3. Public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-
employment can enhance economic security.  
Strong relations between the international private sector and local distributors and 
contractors can create opportunities to develop the local private sector and contribute to 
knowledge transfer and further cultural understanding. The provision of microfinance 
opportunities and financial assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
can broaden the scope of employment. Creating space and financial support for 
developing social entrepreneurships can provide opportunities for social change. 
Strategies to reduce poverty and unemployment strengthen the resilience of a society to 
withstand internal and external economic shocks. Furthermore, universal health 
coverage and health sector development can ensure that all individuals have access to 
quality health services regardless of financial status. Access to health care and the 
prevention of preventable diseases and infections, such as rabies and sexually 
transmitted infections, are all crucial to a healthy and safe society.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of public and private sector employment, wage employment, 
and self-employment can constrain economic security.  
The dominance of the international private sector can severely compromise the 
development of the local private sector, thereby weakening the prospects of non-public 
sector employment. Collaborations between international companies and large local 
corporations might be positive; however, these partnerships often neglect the capacity 
of local SMEs. The absence of public-private sector initiatives that introduce potential 
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SMEs to partnerships with international investors may prevent the local private sector 
from expanding into the market. International companies rarely hire a significant 
percentage of locals when they are not legally required or encouraged to do so. 
Oftentimes, in fragile, conflict-affected, and violent regions, the public sector serves as 
a major employer. However, a high prevalence of appointments based on political 
patronage and government make-work jobs can contribute to a bloated public sector and 
can reinforce long-established patronage networks. Entrepreneurship, competition, and 
innovation are typically stifled when the government is the main source of employment. 
The absence of financial support for social enterprises weakens the possibility for social 
change and entrepreneurship to emerge. Furthermore, increased poverty and high 
unemployment can severely threaten the resilience of a society to withstand internal and 
external economic shocks.  
 
4. Rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector  
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector can 
enhance economic security.  
Economic prosperity for famers and expansion of farm-to-market roads are crucial to 
ensure the development of the agriculture sector. The ease of transporting local food 
products to the market encourages local food production, provides a cheaper and 
healthier option for local consumption, and widens the potential for export to 
surrounding regions. Government support for the agriculture sector in the form of food 
production incentives, price subsidies, strategic storage, and grants can all help farmers 
compete with less expensive foreign products in the market. (Norell et al. 2015). 
Agricultural products must be affordable especially for vulnerable households (Ip et al. 
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2015). A long-term approach that addresses the development and diversification of the 
local agriculture sector, the advancement of new technologies, the integrity of the 
environment, and the protection of infant agricultural industries will lessen long-term 
dependency on food imports and thereby strengthen food security (United Nations 
Human Security Unit 2009). Cross-sectoral strategies, such as sustainable food value 
chain development to reduce poverty and hunger, serve as multipliers for 
socioeconomic growth. Fair land resettlement programs are key to ensuring that the 
local agriculture sector is not disrupted in the name of economic progress. The 
development of strategies to adapt to climate change are crucial to ensuring the 
sustainability of the agriculture sector. Furthermore, the drivers of the agriculture 
sector’s vulnerability to negative climate change must be identified and mitigated.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector 
can constrain economic security.  
The absence of adequate farm-to-market roads, the destruction of towns and farmlands, 
forced displacement of farmers, and economic sanctions can severely endanger the 
agriculture sector. The costs of production and transport increase considerably without 
proper infrastructure and effective market transportation for farmers to move their 
goods to local and regional markets in a timely manner. The absence of a long-term 
government strategy to develop and enhance the agriculture sector particularly impacts 
small farmers who rely on subsistence and traditional farming, all of which are 
vulnerable to market flooding of low-cost food imports. Food dependency on imports, 
population growth, and the absence of agricultural production threaten economic 
security. The absence of fair land resettlement projects and land access, are major social 
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risks for the natural resources sector. Furthermore, the sustainability of the agriculture 
sector is endangered by a lack of awareness concerning the potential vulnerabilities of 
the environment to climate change (Poulsen et al. 2015). An absence of environmental 
management, water scarcity, critically high levels of pollution, the lack of high-quality 
food, low levels of nutrition, high levels of poverty, the absence of public services, and 
weak agricultural productivity severely hinder the rehabilitation of the agriculture sector 
(Kandeel 2014).  
 
5. Infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, infrastructure recovery and the restoration of access to basic services 
can enhance economic security.  
Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources such as education and 
health, as well as – although to a lesser extent – equity in income distribution. A rights-
based strategy for infrastructure development ensures equitable distribution of 
resources and governance of basic services. Streamlining the government procurement 
process, strengthening relations with local businesses – in particular, social enterprises 
– and purchasing supplies from the local private sector can have a significant positive 
impact on economic development and job creation (Bradley 2013). The presence of 
anchor institutions such as hospitals, museums, universities, and other institutions that 
provide a public good can serve as multipliers for social change. Strong relations 
between community leaders, representatives from the government, and the private 
sector can help to reduce the likelihood that local people’s livelihoods and traditions 
will be destroyed in the name of economic progress. Infrastructure recovery serves as a 
major pillar in the development of farm-to-market roads, thus influencing the 
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rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector. The restoration or building 
of critical infrastructure, such as banking and finance systems, electrical grids, 
telecommunication systems, and water systems is crucial not only to facilitate self-
sufficiency, but also to improve the capacity of a society to adapt and reconfigure in 
times of disaster.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic 
services can constrain economic security.  
The absence of a rights-based and a crosscutting, multi-level governance policy to 
address infrastructure recovery in areas such as water management and human health 
systems can undermine fair socioeconomic development and lead to an inequitable 
distribution of resources. Without a proper strategy to leverage the presence of anchor 
institutions, the local private sector will likely miss an opportunity to benefit from the 
procurement process. The development of infrastructure without expanding the capacity 
of the local private sector and labor force undermines economic growth across different 
socioeconomic levels. The absence of government oversight and upkeep of 
infrastructure further undermines any progress undertaken. Moreover, without 
favorable prospects for communication between the government, private sector, and 
local communities, it is likely that unjust and sporadic infrastructure recovery will be 
preferred in the name of economic progress.  
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6. Dismantling of a war economy and illegal economic networks 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the dismantling of a war economy and illegal economic networks can 
enhance economic security. 
Legal economic networks can be strengthened by the implementation of a strong and 
transparent pre-inspection process for imported goods, streamlining and automating the 
inspection process at border crossings, the reinforcement of strong border controls, and 
strengthening private sector and community relations on each side of the official 
borders. Good relations with neighbors are beneficial for the private sector and attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and human capital inflows (Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2015b). A functioning government that is regionally integrated, and relative 
political stability with low levels of organized internal conflict and corruption, can boost 
confidence and trust in institutions and the formal economy, thus delegitimizing illegal 
economic networks and leading to the dismantlement of a war economy (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2015b). Security sector reform and the redirection of excessive 
funding of the military and security sector to sectors that have a direct impact on 
development send a positive message that the government is committed to sustainable 
peace (Kummel 2002). Furthermore, the existence of robust laws that guarantee basic 
human rights and freedoms is crucial to the help citizens learn to accept the rights of 
others. The development of informal social and cultural standards that relate to the 
behaviors of citizens is important to gage the level of tolerance among different ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, and socioeconomic groups.  
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Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the presence of a war economy and illegal economic networks can 
constrain economic security.  
The absence of a strong and transparent pre-inspection process, a disjointed and 
outdated inspection process, regional economic instability and interdependency such as 
weak border and customs control, and poor relations between regional private sector 
circles and communities living along formal borders can further exacerbate illegal 
economic networks (United Nations Human Security Unit 2009). Bad relations with 
neighbors compromise the prospects for FDI and human capital inflows. The lack of 
sufficient regional integration, the inability to respond to internal and external economic 
shocks, and the failure to dismantle cross-border illegal economic activities undermine 
any sense of legal economic, institutional, and regulatory frameworks. A weak 
government and economic institutions, political instability, and high levels of organized 
internal conflict severely threaten human security. Excessive military funding and the 
lack of security sector reform undermine prospects for peace. The presence of 
interrelated illegal and criminal economic networks and extreme levels of corruption 
reinforce the existence of a war economy. The absence of laws that guarantee human 
rights and freedoms may lead to civil unrest and corruption and can be the catalyst for 
more serious violence. 
 
7. Expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills development, and 
empowerment  
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills 
development, and empowerment can enhance economic security. 
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In countries where the power structure has deliberately selected a neoliberal model of 
development and especially where FDI is the primary source of available capital, the 
government and the domestic private sector must work with foreign companies to 
develop a trained workforce. Human capital development, which expands the skills, 
education, health, and training of individuals, is fundamental to economic security and 
sustainable peace (United Nations Human Security Unit 2009, Ogunade 2011). A strong 
human capital base reflects the extent to which societies are willing to educate citizens 
and encourage the development of knowledge. Initiatives that develop curriculums and 
build connections with the education system and the labor market are key to ensuring 
that students are equipped for the immediate or emerging needs of the private sector. 
The expansion of free to minimum-cost high-quality post-secondary, technical, and 
vocational education opportunities allows individuals to choose which career path may 
be best for them. Ongoing professional skills development, internships, and vocational 
assistantships reinforce employment continuity with foreign corporations. Strong 
relations between the government and the international private sector are key to 
encouraging foreign companies to provide opportunities for local staff and students to 
gain further experience in their designated sector. It is important that a society properly 
utilizes the education, experience, and talents of its labor force, as there are clear 
correlations between human capital, economic performance, and poverty alleviation in 
fragile and conflict-affected countries.  
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of opportunities for people through training, skills 
development, and empowerment can constrain economic security. 
Diminished human capital due to wars, disasters, and civil strife, especially at the local 
level, and the absence of human development opportunities may lead to increased 
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unemployment, underemployment, economic insecurity, stagnation, and the emergence 
of criminal enterprises. States must assist in human capital development not only for 
obvious FDI-focused projects, such as those found in resource-dependent “rentier” 
economies. Every effort must be made by private-public partnerships to develop 
multiple sectors of the economy so that if primary sectors – especially those dependent 
on the export of commodities – falter, the country is not left destitute and/or dependent 
on criminal economic activity to survive. A stark gap between career expectations and 
educational levels coupled with professional experience may create a sense of 
frustration among new-entry employees and may lead to job-hopping or employment in 
the informal labor market. Furthermore, an overqualified workforce that is unable to 
find compatible positions may strain the social cohesion of society, leaving many 
professionals wanting to emigrate. Structural impediments to socioeconomic growth, 
such as poverty, inequality, and the exclusion of vulnerable groups from the formal 
economy, can also affect the opportunities available for professional growth 
(International Labour Office 2014).  
 
8. Development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and 
impoverished groups 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the development of productive activities for ex-
combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups can enhance economic security.  
A livelihoods approach to productive activities that emphasizes the “capabilities, assets, 
(including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of 
living” (Carney 1998, 213), rather than just focusing on income generation is more 
likely to enhance economic security. Although job creation and financial compensation 
for duties performed are important, not everyone has the capacity or ability to engage 
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in paid productive activities, due to family constraints or a shortage of employment 
opportunities in the formal economy. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize the importance 
of activities that fall outside the formal economy, such as civic engagement, community 
service, unpaid domestic work, and creative artistic work. While initiatives that expand 
opportunities for productive activities should be sensitive to the specific needs of each 
group, there are overarching forms of support that can prove beneficial to ex-
combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups. The absence of a war economy, illegal 
networks, and high levels of crime and violence makes it possible for individuals from 
these groups to participate in activities that best fit their talents and ability. Both public 
and private initiatives that provide training and education opportunities can help 
individuals gain the skills necessary to expand prospects for self-employment and 
acquire positions within the formal economy. Social support such as cash transfers can 
provide much-needed financial assistance while individuals are gaining skills required 
for paid employment. Although not a solution to tackling unemployment, the expansion 
of social enterprises can serve as multipliers and harness existing spending flows to 
support job creation and productive opportunities. Furthermore, it is critical to address 
the barriers that prevent members of these three groups from accessing employment in 
the formal economy. 
 
An appropriate disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program is 
central to emboldening ex-combatants to seek employment in the formal economy and 
participate as active citizens in their communities. However, in addition to creating 
productive activities for ex-combatants, it is important to acknowledge actions they may 
have committed, such as atrocities against civilians, including members of their own 
communities. These acts of violence may create a sense of suspicion that prevents them 
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from gaining and maintaining respectable employment in the formal economy. At the 
same time, support groups and organizations that provide psychological support to 
address Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are crucial in assisting ex-combatants 
to reintegrate into civilian life. Low levels of participation in illicit activities and the 
absence of links to recruiters from neighboring conflicts protect individuals from falling 
into a criminal lifestyle. An assessment of the tools available to prevent violence 
and identification of gaps in national and cultural responses to violence are imperative 
to diminish the cycle of violence.  
 
Oftentimes, returnees and individuals from impoverished groups have a difficult time 
navigating the employment market, as their skills might not match the opportunities 
available. As part of a broader development program, initiatives that develop human 
capital and that disseminate information on paid positions can expand opportunities for 
gainful employment. Furthermore, the existence and enforcement of labor laws, which 
ensure that employees are not taken advantage of, are critical to ensuring a smooth 
transition for individuals from the informal to formal economy. The absence of gender-
biased practices ensures that in particular, women are able to access opportunities in the 
formal labor market. Social protection from the state guarantees support, even if 
individuals are not able to acquire employment in the formal economy. The presence of 
strong social contracts to manage and distribute resources ensures collective well-being 
and opportunities to multiply scarce resources. Positive family role models, supportive 
community associations, engaged schools, and a strong civil society reduce the 
exposure of children to violence and promote positive links within communities. The 
existence of safe modes of transportation is important for eligible workers and job 
seekers, particularly for female members of the workforce. Financial support for social 
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enterprises that provide vehicles, ride share options, and vehicle repair expands 
transportation possibilities.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the lack of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and 
impoverished groups can constrain economic security.  
The absence of a livelihoods approach to productive activities ignores the non-financial 
contributions of individuals to the social cohesion of society. The presence of a war 
economy, illegal economic networks, and high levels of crime and violence severely 
compromise the development of productive activities for members of these groups. The 
absence of a sound DDR strategy leaves ex-combatants fully responsible for their 
reintegration into society. Oftentimes, it is difficult for ex-combatants to acquire a 
professional job, leaving many of them susceptible to depression and PTSD and 
vulnerable to becoming homeless. The absence of targeted financial assistance, public 
and private institutions that provide human capital develop initiatives, robust labor laws, 
and social enterprises that support productive activities increases the probability that 
members of these groups will pursue opportunities in the informal economy, thus 
leaving them susceptible to exploitation and recruitment into criminal enterprises. A 
weak social structure, one that does not emphasize a strong civil society and democratic 
freedoms, leaves communities vulnerable to outbreaks of violence, particularly among 
youth.  
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9. Provision of microfinance opportunities 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the provision of microfinance opportunities can enhance economic 
security.  
The development of financial infrastructure permits the provision of an array of 
financial services such as deposits, insurance, loans, money transfers, and savings to 
low-income households and their microenterprises. Access to microfinance and 
investment in the local private sector contribute to an increase in productive capacity, 
ensure sustainable economic growth, and enhance the resilience of the local private 
sector. Capacity development, supportive policies, and targeted investments help secure 
intergovernmental transfers and vital sub-national government financing. A close 
analysis of microfinance institutions and their operations is required to ensure they have 
a “clear social mission that is focused on alleviating poverty and making a social and 
environmental impact on the community. If social microfinance institutions are to be 
coherent with their mission, their loan assessments should include not only financial 
aspects but also social and environmental aspects” (Serrano-Cinca, Gutierrez-Nieto and 
Reyes 2015, 1, Allet 2014, Allet and Hudon 2013). Sound structures to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of applicants are important to ensure that individuals from low-income 
households are not caught in a situation where they are unable to afford payments and 
end up in worse financial circumstances than before they were awarded microcredits or 
loans. Acknowledgement of the existing financing value-chain and its limitations is 
crucial to understanding the local context. As a part of the discourse on sustainability 
the expansion of corporations and social enterprises that protect the environment and 
contribute to social prosperity and the welfare of society can have a positive impact on 
economic security.  
  
88 
 
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the lack of microfinance opportunities can constrain economic security.  
The absence of financial infrastructure and services makes it difficult for individuals 
from low-income households and microenterprises to access crucial monetary support. 
Without capacity development and targeted investments, the quality and volume of 
intergovernmental transfers and sub-national financing are limited. Regulatory 
challenges and a lack of accountability of microfinance institutions create an 
atmosphere ripe for fraud and corruption (Armendariz and Szafarz 2011). Furthermore, 
without proper examination of their creditworthiness status, applicants might default on 
loans, pushing them into a deeper state of vulnerability. Absence or gaps in the local 
financing value-chain might exclude potential entrepreneurs and businesses that have 
the potential to provide a public good. Mismanagement and negative cultural, 
institutional, and political attitudes might further constrain economic security.  
 
10. Clarification of property rights 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the clarification of property rights can enhance economic security. 
The clarification of property rights encompasses intellectual property rights, housing, 
and land rights. Whether political parties or elites, actors that control the decision-
making process regarding the clarification of property rights hold a significant amount 
of power. Oftentimes, the administration of property rights enables the incumbent 
political party to condition rights to land and property based on political behavior, 
further reinforcing the position of the political party (Castaneda Dower and Pfutze 
2015). An environment of patronage and clientelism arrangements is prone to trigger 
conflict and reinforce inequality. To restore trust in communities and address the impact 
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of violent displacement, it is crucial to establish an impartial legal framework and 
protections to secure property rights, robust land strategies, strong contract 
enforcement, and post-conflict property restitution, particularly in the sectors of 
agriculture, manufacturing, and real estate. With limited natural resources and climate 
change affecting the quality of land and resources available, it is essential for the state 
to provide increased protection of property rights. As there are competing notions of 
property rights, the state’s impartial definition of property and associated rights may 
reduce conflict between competing actors (Butler and Gates 2012, Kimbrough and 
Sheremeta 2014).  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, a lack of clarification of property rights can constrain economic security. 
A patronage environment that operates with clientelism arrangements compromises an 
ethical clarification of property rights. Corruption and exploitation of power emerge in 
the absence of impartial legal parameters and transparent decision-making processes for 
the distribution of property rights. In particular, post-conflict countries will remain in a 
fragile state if they do not address the impact of violent displacement, the absence of 
secure property rights, severe discrepancies in land strategies, inadequate contract 
enforcement structures, and nonexistent property restitution. Weakening property rights 
and prioritizing the private sector in the name of economic progress undermines the 
legitimacy of the government.  
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11. Macroeconomic development and job creation  
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, macroeconomic development and job creation can enhance economic 
security. 
Inclusive economic strategies and equitable distribution of basic services are crucial to 
ensure the economic well-being and prosperity of all citizens. Private sector-supported 
activities such as a sound foreign investment policy, one which emphasizes the 
expansion of the local private sector, the presence of economic capital, financial 
reserves, a diversified economy, and ensuring an open culture towards investment and 
government policy and incentives can contribute to the enhancement of economic 
security (United Nations Human Security Unit 2009). Strong and transparent customs 
regulations, development of the banking and finance sector, expansion of the insurance 
sector, and infrastructure recovery can increase investors’ confidence in the economy. 
Private enterprise and competition policy regarding starting a business, intellectual 
property, and combatting nepotism ensure that high levels of corruption are kept at bay. 
A transparent collection of taxes, including corporate and personal taxes, provides a 
government with additional financial resources to utilize for socioeconomic 
development.  
 
The creation of quality jobs in the private sector, with good benefits and a fair wage, 
family support schemes, opportunities for professional development, a safe work 
environment, and transparent hiring practices is important for equitable economic 
development. An integrated and innovative framework that addresses barriers such as 
needs for child care, home health support, sick leave, and transportation to and from 
workplaces for job seekers – especially individuals from vulnerable groups – to acquire 
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and maintain a job can expand employment opportunities and have a positive impact on 
socioeconomic development. Vibrant employment services that develop the labor 
market and pair job seekers with potential employers in the private sector can help 
expand employment outside the realm of the public sector. Employees who earn low 
wages need a predictable income, benefits, and a regular work schedule as oftentimes 
they try to maintain multiple jobs to offset minimal earnings.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of macroeconomic development and job creation can 
constrain economic security. 
A neoliberal model that fails to promote inclusive strategies and diversify the economy 
can severely stifle growth and exacerbate social disintegration. Increased poverty and 
unemployment, the collapse of the economy, limited economic opportunities, and a lack 
of capacities and resources to reinvigorate the economy can further compromise 
prospects for sustainable economic development. A business environment that is 
vulnerable to external and internal shocks, dependent on only one sector, such as the oil 
and gas sector, to generate GDP, inadequate policy-making abilities, an economy that 
witnesses low probability and public finances, dependence on regional markets, and 
cross-border illegal activities all negatively affect economic security. The absence of 
private sector-supported activities such as foreign investment policies that ensure an 
open culture towards investment and government policy and incentives can decrease 
the private sector’s confidence. High levels of corruption, a nonexistent or weak dispute 
resolution process, and disregard for international legal frameworks can raise questions 
regarding the credibility of the government.  
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A shortage of gainful and quality employment opportunities in the private sector, the 
dominance of the public sector as a major employer, an unbalanced presence of foreign 
labor, weak technical and language skills, limited managerial experience, inflexible 
labor laws, and bleak prospects for professional training stifle the expansion and 
diversity of talents of the local labor force. The absence of transparent hiring practices, 
substandard benefits, unpredictable work schedules, unsafe working environments, and 
unrealistic salary expectations in relation to levels of employment experience and 
education can cause frustration among the workforce. Without structured institutions 
and professional support, both skilled and unskilled job seekers are left to search for 
critical sources of income, with some turning to illegal networks.  
 
12. Establishment of social safety nets  
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the establishment of social safety nets can enhance economic security. 
Complex emergencies and armed conflicts can have a dramatic impact on human 
security and exacerbate existing social tensions. A broad social protection agenda is 
crucial to maintain access to essential services and build the long-term resilience of 
society to future shocks. Developing countries only spend approximately 1.6 percent of 
their GDP on social safety nets (World Bank 2015b). However, these support programs 
are central to protecting poor and vulnerable households from economic shocks and 
natural disasters. Innovative strategies such as conditional or unconditional cash 
transfers, nutritional food distribution programs, universal food subsidy schemes, public 
works, and employment guarantee programs can safeguard communities against risks 
of their livelihoods, prevent people from adopting damaging coping mechanisms such 
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as depleting assets, and can assist their transition out of poverty (United Nations Human 
Security Unit 2009). 
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of social safety nets can constrain economic security. 
Oftentimes, states that have recently experienced conflict, disasters, or economic crises 
are overwhelmed with demands for assistance from citizens. Without a robust social 
protection agenda, vulnerable individuals and households are more susceptible to 
deeper economic crisis and disasters, as they are forced to assume detrimental coping 
mechanisms such as draining any existing liquidity to survive. According to the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), approximately “80 percent of the world’s 
population lacks access to adequate social protection and more than half lacks any 
coverage at all” (FAO 2012, 18). As mentioned earlier, there are an array of government 
social welfare models, however; it is crucial they are appropriate for the local setting in 
order to successfully deliver support to the most vulnerable. Macroeconomic 
irregularities can compromise a government’s capability to provide cash transfers. Yet, 
there are certain consistencies, such as labor supply for public works and employment 
guarantee programs that can provide assistance to vulnerable households during severe 
economic hardship. Without a rights-based approach to the provision of social safety 
nets, there could be major differences between the level of participation and benefits, 
as not every citizen has the same ability or available time. A meticulous analysis of 
social protection is required to ensure that poverty, inequality, and the erosion of social 
cohesion do not expand significantly.  
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13. Provision of well-coordinated, predicable, and multifaceted aid 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the provision of well-coordinated, predicable, and multifaceted aid can 
enhance economic security. 
A social justice approach to humanitarian and development assistance is crucial to 
ensure support to the most vulnerable groups, including IDPs and refugees. Disaster 
risk reduction requires immediate and uninterrupted relief items, coordination among 
stakeholders, and an organized, efficient, and transparent distribution system. The 
inclusion of all stakeholders is key to understanding local political or religious 
sensitivities. Consideration of multiple layers of assistance is important, as disasters 
often have a trans-border dimension to them. Development interventions must be suited 
to the local conditions and ensure long-term sustainable and equitable development. It 
is critical to implement a coordinated approach towards sustainable development and 
work across sectors such as agriculture, health, and education to leverage limited 
resources. Furthermore, it is important to encourage engagement of all stakeholders 
including local NGOs and community leaders, donors, policy-makers, and program 
managers to meet regularly and discuss how efficiency and impact can be improved.  
 
Following the intervention of the international private sector in a fragile and conflict-
affected state, the absence of well-coordinated, predicable, and multifaceted aid can 
constrain economic security. 
Discrepancies in humanitarian aid and development assistance and the absence of sound 
inclusive strategies can compromise the best-integrated approach to disaster 
management and socioeconomic development. Without the engagement of all 
stakeholders, interventions often fail to address the structural causes of conflict and 
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natural disasters due to climate change (Harris et al., 2013). Delays in sending relief 
items, weak coordination, and unorganized, inefficient, and corrupt distribution systems 
severely compromise the positive impact of assistance on reducing suffering and 
environmental degradation. It is important that any humanitarian or development 
assistance does not make an unstable situation worse. For instance, dependency on food 
aid without proper agriculture development can increase food prices and foreign 
exchange, which can be detrimental to an emerging economy.  
 
Conclusion  
As discussed earlier, with the end of the Cold War and the expansion of technology, the 
world became interdependent and interconnected. It was apparent that old-world 
traditions were no longer appropriate or relevant to tackle multidimensional security 
challenges. Scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ken Booth, Keith Krause, Mary Martin, and 
Oliver Richmond began to question the status quo, by presenting alternatives to the way 
we perceive the world, and proposed strategies to mitigate the structural causes of 
conflict and human insecurities. Not immune to criticism, scholars such as Mohammed 
Ayoob and Bill Sweeney challenged critical security studies to seriously reflect on its 
impact in the field of international relations. Human security further emerged as an 
additional approach to addressing contemporary global issues. The two main strands – 
deemed the “narrow school” (freedom from fear) and the “broad school” (freedom from 
want and freedom from fear) – share a common goal of addressing threats to the 
individual; however, they each have different paths for how to achieve that goal. The 
human security paradigm addresses the structural causes of conflict, and proposes a 
multidimensional approach to addressing the human insecurities of today. Economic 
security, a component of human security, provides the main theoretical architecture of 
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this research project, with a series of targets in which to measure the impact of the 
international private sector. As will be highlighted in the forthcoming empirical 
chapters, economic security complements the other six strategies to enhance human 
security by analyzing both monetary and non-monetary factors, such as public-private 
relations, infrastructure recovery, restoration of access to basic services, and 
macroeconomic development.  
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Chapter 3 – Contextual Framework 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an in-depth review of the contextual framework 
for this research project. The first section will discuss the rise to power of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) otherwise known as the AK Party, in Turkey, since it 
was elected in 2002 (Carkoglu 2011). The AK Party promoted an array of approaches 
“to foster the linkages between political stability, economic welfare and cultural 
harmony in order to attain sustainable global peace” (Turkey Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs). Building on previous government policies of cooperative security and 
multilateralism, the AK Party established a multidimensional approach to foreign policy 
(Menderes 2011, Robins 2006). Due to the complexity of relations between Ankara–
Baghdad and Ankara–Erbil, the chapter will intertwine points of confrontation 
regarding the struggle over autonomy of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) versus the 
unity of Iraq, and the ongoing conflict over territory, resources, and influence, coupled 
with the opportunities for economic development in the region. 
 
The second section will provide an overview of the economic component to this thesis. 
A brief overview of the AK Party’s efforts to implement previous government economic 
policies, as well as Turkey’s economic progress in the form of GDP growth, relatively 
low inflation rates, fiscal austerity, and unforeseen levels of privatization and foreign 
direct investment will be addressed (Onis and Senses 2009). This thesis moves away 
from a purely traditional security perspective and presents a new perspective on the 
deepening and widening of the Turkish private sector’s presence in the KRI. The section 
will illustrate how Turkish trade and investment have been crucial to boosting the 
development of the KRI, to contributing to Turkey’s own long-term socioeconomic 
  
98 
 
development, and how they have been an important source of support for the AK Party 
since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.  
 
With regard to the growing presence of the Turkish private sector in the KRI, the main 
business associations that pertain to this research thesis will be identified. More detailed 
information on the businesses themselves is included in the Index Section of this 
dissertation. Lastly, I will look at the economic integration and interdependence 
between Turkey and the KRG over the last decade. Furthermore, in addition to the main 
respondents, I conducted interviews with key representatives from the Turkish private 
sector to gain insight into the presence of the major sectors that operated in the KRI.  
 
The third section of this chapter provides insight into the ambitious plan undertaken by 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq to transition from an entirely state-
run economy to a more neoliberal approach to economic growth, albeit while depending 
heavily on oil exports since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Building on the experience 
of self-rule following the enforcement of the no-fly zones in the 1990s and the sudden 
withdrawal of government officials by Saddam Hussein from the KRI, the KRG 
established key government bodies, such as the Parliament, the Board of Investment 
(BOI), and the Ministry of Planning (MOP) to pursue a democratic reforms and expand 
private sector activities in the region. The KRG orchestrated strategies to promote 
socioeconomic development in the region and implemented key private sector-friendly 
legislation to attract foreign investment. However, despite significant progress in 
institutional development, the KRG still struggled to build a diversified economy and 
develop an independent local private sector. The investment-friendly environment, 
including the main piece of legislation, the 2006 Investment Law, deemed one of the 
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most generous economic frameworks in the region, enticed the Turkish private sector 
to further engage in the KRI. In cooperation with the Turkish government, led by the 
AK Party, the Turkish private sector contributed to the normalization of Ankara-Erbil 
relations. Turkey’s need to expand its source of energy supplies, and desire to establish 
itself as a transit country for energy supplies to Europe, influenced a deepening and 
widening of diplomatic, economic, and security aspects of Ankara-Erbil relations. 
Mehmet Erman Atik noted, “We have not taken any financial support from the Turkish 
government or any other related associations. However, the current political 
relationship between Turkey, KRG, and Bagdad is encouraging enough to make you 
feel that it is worth it to be there” (Mehmet Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). 
 
Understanding Turkish foreign policy  
Since the creation of the modern Turkish state, Turkish foreign policy related directly 
to its experience of great-power rivalry and foreign occupation during and after WWI 
(Helmreich 1974). The victorious powers sought to occupy and divide almost all of the 
former Ottoman territories, leaving the Turks with comparatively modest territory to 
claim as their own. During the Turkish War of Independence which began with the 
Amasya Agreement in 1919 and lasted until the Turkish Republic was announced in 
1923, two major treaties were instituted (Sumer 2013). The government of the last 
Sultan, Vahdettin, reluctantly yet eventually adopted the Treaty of Sevres in August 
1920. According to Section III, Articles 62-64, a referendum was to take place to allow 
the Kurds to decide the future of their territory (Kelly 2010). However, the Sevres 
Treaty was never implemented, and the creation of a Kurdish state was not included in 
the subsequent Lausanne Treaty adopted in 1923.  
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Mustafa Aydin notes that as the leader of the resistance movement against foreign 
occupation, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was concerned with the “independence and 
sovereignty” of the new republic (Hale 2000, 44, Bottini 2007, Davison 2003, Demirtas 
Bagdonas 2008, Aydin 2004, 11). Thus, “his foreign policy objectives reflected a 
departure from the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire” (Aydin 2004, 11). 
Bulent Aras argues that Turkey’s “new mindset was responsive and defensive, with 
serious concerns for the survival of the new nation-state” (Aras 2009, 30). With regard 
to Turkish foreign policy post-WWI, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Tevfik 
Rustu Aras, remarked, “Our foreign policy is simple and direct; we seek friendship with 
all, alliance or groupement with none” (Grew 1952, 917, Ahmad 2004). Ataturk’s 
determination to “reconstruct the Turkish state on quite untraditional lines – as a secular 
republic, committed to modernism and a Turkish-ethnic rather than Muslim identity” 
(Hale 2000, 44) solidified the urgency to align with the “West” (Okman 2004, Ahmad 
1969). The late foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire reflected the notion that non-
Western states, particularly those in the Middle East, did not adhere to the principles 
that would facilitate Turkey’s path to modernity. Furthermore, negative stereotypes that 
people living in the former Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire were 
unmodern and uneducated emerged among the intellectual class in the early days of the 
new Turkish Republic. 
 
During the Cold War, Turkey adopted the American policy of “containment” of the 
Soviet Union, which was formulated by George F. Kennan, and introduced as part of 
the Truman Doctrine. As part of the Western alliance, Turkey received financial aid 
from the United States and, along with Greece, was eventually accepted as a member 
state to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Having based its 
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foreign policy on a combination of cooperative security and realpolitik, Turkey saw 
being a member of NATO as essential to its national security (Aydin 2000). However, 
Turkey’s “role as bulwark against Soviet expansionism on NATO’s southern flank 
meant that its external relations were heavily constrained” (Aleassandri 2010, 87). 
Disagreements over Turkey’s alliance with the Western Bloc started to emerge over its 
perceived position as a buffer zone against Soviet expansionism, Turkey’s invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974, military coups in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and over the unfair 
treatment of its Kurdish population (Lesser 1992, Bal 2005, Aydin 2000). 
 
The bi-polar world disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and a new multi-polar 
system began to develop that would change Turkey’s foreign policy. Ahmet Sozen 
argues that two opposing global trends emerged: fragmentation or disintegration, and 
integration. He notes, “On the one hand, the EU had been widening and deepening their 
integration, while on the other hand, such multi-ethnic countries as the former Soviet 
Union and the former Yugoslavia had been disintegrating into dozens of nation-states. 
The two opposing global trends of the post-Cold War era created an ambivalent 
atmosphere of optimism and pessimism” (Sozen 2010, 113). It is within this shifting of 
the balance of power, and the changing security perceptions of Turkey and its Western 
partners, that Turkey reassessed its own position in the new system and the way in which 
it operated (Dorronsoro 2004, Robins 2007, Sayari 2000, Onis 1995). Thus, Turkey’s 
search for a more independent and multidimensional foreign policy began to unfold. 
According to Kardas, former Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (1997-2002) led Turkey to 
increase its “use of cultural factors and Turkey’s multi-civilizational identity, along with 
reconciliation with the Middle East” (Kardas 2010, 122). Considering domestic and 
global developments, former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal emphasized both economic 
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liberalization and rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors. However, due to the 
domestic challenges Turkey faced, such as the PKK insurgency and other regional 
conflicts, Turkish foreign policy was based on cautious activism, and continued to rely 
on a strong military and military relations with key partners, such as the United States, 
the European Community (EC), and Israel (Oguzlu 2010).  
 
Beginning in the 1990s, Turkey’s desire to assert itself as an important component of 
European security – to acquire “candidate status,” let alone become a member state of 
the European Union (EU) – served as an “anchor” for democratic promotion in Turkey 
(Kubicek 2005, Kubicek 2011, Kubicek 2008, Camyar and Mustafa Tagma 2010, 
Glyptis 2005, Park 2012). By introducing democratic reforms and encouraging a 
desecuritization of issues, such as the demand by minorities for more cultural and 
political rights (Barkey and Fuller 1998, Aytac 2010), the EU agreed that Turkey was a 
suitable candidate for membership, and confirmed that the official negotiation process 
could begin in 2005 (Alessandri 2010, Grigoriadis 2009, Diez 2005, Casanova 2006, 
Kubicek 2011, Adanir 2005, Bonner 2005, Gates 2005, Wood and Quaisser 2005, 
Muftuler-Bac 2008, Avci 2003, Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz 2006.) Promises to uphold 
the reform process were made by the AK Party after their single-party government took 
power in 2002 (Sozen 2005). Turkey appeared to be on a democratic trajectory as the 
government reformed key pieces of legislation that supported the rule of law, human 
rights, good governance, access to education regardless of religious beliefs, and 
economic well-being in its neighborhood, in line with the acquis communautaire, the 
compilation of all European Union laws and regulations (Grabbe 2002, Muftuler-Bac 
2008, Lagendijk 2013). However, a slew of mishaps on behalf of both EU member 
states and Turkey and perceived biases in the objectivity of the accession process shifted 
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the excitement over Turkey’s possible membership to the Western club to an air of 
passivity and outright opposition to the idea of membership. According to Kemal 
Kirisci, there was “domestic opposition and fear that Turks may flood the Unions’ labor 
market and aggravate immigration-related problems” (Kirisci 2004, 91).  
 
Turkish foreign policy under the AK party  
Hugh Pope argues that under the AK Party, Turkey has pursued both opportunist and 
isolationist strands (Pope 2015). Building on previous government policies of 
cooperative security and multilateralism, the AK Party established a multidimensional 
approach to foreign policy (Menderes 2011, Robins 2006, Cornell 2012). Emiliano 
Alessandri notes that the AK Party gave “full course to the processes that had started in 
previous years while further widening the network of Turkey’s relationships and 
affiliations” (Alessandri 2010, 89). According to Saban Kardas, the AK Party foreign 
policy platform “is the extension of a liberal economic and cooperative-security 
approach to a new region where realist concerns traditionally determined Turkey’s 
conduct” (Kardas 2010, 122). Furthermore, the AK Party was motivated by a 
“geopolitical approach involving a desire to conduct international relations according 
to Realpolitik and nineteenth-century diplomacy, and a geocultural approach envisaging 
a leadership role for Turkey in the historical trajectory of Islamic world” (Kardas 2010, 
123-124). The AK Party foreign policy platform was based on the following principles: 
balance between freedom and security; zero problems with neighbors; a new diplomatic 
discourse based on firm flexibility; multidimensional and multi-track policies; and 
rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoglu 2008, Sozen 2010). According to Ahmet Davutoglu, 
who then served as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, there were three 
methodological principles that helped shape the foreign policy of the AK Party: a 
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visionary approach, a consistent systemic framework, and the use of “soft” power as a 
new instrument for foreign policy-making (Davutoglu 2009, Altinay 2008, Oguzlu 
2014).  
 
Three key individuals within the AK Party leadership were the authors of the AK Party 
foreign policy platform. First, the president of the AK Party and the Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan; the President, Abudullah Gul; and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, have all played significant roles in establishing the 
theoretical underpinnings and implementation of the AK Party’s foreign policy. 
However, having held several positions as an academic, chief advisor on foreign affairs 
to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister of Turkey, 
Ahmet Davutoglu was the greatest contributor to the changed tone and substance of 
Turkish foreign policy. In his book titled Strategic Depth, he outlined the need for 
Turkey to follow a more multidimensional foreign policy, emphasize political and 
economic cooperation, and rely more heavily on deepening diplomatic relations with 
its neighbors (Davutoglu 1993, Davutoglu 2001, Davutoglu 2008, Davutoglu 2010a, 
Davutoglu 2012, Kirisci 2011, Aras 2009b, Grigoriadis 2010a, Uslu 2009, Economist 
2007). Steven Larrabee notes, “The concept of strategic depth emphasizes the 
importance of Turkey’s Ottoman past and its historical and cultural ties” (Larrabee 
2010, 159) with the surrounding regions. However, Larrabee’s remarks should not be 
confused with the concept of neo-Ottomanism (Yavuz 1998), which some experts have 
criticized the AK Party for reintroducing. According to Phillip Robins, “The origins of 
this doctrine can be traced to Ozal’s neo-Ottomanism, ‘the multi-dimensional’ foreign 
policy of the Erbakan government, and Davutoglu’s innovative approach to geopolitics” 
(Robins 1999). Alexander Murinson argues, “The main thesis of this doctrine is that 
  
105 
 
strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth. Consequently, 
Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great 
geographical depth” (Murinson 2006, 947) Therefore, by basing Turkey’s foreign 
policy platform on “strategic depth,” an activist approach to Turkey’s neighborhood 
was perceived as critical. Aras argues, “Davutoglu’s doctrine is based on self-
confidence, good neighborliness and stability at home. Methodologically, the doctrine 
is novel and visionary, as well as integrated and inclusive” (Aras 2010, 13). 
 
Early in the research timeline of this thesis, the AK Party pursued a balance between 
freedom and security. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, “Legitimacy of any political 
regime comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens; this security should not 
be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country” (Davutoglu 2008, 79). 
The notion that attention to both freedom and security should be balanced, and is 
necessary for a political regime to be legitimate, was partly related to Turkey’s desire 
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria required for the attainment of membership in the 
European Union (Marktler 2006). Historically, Turkey was ruled by authoritarian 
leaders who restrained minority rights, democratic participation in the political process, 
and the advancement of the rule of law. The AK Party, carrying on the democratic 
trajectory that was established during the previous coalition government, led by Bulent 
Ecevit, passed legislative reforms that focused on easing restrictions on freedom of 
expression, inclusion of minority communities, and judiciary oversight. According to 
Ibrahim Kalin, a Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister for foreign policy and public 
diplomacy, “It is now widely accepted that security without freedom leads to 
authoritarianism, and freedom without security invites chaos and instability” (Kalin 
2011, 54). An easing of antagonistic civil-military relations between 2006 and 2011 
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(Cizre-Sakallioglu 1997), coupled with the AK Party’s determination to desecuritize 
Turkey’s relations in its neighborhood, resulted in “a process in which security issues 
(were) gradually removed from the security agenda, and placed on the political agenda” 
(Guneylioglu 2011, 151). However, Kalin later acknowledged that with regard to 
Turkey’s own democratization process, “It is also true that the fragile balance between 
security and democracy still needs improvement” (Kalin 2011, 54). The deepening and 
widening of diplomatic, cultural, and economic engagement with Turkey’s neighbors 
contributed to a shift in Ankara’s prioritization of policies, and was seen as crucial for 
reducing regional security uncertainties and building a multilateral security regime 
(Aras and Karakaya Polat 2008, Bank and Karadag 2012).  
 
The concept of “zero problems” with neighbors is based on the need for a 
multidimensional foreign policy in a multi-polar world (Davutoglu 2004, Davutoglu 
2008, Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, Kardas 2010). During the Cold War, Turkey was 
unquestionably part of the Western Bloc, and often experienced tense relations with its 
neighbors, such as the Soviet Union, Syria, and Iran, and fellow NATO member Greece. 
A decade after the end of the Cold War, the AK Party, under the leadership of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, sought to extend a hand to Turkey’s 
neighbors to resolve intractable problems. Turkey normalized its relations with Greece, 
Iran, Syria, and Russia. In some situations, the AKP administration sought to play a 
mediator and/or facilitator role in conflict resolution efforts – namely, between Syria 
and Israel, between the Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq, and between the 
international community and Iran over its nuclear proliferation program. Although this 
main pillar of the AK Party’s foreign policy platform was commendable, in reality, the 
“zero problems” approach to foreign policy proved difficult to implement due to lack 
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of qualified human capital and capacity within the government. Furthermore, with the 
unfolding of the Arab Spring, it became apparent that some of Turkey’s neighbors, such 
as Egypt, Libya, and Syria, perceived the AK Party’s assertive foreign policy efforts 
negatively. William Hale, a well-known academic, notes that the “goal was clearly very 
hard to achieve if the neighbors were in conflict with one another” (Hale 2009, 156).  
 
Turkish rapprochement with Russia accelerated in 2003 as a result of Washington’s 
invasion and disastrous occupation of Iraq that brought regional destabilization. During 
the eight years of the American occupation in Iraq, Turkey imported 70 percent of its 
natural gas from Russia, Russian tourism to Turkey became second only after Germany, 
Turkish construction companies flocked to Russia, and the two countries became big 
trading partners (Hill and Taspinar 2006, 84). Moscow viewed Washington’s aggressive 
military expansion into the Middle East as a threat to regaining some of the influence 
the former Soviet Union had built up since World War II. Russia thus encouraged 
Turkish dependency on Russian gas as part of a larger strategy to undercut 
Washington’s support of a gas pipeline corridor from Azerbaijan through Turkey to 
Central Europe that would undercut European dependency on Russian gas (Roberts 
2003). The Soviet Union had been the principle supplier of military hardware to both 
Iraq and Syria, Turkey’s near neighbors. Syria was home to the last remaining overseas 
post-Soviet era naval base and was a center of influence in the Arab Middle East, a 
center of influence that Moscow did not want to lose. Relations between the two nations 
precipitously declined in 2011 after it became clear that Ankara was a principle backer 
of anti-regime forces in Syria. However, robust economic relations continued. 
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Over a few decades, Turkey and Syria transitioned from enemies to best friends and 
brothers and back to enemies. In 1998, Syria expelled PKK leaders and fighters from 
the country, to the gratitude of Turkey. Relations between the two nations improved, 
especially in the business sector. During the American occupation of Iraq, Damascus 
seized the opportunity to escape Washington’s imposed international isolation for a 
closer relationship with Turkey. Relations improved to the extent that the two nations 
established a free-trade agreement (Aras 2012). Turkey’s lucrative trade with Iraq had 
been disrupted due to war and terrorism in that country, so the Turkish business 
community embraced business opportunities to the south. Trade boomed not only with 
Syria but beyond, with Jordan and the lucrative Saudi Arabian market. Syria and Turkey 
both supported each other’s internal repression of Kurds associated with the PKK, as 
well as the 2007 Turkish incursion into northern Iraq to destroy Kurdish PKK fighters’ 
bases (Phillips 2011). The apex of Turkish-Syrian relations was marked by a level of 
cooperation and closeness unrivalled in the history of the relationship between Ankara 
and Damascus. It included a lifting of visa requirements, high-level strategic 
cooperation that included joint military exercises, increased trade and commercial 
relations, and even joint cabinet meetings (Demirtas 2013, 17). After non-violent Syrian 
civil society resistance to the heavy-handed Damascus regime morphed into armed 
resistance, supported by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, Ankara and Damascus 
became rivals, with Turkey supporting opposition groups against the Assad regime 
(Sayigh 2014). The rise of Daesh in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the continuing Syrian Civil 
War, and broken relations with Turkey closed the Syrian market. The war with Daesh 
also prevented overland truck transit through Syria and Iraq to Jordan, Kuwait, and 
Saudi Arabia.  
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With regard to Iran, Turkey supported economic and educational cooperation and 
deeper diplomatic relations over the implementation of new and tougher Western 
sanctions on Iran. Turkey was a significant buyer of Iranian oil. In 2010, Turkey, along 
with Brazil, refused to vote in favor of United Nations Resolution 1929, which would 
enact wide-reaching economic sanctions on Iran. Many Western-oriented Turkey-
watchers criticized the AK Party for interfering in negotiations by playing the role of 
mediator between the P5+1 community and Iran. The AK Party administration argued 
that its interactions with Iran were part of a normalization of relations with its neighbors. 
In March, 2012, Turkey said it would cut imports from Iran by 10 percent – 20 percent 
to demonstrate compliance with the sanctions. Turkey was granted exemptions in 
recognition of the Turkish dilemma and agreement to reduce imports by the U.S. 
government (Katzman2014). Turkey had moved away from the unquestionable Cold 
War mentality of supporting the West, regardless of the impact such a policy might have 
on its own geostrategic standing in the region.  
 
Turkey’s so-called “football diplomacy” with Armenia briefly appeared to lay the 
groundwork for normalizing relations with its eastern neighbor. In September 2008, the 
President of Armenia, Serge Sargsyan, invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to watch 
the two countries play a World Cup qualifying match in Yerevan, Armenia (Halperin 
2009). However, by the spring of 2009, Turkish nationalists and Azerbaijan had 
sabotaged Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia. Despite two protocols signed 
between Armenia and Turkey to develop economic and diplomatic relations, and an 
agreement to open the Armenia-Turkey border, Turkey’s dependence on Azeri energy 
resources and domestic nationalist fears outweighed any rapprochement between 
Armenia and Turkey (Goksel 2014). In the end, the conflict remained frozen, with the 
  
110 
 
Turkish Prime Minister promising, “The border between Turkey and Armenia would 
not be opened until the end of the occupation of Azeri territories” (Ozcan and Usul 
2010, 132, Baykal 2010) by Armenia. 
 
The AK Party pursued a new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility. According 
to Aras, previous “Turkish policy makers were designing foreign policy based on their 
interpretation of the international system and projecting their domestic concerns onto 
the foreign policy-making process” (Aras 2009a, 30). However, the AK Party 
administration sought to “develop relations with neighboring regions and beyond” 
(Davutoglu, 2008, 81), with which the administration perceived Turkey to “share a 
common history, culture and often religion” (Kiniklioglu 2011, 64). The new diplomatic 
discourse sought to rebrand “neighbors as brothers, relatives, people with whom” 
(Kiniklioglu 2011, 64) Turkey shared similar values. Kiniklioglu further stated that the 
AK Party policy “seeks to reintegrate Turkey into its immediate neighborhood” 
(Kiniklioglu 2011, 65). One example of the shift in tone and rhetoric was the AK Party 
policy towards Cyprus. According to Sozen, “Cyprus policy was based on a ‘win-win’ 
strategy” (Sozen 2010, 117). 
 
The AK Party argued that establishing a multidimensional and multi-track foreign 
policy platform was crucial in order to adapt to changing global and regional politics. 
According to Onis and Yilmaz, “Foreign policy is no longer perceived as a series of 
bilateral relations or foreign policy moves but as a series of mutually reinforcing and 
interlocking processes” (Onis and Yilmaz 2009, 9). As Davutoglu expressed, by 
adhering to a multidimensional foreign policy, “Turkey’s relations with other global 
actors aim to be complementary, not in competition” (Davutoglu, 2008, 82). The AKP 
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government emphasized the expansion of business, civil society, humanitarian, cultural, 
and educational links as an effective means to increase Turkey’s “soft” power and 
influence abroad. Subsequently, Turkey’s channels of engagement in the surrounding 
regions widened as trade, supported by visa-free regimes with many neighboring 
countries including Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Russia, expanded. According to 
Kirisci, “The share of Turkey’s neighborhood in Turkey’s overall foreign trade grew 
21-fold from 3.7 billion in 1991, to almost US$80 billion in 2008 that is from 10.8 to 
23.6 percent of its overall trade” (Kirisci 2012, 321). The continued growth in Turkey’s 
trade with its neighbors highlighted the importance of liberal trade policies, and 
displayed the value of Turkish exports to the political economy of the region. 
 
Another noteworthy development during the AK Party’s administration was the 
emergence of Turkey as a donor of humanitarian aid and development assistance, both 
for in-kind relief and monetary contributions (Altunisik 2014). Turkey stressed the 
importance of addressing human security threats by increasing foreign aid to the 
developing world (Ozerdem and Ozerdem 2013). The expansion of the Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Disaster and Emergency 
Management Authority (AFAD) placed Turkey in the top ranks of the international 
humanitarian donor community. Underscoring their importance to national security 
policy, TIKA and AFAD report directly to the office of the Prime Minister. In 2008, 
Turkey earmarked $700 million for humanitarian purposes. That figure grew to $3.4 
billion in 2012 (Today’s Zaman 2013).  
 
By 2015, Turkey hosted the highest number of Syrian refugees. As of August 2015, the 
United Nations estimated that the Syrian refugee population living in Turkey was more 
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than 1.8 million (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015). Until 2013, 
most Syrians lived in camps built and paid for by AFAD. In 2014, Turkey constructed 
two camps in the KRI for refugees from Syria and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
from other governorates in Iraq. However, with the conflict in Syria in its fifth year, a 
bleak picture of when refugees could return to Syria, and a lack of capacity to meet the 
long-term needs of refugees, many decided to find lodging and employment outside of 
Turkey, putting further pressure on other states in the region (Icduygu 2015, Berti 
2015a, Berti 2015b, United Nations UNICEF 2015, Dahi 2014, Cagaptay and Menekse 
2013, UNHCR 2014). Refugee flows from Turkey to Greece to mainland Europe 
increased significantly towards the latter half of this research project (European 
Stability Initiative 2015a, European Stability Initiative 2015b, European Stability 
Initiative 2015c).  
 
During the AK Party administration, Turkey’s engagement in Africa highlighted a 
combination of soft and hard power approaches. In 2012, the AK Party sent the first 
Turkish Naval Task Force to Africa. The four ships of the task force visited 24 African 
nations and distributed humanitarian assistance items provided by TIKA during its sail 
around the continent (Tastekin 2014, Gurcan 2014). The active Turkish humanitarian 
diplomacy and aid efforts in Somalia were also a good example of Turkish unilateral 
efforts to show interest in a failed African state ignored by most global powers and 
international NGOs (Akpinar 2013). Turkey often sent funds earmarked for 
development projects to areas to where the Turkish private sector was also striving to 
make inroads into the local economy.  
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“Rhythmic diplomacy” referred to the AK Party’s attempt to perform a leadership role 
in key multilateral institutions. According to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
AK Party’s approach to rhythmic diplomacy included the “active involvement in all 
global and international issues, in all international organizations” (Davutoglu and 
Yilmaz 2009, 12). Furthermore, Davutoglu indicated, “Turkey’s aim is to intervene 
consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a 
transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power” (Davutoglu 2008, 
83). During the early years of the AK Party administration, Turkey was chosen to hold 
a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and participated in the 
African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Caribbean States, and the 
Organization of the American States as an observer state. The AK Party also organized 
and held international conferences to promote its foreign policy platform and gain 
legitimacy among the international community. Towards the second half of this 
research timeline, Turkey began to lose its neutrality and became more of a divisive 
actor on the global stage. In 2014, Turkey lost an opportunity to reinforce its influence 
in the international arena by failing to win another non-permanent member seat on the 
United Nations Security Council.  
 
Criticisms of the AK party’s foreign policy platform 
The three main critical themes of the AK Party’s ambitious foreign policy platform 
centered on the notion that Turkey was turning away from the West (Oguzlu 2008), that 
Turkey was undergoing an axis shift (Cornell 2011, Ozeren 2010), and that the AK 
Party was pursuing a policy of neo-Ottomanism in the region (Cagaptay 2009a, 
Cagaptay 2009b, Baykal 2010, 8, Taspinar 2008, Taspinar 2011). For Western-oriented 
Turkey-watchers, part of Turkey’s allure as a “model” democracy, with a predominately 
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Muslim population, was its position in the Western alliance. This argument was thought 
to have been solidified with Turkey’s membership in NATO, and as a candidate for 
membership in the European Union. Once it appeared that Turkey, under the leadership 
of the AK Party, was no longer committed to democratic reforms that were directly 
linked to the European Union acquis communautaire, the AK Party started to lose 
legitimacy in the eyes of many Turkish liberals (Yavuz 2006, Dagi 2006), European 
Union member states, Western-oriented Turkey-watchers, and neighboring countries 
that hoped to one day live next to a European Union member state (Onis 2007, Onis 
2008a, Onis 2008b, Onis 2009, Dogan 2005, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2009). Non-
ideologically based criticisms focused on the apparent lack of capacity and expertise 
needed to ensure a successful implementation of such a complicated foreign policy 
platform.  
 
The Turkish government offered strong rebuttals to the argument that Ankara, by 
forging new relations with countries not aligned with the West, was abandoning its 
traditional allies. Speaking at the Istanbul Forum in October 2009, Prime Minister 
Erdogan stated, “There is no axis shift of Turkey. We are standing where we have been 
standing at the beginning of our political power” (Candar 2009, 4). President Gul noted, 
“What Turkey is doing is clear. Turkey, surely, is moving simultaneously in every 
direction, towards East and West, North and South” (Candar 2009, 5). For Gul, “the 
important point is to which direction its values are moving” (Candar 2009, 5). He 
defined that “direction” as “democratic values, supremacy of law, respect of human 
rights, transparency, gender equality, and a functioning free market economy” (Candar 
2009, 5). Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu stated, “I can see what we are 
having today is a restoration. This concept is important: Restoration, not paradigm shift. 
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Not revolution, but a restoration of Turkish society, economics, politics, and foreign 
policy” (Davutoglu 2010b, 4). The Economist highlighted Davutoglu’s rejection of 
criticism of the AK Party foreign policy platform: “Turkey can be European in Europe 
and eastern in the East, because we are both” (Economist 2007). 
 
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East 
According to Nur Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East was regarded as an extension of its pro-Western foreign policy (Criss and 
Bilgin 1997). With the election of the AK Party in 2002, the “consolidation of state 
strength during AK Party rule allowed a more effective implementation of foreign-
policy objectives and the application of a liberal approach to a new region, the Middle 
East” (Kardas 2010, 120). With the increasing domestic support for the AK Party, 
Turkey aimed to reengage the Middle East, in particular, Iraq and the area governed by 
the KRG (Kilic 2010, Altunisik and Martin 2011); Turkey broadened relations with 
non-traditional allies as security concerns changed; the requirement for strategic 
resources, such as oil and gas, became higher priorities; and a new phase of diplomatic 
and economic initiatives emerged (Onis 2012). However, the complexity of regional 
relationships and disagreements over the unfolding of power shifts during the Arab 
Spring, which emerged in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, were still evolving 
and were set within the context of wider regional and global concerns (Altunisik 2004, 
Altunisik 2008, Altunisik 2009, Tur 2011, Pope 2010, Mufti 2002, Bagci and Sinkaya 
2007, Kirisci 2011, Stein 2014).  
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Ankara-Baghdad-Erbil relations  
The discourse surrounding Turkey’s policy toward Iraq and the area governed by the 
KRG were defined through a traditional “security lens” or realist approach (Barkey and 
Laipson 2005, Barkey 2001, Barkey 2005, Altunisik 2006, Altunisik 2007, Park 2002, 
Park 2003, Park 2004a, Park 2004b, Park 2008, Park 2012b, Fuller 2008, Brown 2007, 
Canci and Sen 2010, Aykan 1996, Keskin 2008, Uslu et al. 2005). Beginning in the 
early 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq was shaped by four dominant 
strategic cultures: a pro status quo stance, a tradition of realpolitik, non-involvement, 
and the experience of great power rivalry and foreign occupation, as a result of the 
Sevres Treaty (Altunisik 2006, Altunisik 2007, Robins 2003, Olson 2005, Somer 2005, 
Erkmen 2003, Gorvett 2006, Erickson 2004, Gordon and Taspinar 2006). More 
recently, under the leadership of the AK Party, Turkey pursued a fifth multidimensional 
approach to relations with Iraq and the KRG, based on engagement through economic 
cooperation and deepening of diplomatic relations (Barkey 2011, Phillips 2009a, 
Cetinsaya 2006b). Although Ankara still had security concerns over the continued 
presence of the PKK within the KRI, Turkish diplomatic and private sector circles 
collaborated to establish opportunities for economic cooperation, and strengthened 
relations with both poles of power in Iraq: Baghdad and Erbil.  
 
The first official attempt at pursuing a policy of engagement and cooperation with Iraq 
was led by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul. Concerned with the 
possible outbreak of armed conflict in Iraq, Ankara, in cooperation with key countries 
in the region, launched the “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process,” an initiative that 
brought together Iraq and its neighbors for ministerial consultations in January 2003, 
prior to the U.S.-led invasion (Today’s Zaman 2008). The initiative eventually evolved 
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into the “Expanded Neighboring Countries of Iraq Foreign Ministers Meeting,” which 
included Iraq’s neighbors, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
G-8 countries, the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab 
League, and the European Union. The Initiative created an environment where 
representatives of Iraq, Iraq’s neighbors, and countries who would play a key role in the 
country, could discuss important issues regarding security and stability in Iraq. These 
activities continued until 2008 when Ankara and Baghdad established a bi-lateral “High 
Level Strategic Cooperation Council” in which the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to a Strategic 
Partnership (Ozcan 2010). The high level meeting between the two Prime Ministers, 
which was facilitated by Jalal Talabani, Iraqi President and co-leader of the KRG, 
resulted in a list of political, economic, energy, water, cultural, security and military 
principles or agreements to guide relations between the two countries (Turkey Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2008). The Joint Political Declaration guided the ministers of both 
governments during their periodic coordination meetings and implementation of action 
plans in the political, diplomatic and cultural and the security and military cooperation 
spheres. Turkey’s participation in the initiative facilitated further attention on the more 
important AK Party foreign policy goals, to ensure the success and stability of economic 
and energy cooperation with Iraq and the KRG. To the surprise of the U.S. 
administration, Ankara denied the U.S. military to undertake a major offensive from 
Turkish soil into northern Iraq in March 2003 (Martin 2012, 232-233).iv Concerned with 
the potential instability the invasion of Iraq would generate, Erdogan indicated Turkey 
would establish a 20-kilometer buffer zone,  
“aimed at controlling a possible wave of refugees into Turkey, to prevent certain 
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provocations against our security, and to protect our borders” (Open Society Institute 
2003). 
 
Why Ankara needed a strategic partnership with Baghdad 
With one of the fastest growing economies in the world yet energy poor, Turkey, was 
forced to search for alternative and uninterrupted sources of energy, and to operate at 
multiple levels with countries supplying energy sources to arrange constant supplies of 
oil and gas (International Energy Agency 2009). Without constant and affordable 
energy supplies, the economic miracle in Turkey risked implosion, political turmoil, 
and the possible fall of the AKP Government. Ever since 2002, when American 
President Bush declared Iran to be part of an “Axis of Evil,” along with Iraq and North 
Korea, the stability of oil and gas imports from Iran and Iraq became problematic (Bush 
2002). The American invasion of Iraq, and subsequent Iraqi resistance and civil war, 
resulted in severe degradation and sabotage of the Iraqi oil infrastructure and reduction 
of oil exports (Taydas and Ozdamar 2013). In 2009, Iraq was the source of 9 percent of 
Turkish oil imports, but they steadily rose to 15 percent and 17 percent, in 2010 and 
2011, respectively. Turkey’s dependency on Iran for crude oil imports increased to 51 
percent in 2011 (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2014, Bahgat 2014). However, by 
2012, crude oil imports to Turkey from Iran decreased significantly to 39 percent of the 
total imports, followed by Iraq with 19 percent, Saudi Arabia at 15 percent, and Russia 
with 11 percent (International Energy Agency 2013, 6). Pressure from the United States 
on Turkey to observe the American led embargo on importation of Iranian oil was 
irresistible and difficult for Turkey to avoid or circumvent. Furthermore, Turkey was 
determined to diversify its sources of foreign oil and natural gas, in order to insure that 
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no disruptions of oil and gas from any country could result in a crippling blow to the 
Turkish economy. 
 
As part of its national security policy to ensure stability in Turkey and the region, 
Turkey needed to negotiate with both the Baghdad government and the leaders of the 
KRG. Diplomatic, political, and military circles in Turkey were concerned about the 
impact of Iraq’s disastrous civil war, the rise of al-Qaeda associated terrorists, and an 
uncertain future due to the anticipated drawdown of American occupation troops.v A 
sound security framework involving Turkey and Iraq was essential for the other 
principles, particularly economic and energy, to be successful (Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008). In order for expansion of oil and gas production and to ensure 
onward movement of the products, via pipelines and trucks, to Turkey and other markets 
in Europe a stable security situation in Iraq was necessary. Essential, from Turkey’s 
viewpoint, was a cooperation agreement to counter terrorists and organized criminal 
groups. The Turks focused on the PKK, whose demands for independence, and later, 
autonomy, threatened the political cohesion of the Turkish state. The conflict in 
Southeastern Turkey continued to disrupt the economic stability of Turkey, and 
threatened the expansion of energy imports and export trade with Iraq. Inside Turkey, 
pipelines carrying Azeri and Iranian natural gas, as well as Iranian and Iraqi crude oil 
imports, were subject to periodic sabotage by the PKK. In addition to the attacks on 
Turkish crude oil pipelines, the PKK, operating from their safe areas in the northern 
portion of Iraqi Kurdistan, attacked military outposts along the border and, occasionally, 
tourist areas in Turkey (Ant 2008, Kapsis 2005). Therefore, from a military standpoint, 
Ankara was concerned about the PKK operating from the mountains in the KRI and 
possibly from Syria (Olson 2007, Bengio 1995). The expansion of the Turkish trade and 
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energy corridor from Iraq to Europe was contingent on the safe movement of Turkish 
goods and Iraqi energy via roads and pipelines to destinations in Iraq and Turkey 
(Celikpala 2009). In 2011, the KRG’s influence in Baghdad took an abrupt change when 
the Vice President, Tariq al-Hashimi, was given sanctuary in the KRI, and later in 
Ankara, to avoid arrest on murder charges. In 2013, Erbil-Baghdad relations further 
soured over the withholding of the KRG’s fair share of the Iraqi budget.  
 
Why Ankara became big brother to the KRG 
Turkey desired to develop and capitalize on common interests with Iraq, not only to 
repress, jointly, the PKK, but also to ensure that al-Qaeda-connected violence and 
subversion in Iraq did not spill over into Turkey, or jeopardize mutually beneficial trade. 
The main oil pipelines from southern and northern Iraq to Turkey all passed through 
Baiji, an area of insurgent sabotage activity in north central Iraq (Healy 2011). Ankara 
perceived that stronger security cooperation with Baghdad would weaken the PKK, in 
addition to reducing possible al-Qaeda spillover security challenges. However, 
Baghdad had limited ability to help Turkey, since the PKK base camps were located in 
“ungoverned space” in the far tip of northeastern Iraq, contiguous to southeastern border 
of Turkey (Phillips 2009). The area, although nominally part of the area governed by 
the KRG, was not under their effective administration. The major base camps of the 
PKK were located in the rugged Qandil Mountains of Iraq, bordered by both Turkey 
and Iran, effectively in ungoverned space. The 3,000-meter-high peaks, deep valleys, 
and few roads made the area almost unreachable. The KRG could not control the PKK 
mountain base camps or the PKK border launch sites into Turkey (Krajes 2012). The 
KRG was also reluctant to close down the military aspects of the PKK-influenced 
Makhmour refugee camp located west of Kirkuk (Cuma 2011, Busch 2005). Even if 
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Baghdad wanted to attack the PKK safe areas and prevent PKK raiding parties from 
infiltrating into Turkey, it did not have the military means nor the access to the Turkey-
Iraq border to make a significant difference in mitigating the Turkish internal security 
challenge (Keskin 2008). To address these challenges, a successful Ankara and 
Baghdad joint security effort needed the active support of the KRG, as well as 
intelligence and airlift support from the American occupation forces; otherwise, the 
well-insulated PKK could not be defeated. A series of attacks by the PKK in 2007 from 
the KRI resulted in subsequent Turkish air strikes on suspected PKK base camps. In 
2008, the Turkish Army moved ground forces into the Zab region of the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq. The Turkish cross-border operations reinforced a security approach to 
combating the PKK without addressing the negative impact on local communities in the 
region.  
 
By 2007, two observables trends started to emerge: First, Baghdad was unable to help 
Turkey defeat the PKK in their northern Iraq safe areas, and the American occupation 
forces refused to do it for them. Secondly, the Turkish Prime Minister and security 
establishment admitted that military action, alone, would not solve their “Kurdish 
problem” (Minhac 2012, 65-67). A new security approach was needed. The AKP 
Government believed that without addressing the marginalization of the Kurds with 
Turkish citizenship, and the active cooperation of the KRG leadership to pressure the 
PKK to renounce their armed struggle, the insurgency could continue, indefinitely. The 
AK Party, with the tacit support of the military, decided to engage in political dialogue 
and support economic development in southeastern Turkey in order to persuade the 
Turkish Kurds to abandon their resistance, in return for cultural rights and a more just 
relationship with the Turkish state. Concurrent with the opening to the Turkish Kurds, 
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the Turkish government made the decision to develop a cooperative relationship with 
the KRG. Expansion of trade between Turkey and the KRG was expected to benefit the 
relatively poor economy of Southeastern Turkey and, therefore, benefit the Kurds living 
closest to Iraq. Robert Olson noted, “An increase in economic activities in the southeast 
could lessen the support of the Kurds in the region for militant Kurdish nationalist 
groups” (Olson 2006, 18). Iraqi President Talabani’s visit to Ankara on March 7, 2008, 
and Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad on July 10, 2008, marked significant 
steps towards normalizing relations between Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil (Robertson 
and Williams 2009). During the trip, Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, 
signed a “Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of a High Strategic Council 
between the Government of Turkey and the Government of Iraq” (Phillips 2009a, 11). 
The declaration “pledged security cooperation to eradicate the PKK, which al-Maliki 
compared to al-Qaeda, and restricted PKK operations, recruitment, revenues, and media 
access” (International Crisis Group 2008, 5).  
 
Diplomatic and trade relations between Ankara and Erbil greatly deepened since the 
first Turkish government delegation traveled to the area governed by the KRG in order 
to advance contacts, in 2008. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to Erbil 
in October 2009 was a significant moment in Ankara-Erbil relations, as his trip marked 
the first time a Turkish foreign minister visited the KRI. President Barzani, in a press 
conference following his meeting with Foreign Minister Davutoglu, stated, “This visit 
of the Foreign Minister to Erbil is an important step, indeed an historic step. We know 
that Turkey has an important role in our development, and this relationship requires 
special attention. I am, therefore, delighted to announce that Turkey will open a 
Consulate General in Erbil” (KRG 2009). Although skeptical, many Iraqi Kurds 
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perceived Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s visit as recognition of the importance Erbil was 
starting to play inside Iraq and in the region. However, public opinion in Turkey was 
mixed over Ankara moving closer to Erbil. Nevertheless, Ankara opened a Consulate 
General in Erbil in 2010, a positive signal that Ankara was willing to move beyond the 
tensions of the past. In 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – the first Turkish 
premier to visit the Iraqi Kurdish-held region – attended the inauguration of Erbil 
International Airport, which was constructed by Makyol Cengiz, a Turkish joint venture 
(Yilmaz 2007). During Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Erbil, President Barzani 
stated, “We consider this to be a very historic moment. We believe that this visit will 
build a very solid bridge in bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey and between the 
Kurdistan region and Turkey especially” (Iraq-Business News 2011). The subsequent 
visits by the KRG President, Masoud Barzani, and KRG Prime Minister, Nechirvan 
Barzani, to Turkey in May 2012, further contributed to the deepening of bilateral and 
economic relations between Ankara and Erbil. According to Soner Cagaptay and Tyler 
Evans, “Turkey is in many ways a better option than Baghdad as a gateway to the global 
economy” (Cagaptay and Evans 2012, 9). Furthermore, “this commercial relationship 
underlines the fact that Kurdistan’s economic stability and consequent political success 
are highly contingent on Turkish goodwill. Given this fact, and the KRG’s perceived 
threat from Baghdad, it is safe to say that the Iraqi Kurds have more incentive to get 
along with Turkey than ever” (Cagaptay and Evans 2012, 9).  
 
Turkey-KRG relations 2011 – 2014: The good to bad years 
Everything seemed to be on track for a growing and mutually productive relationship 
between the KRG and Turkey. Business was booming. Export volumes from Turkey to 
Iraq and the KRG were the highest ever. Turkish companies were rushing into the KRG 
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to take advantage of lucrative construction contracts and high consumer demand for 
Turkish made or grown products. Turkish business dominated the KRG construction 
and consumer products sectors. The KRG seemed immune to the negative fallout from 
Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki’s decision to centralize all means of coercive state power 
under him, and to completely marginalize Iraqi Sunnis, starting as soon as the last 
American troops withdrew from Iraq in December, 2011. Over a period of nine years, 
al-Maliki had progressively purged Sunni ministers and officers from positions of 
power and authority in the Ministry of Defense, the Army, the Police and secret police, 
replacing them with loyal political hacks, characterized by their incompetence, 
corruption and vindictiveness towards Sunnis (Khedery 2014a). 
 
Political stability in Iraq continued to crumble between 2012 and 2014, but in the 
dynamic KRI, it seemed stable, prosperous, and without ethnic tensions. As long as the 
KRG received their 17 percent share of the Iraqi National budget, the movers and 
shakers in the KRI were content to push on with infrastructure development, capacity 
building and expansion of private sector initiatives to attract more foreign direct 
investments, and to build a direct link to Turkey’s oil exporting capability. Their 
relationship with the Baghdad government, although testy, seemed secure with the 
calming presence of Talabani as the influential President of Iraq. However, when Vice 
President Tariq al-Hashimi, an important leader of Iraqi Sunnis, had his personal 
bodyguards attacked and imprisoned by al-Maliki in December, 2011, he fled to Erbil 
to avoid arrest and persecution. The disintegration of the political fabric of the Iraqi 
nation began to unravel. Al-Hashimi later left Erbil for Ankara, and was granted 
political asylum in Turkey. KRG co-leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was 
unable to smooth over tensions between the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi Sunnis 
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because he became seriously ill in 2012. For a two-year period, he remained in a 
German hospital for an extended recovery. His absence from the political scene was a 
severe blow, since it was thought he could have moderated the extremism of al-Maliki. 
Talabani return to Iraq in July, 2014, but was replaced as President by Fuad Masum, a 
fellow Kurd. Even if Talabani had returned to office in 2014, it would have been too 
late to have undone all of the damage al-Maliki had wrought to destroy Sunni trust and 
confidence in his regime.  
 
Meanwhile, back in paradise 
The KRG was successfully branding itself as an oasis of peace inside a turbulent Middle 
East. In advertising and special business publication supplements, the KRI was self-
described as “the other Iraq,” a modern, safe, and secure secular political entity for 
foreign direct investments (Saaid, 2010). Business and trade with Turkey was booming 
(Cagaptay, Bache Fidan, Sacikara 2015). Turkish companies were building most of the 
infrastructure projects in the KRI to include: transportation, electrical power generation, 
as well as luxury housing and prestige projects such as the new airport in Erbil and 
Dohuk in the KRI. The Erbil International Airport project was considered one of the 
best in the Middle East, and more modern than the Baghdad International Airport in the 
nation’s capital. However, while things were booming in the KRI, the situation in 
northern Iraq was about to explode. 
 
The coming storm in Iraq 
The Syrian Civil War from 2011 onward, after the failure of non-violent resistance, 
pitted the State, controlled by the extended Assad family and their Arab Socialist Ba’ath 
Party apparatus, a coalition of Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds against much of 
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the greater Sunni community. Within the violence and chaos of the armed struggle, 
various Jihadi radical guerrilla groups, backed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, 
started to dominate. Still functioning remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq and former military 
and intelligence officers of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq joined forces, seized the opportunity 
and moved most of their operations into Syria. The name for this transnational group 
was Daesh. Winning battles and absorbing other groups they formed the dominant anti-
Assad fighting force in Syria. In 2014, they refocused their main interest upon Iraq 
(Khedery 2014b). The regime of Nouri al-Maliki had so oppressed and disillusioned the 
Iraqi Sunnis that by June 2014, a few hundred Daesh fighters took over Mosul, the 
second largest city in Iraq, in what seemed more like a cakewalk than a battle. 
Threatened with the motivated Daesh fighters, the corrupt and incompetent Iraqi Army 
generals and colonels in Mosul deserted their posts and fled the city. This triggered a 
general panic and the complete collapse of the Iraqi Army in northern Iraq. Daesh thus 
ruled Mosul, the most important city in northern Iraq. It also robbed banks and inherited 
billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. provided military equipment, such as tanks, artillery 
and transport vehicles that would give them the means to transition to mobile warfare 
against the confused forces of the KRG, the crumbling Iraqi Army and the anti-Daesh 
Sunnis (Kirkpatrick 2014). The dreams of a viable, secure and prosperous Kurdish 
Region in Iraq were in danger of going up in flames. Daesh forces quickly positioned 
themselves to seize Erbil, however, with the arrival of the U.S. airplanes were pushed 
back (Phillips 2014, 353, Malek 2014, Gunter 2015, 105). The priority of the KRG 
became the survival of the regime and the Kurdish people. The enhancement of human 
security fell to the bottom of the list of priorities of the Kurdish state until the existential 
threat to the KRI was mediated or defeated. During this period of extraordinary crisis, 
Turkey failed to provide quick military assistance to the KRG with its desperate fight 
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with Daesh. The Turkish private sector’s engagement in the region appeared to not have 
really translated into stronger ties between Ankara and Erbil.  
 
In the fall of 2014, a symbolic fight that unraveled within the watch of the international 
media based in Turkey broke out in the Syrian town of Kobane (Romano 2015, Barkey 
2014, Gurses and Romano, 2011). A predominantly Kurdish city, the Syrian Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG) opposition group was unable to keep Daesh at bay. On 
October 29, 2014, with the consent of Ankara Kurdish Peshmerga fighters crossed 
through Turkish territory into Syria to fight Daesh (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 2014). With the help of coalition airstrikes, and in cooperation with the 
Peshmerga, the YPG pushed Daesh out of Kobane. Soon after, the Turkish military sent 
advisers to the KRI to train the Peshmerga soldiers and established two military training 
camps for the KRG in the Soran and Qalacholan districts, both which are located in the 
KRI (Dizayee 2015).  
 
Development of the Turkish economy during the AK party government  
Turkey, under the leadership of the AK Party government, continued to implement 
economic policies that had been established during the former Ecevit-led coalition 
government (Bugra 2003). During single party rule, Turkey experienced significant 
GDP growth, relatively low inflation rates, fiscal austerity, and unforeseen levels of 
privatization and foreign direct investment (Onis and Senses 2009, Onis 2011). The 
restructuring of the financial sector, particularly the banking sector, among other 
prescribed policy recommendations, “maintained the confidence of international 
financial institutions, big business holdings and foreign investors” (Bank and Karadag 
2012, 10, Demir 2009). The rate of privatization under the AK Party was unsurpassed 
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when compared to previous administrations. The rate of privatization from 1985 until 
2002 generated $9.5 billion; whereas, from 2002 until 2012, privatization proceeds 
exceeded $34 billion (Bank and Karadag, 2012, 10). Most of the sales occurred in key 
areas such as energy, telecommunications, mining, sugar and tobacco. Furthermore, 
foreign direct investment increased almost ten-fold since 2002 (Kutlay 2011, Altan-
Olcay 2011). The AK Party served as a “source driving the disembedding of the market 
and as the main ‘re-embedder’ of the discontented, and thus propagated pro-capitalist 
and social solidarity values at the same time” (Gocmen, 2011).  
 
The AK Party supported the development of the private sector and export-led growth 
strategies in Turkey. The government initiated tax incentives and other development 
schemes to encourage the private sector to export and conduct business activities 
abroad. For instance, Turquality, an initiative of the Turkish government, Ministry of 
Economy, Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, and the Apparel Exporters’ Association, 
facilitates and supports the emergence of Turkish brands in the international market. 
The Turquality program provides members reimbursements on business activities 
related to export operations. The emergence and growth of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) contributed to the stability and diversity of the Turkish economy, as 
many of them pursued business opportunities in the surrounding regions, including the 
Middle East. The rise of SMEs in the Turkish private sector was concurrent with the 
rise of the AK Party as they served as a strong support base for the AK Party (Hosgor 
2011).  
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Setting the scene and the importance of trade relations  
Some Turkish companies operated in the KRI prior to the United Nations-led economic 
sanctions of the 1990s, some even dating back to the 1970s, however, it was really after 
the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, and the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, that the presence 
of the Turkish private sector deepened and widened in sectors, such as banking and 
finance, construction, education, electricity, food items, gas, health, imports, oil, 
telecommunications, transportation, tourism and water. After the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion, the no-fly zones, both the international economic sanctions on Iraq, and the 
internal sanctions that Saddam had imposed on the KRI were abolished. The centrally 
run Iraqi economy crumbled after the American invasion, and a new liberal economic 
framework was pursued. Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, on March 19, 2003, 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as a transitional government 
with executive, legislative and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from April 
21, 2003 until its dissolution on June 28, 2004. The CPA advocated for an economy, 
which was to be determined by “free markets, increased globalization, and reduced 
government interference in the marketplace” (Looney 2004, 1). However, rather than 
the development and diversification of a formal private sector, the informal economy 
expanded due to the ongoing conflict and lack of investors (Looney 2006, Halchin, L. 
Elaine 2005, Ward 2005, Looney 2003a, Crum 2006, Slevin 2003, U.S. Institute for 
Peace 2005, Foote, Block, Crane and Gray 2004, Bremer 2003). The importance given 
to the oil sector since the 1950s and reconstituted under the CPA, and continued by the 
new Iraqi central government, discouraged the “emergence of new manufacturing 
exports that were essential for the successful diversification of the economy and job 
creation in the formal economy” (Looney 2006, 4). The central government’s 
overwhelming prioritization of the oil sector hindered the diversification of the 
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economy and the private sector and the development of local industries that could 
compete with the importation of inexpensive goods.  
 
Due to the secure environment that the KRG had established over the last few decades, 
the KRI was largely exempt from the chaos and terrorism resulting from the American 
invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The determination of the KRG to establish a 
friendly business and investment climate, coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit of the 
Turkish private sector, resulted in significant economic cooperation -- unthinkable a 
few years ago. The deepening of relations between Turkey and the KRG highlighted 
Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy and immense “soft power” in the region 
(Nye 2004a, Nye 2004b). The KRG, not only safeguarded a region known as a relative 
oasis of peace and stability in the Middle East by investing in their own security, but in 
the development of their economy, infrastructure and human capital. Denise Natali 
indicates that after the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, “the UN 
terminated its oil-for-food program and allocated its remaining funds, or about $1.5 
billion, to the Coalition Provisional Authority, which then transferred the funds to the 
Kurdish Regional Governments in Arbil (Hawler) and Sulaymaniyah to complete the 
unfinished projects in Iraqi Kurdistan” (Natali 2005, 168). Natali further notes contrary 
to other provinces in Iraq, “international humanitarian-aid programs have encouraged 
the autonomous region’s economic and political prosperity” (Natali 2005, 175). The 
KRG creation of a liberal business environment was solidified with the approval of the 
Iraqi Investment Law in 2006. According to one respondent, the KRG leadership 
believed that molding a friendly business environment would distinguish the KRI from 
other regional markets as a safe and relatively easy place to do business (Regional 
Expert at a Foreign Policy Institute, 2015, Interview, Washington, DC). The presence 
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of the Turkish private sector in the KRI expanded, in part, due to the benefits granted 
by the Investment Law, the establishment of a visa-free scheme with the KRG, Turkey’s 
proximity to the KRI, overlapping cultural traits and social relationships with people 
from the KRI, as well as a secure environment. Another senior-level bureaucrat argued 
that the Investment Law cemented the KRI as a viable place for the international private 
sector to do business (Senior Official, KRG, Interview, 2014, Istanbul). The KRG hoped 
that by attracting the international private sector to operate in the KRI, the international 
community would have a stake in future developments in the region. Representatives 
of the Turkish private sector were well positioned to capitalize on positive 
developments from within the KRI due to shared cultural values, historical trade 
patterns, and a contiguous land border. Furthermore, it was thought that any increase in 
Turkish influence with the KRG translated into more influence in Baghdad because of 
the Kurds’ critical role in Iraq’s capital (Barkey 2010).  
 
Despite a series of Turkish truck driver hostage-takings incidents by insurgents, a few 
thousand trucks per day brought in goods, such as electronics, food products, military 
equipment, and other items manufactured in Turkey, not only for the local population, 
but also for consumption by the American and coalition occupation forces (Shadid 
2011, Olson 2006, 19). The Turkish private sector also utilized the KRI as a safe and 
secure destination to store goods destined for other regions in Iraq, Syria and Iran. 
Turkey’s Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) declared that the 
projected trade figures with Iraq, mostly with the KRI, was a “vital artery” for Turkey 
(Toker 2004). In 2005, there were only 86 Turkish companies that undertook 109 
projects worth $1.5 billion in Iraq (Kirisci 2006, 47). In 2009, there were only around 
485 Turkish companies operating in the area governed by the KRG. By 2010, 730 
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Turkish firms, and up to an estimated 25,000 Turkish workers, were employed in the 
KRI (Sabah 2010). By the end of 2010, 4 Turkish firms were consortium leaders or 
partners in 14 out of the 40 production licenses. By 2012, there were approximately 
1,023 Turkish firms in operations, employing roughly 30,000 Turkish citizens 
possessing residence permits. During his April 2012, visit to Turkey, KRG Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Sinan Celebi, pointed out that 25 new Turkish companies were 
launched every month in Iraqi Kurdistan, with more than half of the foreign companies 
that were registered in the KRG being Turkish (Ihlas 2012). According to Turkey’s 
Trade Ministry, the Turkish-Iraqi trade relationship amounted to about $940 million 
prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Ogus and Erbil 2005). In 2007, Turkish 
exports to Iraq totaled $2.8 billion with approximately 50 percent or $1.4 billion going 
to the KRI (Cagaptay, Bache Fidan Sacikara, and Baste 2015). By 2010, Turkey’s 
export volume to Iraq was $7 billion, 70 percent of which went to the KRI (KRG 
Department of Foreign Relations 2012). In 2011, Turkish exports to Iraq equaled $8.3 
billion, of which approximately 5.1 billion went to the KRI and in 2013, approximately 
$8 billion out of $11.9 billion went to the KRI (Cagaptay, Bache Fidan, Sacikara, Baste, 
2015). 
 
Overview of business associations and key sectors in Turkey that relate to this 
thesis 
The AK Party’s multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy included an emphasis on 
the stability of the Turkish market and continued economic growth, coupled with the 
expansion of the Turkish private sector’s global reach. Kirisci noted that this 
phenomenon contributed to the rise of Turkey as a trading state. Kemal Kirisci claims 
that, “The decision in 1980 to liberalize the Turkish economy and adopt the precepts of 
  
133 
 
the Washington consensus led to the gradual emergence of export-oriented Anatolian 
Tigers as constituencies seeking markets abroad” (Kirisci 2009, 43, European Stability 
Initiative 2005).vi The widening of the Turkish private sector established a new pillar of 
influence for Ankara (Kirisci 2009, Kirisci, Tocci and Walker 2010). With regard to the 
relationship between the government and the private sector, Kirisci, indicates, “The 
liberal market policies put into place in the 1980s eventually led to the emergence of 
strong business interest groups increasingly able to access the government as well as 
foreign decision-makers” (Kirisci 2009, 46). Atli noted, “One of the most crucial 
components of the interaction between the state and business is the role of business 
associations that translate common interests into collective action” (Altay 2011, 110).  
 
The main motive behind choosing the construction sector and the export sector and 
associated business entities that are included in this dissertation is that they portray a 
diverse picture of engagement by the Turkish private sector in the area governed by the 
KRG. The impact of the Turkish construction sector on economic security in the KRI 
will be analyzed in Chapter 4 on the Construction Sector. The impact of the Turkish 
export sector and other Turkish business initiatives on economic security in the KRI 
will be reviewed in Chapter 5 on the Export Sector and Associated Business Activities. 
Although this dissertation does not include all Turkish business associations operating 
in the KRI, it highlights the two that are most pertinent to this research project as they 
represent the bulk of businesses engaged in these sectors. The Turkish Contractors 
Association (TMB), established in 1952, is the oldest, nonprofit, non-governmental 
professional organization in the Turkish construction industry and represents the 
leading construction companies in Turkey. The Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), 
established in 1993, serves as the leading association for regional exporter unions, and 
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is fully subject to public institutions’ regulations. Many of the members of these two 
organizations have been operating in the area governed by the KRG since the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, some even before the 1991 invasion of Iraq. The associations 
represent a variety of companies concerning their size, some being small-medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) while others are large corporations. Some of the private sector 
entities that are referred to in this research project are members of more than one 
business association. There were only a few companies that I interviewed that were not 
members of the two associations mentioned in my research. 
 
The engagement of Turkish companies in the construction sector 
Following the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, the Turkish construction sector gained a 
significant portion of all infrastructure and commercial projects in the area governed by 
the KRG. Since 1975, about $12.7 billion of construction projects in Iraq were 
completed by Turkish firms with $11.3 billion of that amount or 89 percent being 
completed after the 2003 invasion (Oxford Business Group 2012). Because of the 
destruction of major infrastructure by the Saddam regime, the KRI was in need of a 
complete overhaul. Bridges, electrical network, hospitals, roads, schools, water and 
sewage systems all needed to be constructed or renovated (United Nations Development 
Programme 2012). Due in part to the proximity of the region, and the capacity for trucks 
to haul in cement and other heavy machinery relatively easily companies from Turkey 
were some of the first to begin working in the construction sector in the KRI. In general, 
Turkish companies were willing to open satellite offices, relocate staff, and share 
technical skills with local employees and contractors.  
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The engagement of Turkish companies in the export sector and associated business 
initiatives  
Turkish manufactures and exporters capitalized on the shared Turkey-KRG border for 
easy access and relatively low-transportation costs to the KRI, rise in stability and 
economic development, familiar cultural reference points, a burgeoning middle-class, 
demand for reasonably priced high-quality goods, and growing commercial 
infrastructure. Companies from Turkey supplied approximately 80 percent of Iraqi 
Kurdish consumer imports ranging from textiles, food products, and furniture (Turunc 
2011). Just step into one of the new shopping malls, such as the Majidi Mall in Erbil, 
and one will find a wide array of Turkish brand name goods, and will intermittently 
hear Turkish spoken, as the language has become widely used in business and retail 
circles (Hava 2012). Even grocery stores supply Turkish food products – from rice and 
pasta, to chocolate and cheese. Erol Ertemer wrote that Riza Nur Meral, the head of the 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey indicated, “There is no 
doubt that Turkey is the key supplier of food to northern Iraq. I believe greater 
opportunity lies in this region for Turkish businesses to increase their export volume” 
(Ertemer 2012). Many companies from Turkey not only exported goods to the KRI, but 
also routinely utilized the warehouse infrastructure in the KRI to store goods before re-
exporting them to other provinces in Iraq and on to Iran and Syria.  
 
The KRG’s quest to establish a friendly business environment in the KRI 
Despite the difficulties faced by the people of Iraqi Kurdistan under the Saddam regime, 
rising regional instability and global economic crisis, combined with the chaos and 
violence that followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, there was still a remarkable move 
towards stabilization and economic growth in the KRI. Building on the political steps 
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that were taken to start a democratic framework during the 1990s, the KRG established 
key government bodies, such as the Board of Investment and the Ministry of Planning, 
orchestrated strategies to promote socioeconomic development in the region, and 
implemented key investment-related legislation. There were key factors, such as the 
passing of the KRG Investment Law, in 2006, the relatively safe business environment, 
high return on investment, the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens in the KRI, Turkey’s 
proximity to the KRI, overlapping cultural traits and social relationships, and a secure 
atmosphere in the KRI that attracted the Turkish private sector to the region.  
 
The major step to following a whole-of-government approach to ensure cohesive and 
sustainable efforts for socioeconomic development was to establish and give authority 
to the relevant government bodies. The Ministry of Planning (MOP), established in 
2006, was tasked with six main responsibilities: prepare the annual investment budget 
and acquire approval from Parliament; conduct long-term sector-based planning for the 
region; develop human resources; coordinate and cooperate with international 
development agencies including the World Bank and U.S. Agency for International 
Development, among others; support the Kurdistan Regional Office for Data and 
Statistics; and lastly, conduct quality control of imported goods. The Board of 
Investment (BOI), also established in 2006, focused on the promotion of domestic and 
foreign investment in the region. The BOI’s specific objectives related to creating 
investment opportunities for both domestic and foreign investors, providing 
professional services, and ensuring that investment procedures were simple, 
transparent, and within the legal framework of the region (KRG Board of Investment). 
In addition to establishing the two main government bodies, tasked with implementing 
socioeconomic development strategies and the necessary frameworks to attract both 
  
137 
 
domestic and international investment, the KRG launched the Erbil Stock Exchange 
(ESX) to ensure a more transparent and sophisticated platform to facilitate the trading 
of shares in local companies, and to attract investment to the region (al Sayegh 2012). 
According to Abduallah A. Abdul Rahem (Abo Bangin), Chairman of the ESX, “The 
launch of the ESX initiative is yet another testimony of the commitment of the people 
of our region to not only showcase the positive developments in Kurdistan, but to also 
position the region as the gateway to Iraq and its growth-oriented companies” (Louis 
Berger, 2013). Furthermore, the “ESX is (a) modern market that parallels legislation, 
regulations, institutions, technology, information and processing of the developed 
markets in the region” (NASDAQ OMX 2013). 
 
The KRG used key international development indicators, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, as benchmarks to evaluate 
the reconstruction and stabilization of the region (Ford 2015). The KRG applied other 
international approaches to combatting human insecurities by establishing their own 
strategies for socioeconomic development (UNDP 2012, KRG Ministry of Planning 
2012a). Development aid agencies that had been engaged in Iraq, some during the 
United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, while others after the U.S.-led invasion of 
2003, offered their analysis on how to implement a sound development framework for 
the KRI. One in particular, RTI-International, prepared an economic development 
assessment for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and outlined 
four key areas that it deemed pertinent for accelerated economic development and 
growth. The first factor was a lack of information and transparency regarding economic 
data and rules and regulations required of ministries. The second was the absence of an 
effective, modern banking sector. The third was the need for an education system that 
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met the demands of a market economy. Fourth was the lack of adequate infrastructure 
that could support the changing economic picture (USAID 2008). The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), initiated the Socio-Economic Infrastructure Needs 
Assessment (KRG Ministry of Planning, 2012b), to assess and “identify the Region’s 
key infrastructure gaps and to provide a detailed and realistic evaluation of the 
investment needed to remedy these deficiencies” (KRG, Ministry of Planning and the 
UNDP 2012, 5). The study was meant to provide the relevant government bodies a 
framework on how to “better prioritize infrastructure investment and to implement the 
policy changes needed to narrow the gap in the quality of service provision in relation 
to other sectors” (KRG, Ministry of Planning and the UNDP, 5, UN-HABITAT 2012). 
 
Introduced by the Kurdistan Board of Investment (BOI), the main piece of free-market 
legislation, the Investment Law was enacted in July, 2006. The law was debated and 
approved by the Kurdistan National Assembly,vii the Region’s parliament, and ratified 
by President Masoud Barzani. Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head of Foreign Relations 
for the KRG, called the Investment Law “among the most investor-friendly laws in the 
wider region” (Kurdistan Tribune 2011). The passing of the Investment Law established 
a relatively safe business environment, and provided opportunities for high returns on 
investment, thus contributing to a boost in the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey 
and the KRI. One regional expert close to the KRG indicated that the idea behind 
enticing the international private sector to operate in the KRI was to ensure they invested 
in the future of the region (Regional Expert at a Foreign Policy Institute, 2015, 
Interview, Washington, DC). It is important to note that not all officials agreed with 
offering such a liberal business environment to the international private sector. One 
representative argued that although the Investment Law attracted essential investment 
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for the development of the infrastructure in the KRI, however, by not including a 
stipulation to employ native residents it failed to guarantee knowledge transfer between 
Turkish and local professionals (Senior Official, KRG, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Representatives from the Turkish private sector who were interviewed for this research 
project mentioned that the following articles of the Investment Law, 2006, enticed them 
to do business in the KRI:  
 Foreign and local investors and capital are treated equally under the law; 
 Foreign and local investors are entitled to own all of the capital of any project; 
 The government allocates free or reduced-price land to investment projects that 
fulfill the criteria; 
 Foreign investors are free to repatriate capital upon the liquidation or disposal of 
the project, provided that it does not conflict with the provisions of law, customs 
procedures, and tax procedures; 
 Investors are entitled to insure a project through any national or foreign 
insurance company; 
 Foreign and local investors are equally entitled to buy and own land for 
investment purposes, that is, if it does not contain oil, gas or mineral resources; 
 Investors get a 10-year non-custom tax break once they start production or 
service provision; 
 A Project shall be exempt from all non-custom taxes and duties for 10 years 
starting from the date of providing services by the Project, or the date of actual 
production;  
 Exemption from all taxes and non-customs duties for machinery, raw materials 
and equipment imported for a project, provided an import license is obtained;   
 Foreign companies are allowed to bring in their own workers and own land; 
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 An Investor may employ local and foreign staff needed for the Project, with the 
priority given to recruiting local manpower in accordance with the laws and 
regulations applicable in the Region (KRG 2006).  
 
A visa-free regime existed for Turkish citizens visiting the KRI. The official 
requirement by the central government of Iraq is that all Turkish citizens must obtain a 
visa from a diplomatic mission abroad before entering the country. However, the KRI 
circumvents this requirement by allowing Turkish citizens planning to visit for a short 
period to enter the KRI without a preapproved visa. Visas could be obtained upon 
arrival, either by land, at the Habur-Zakho border crossing, or at an air border point at 
one of the major international airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. An overwhelming 
majority of respondents acknowledged that the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens 
contributed to the increased presence of the Turkish private sector in the KRI. Turkish 
companies were able to bring workers of all skill levels to the KRI without foreplaning, 
without completing any government paperwork, and at a relatively low cost. Foreign 
workers staying in the KRI for an extended time period were required to register with 
the KRG Directorate of Residence. Many companies from Turkey utilized local 
intermediary firms to expedite the process of acquiring residence permits for 
employees.  
 
The close proximity of the KRI to Turkey rendered it easy and cost effective to transport 
goods and people. The development of infrastructure, including major highways and 
airports, facilitated the ease of travel with many projects being undertaken by companies 
from Turkey. The major flow of people stemmed from Turkey, with more than a million 
Turkish citizens passing through the Habur-Zakho border crossing annually from 2009 
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– 2014. The number of Iraqi citizens entering into Turkey steadily increased since 2005, 
when the figure stood at little more than 100,000. In 2012, 533,149 Iraqi citizens entered 
Turkey and in 2013, 730,639 entered Turkey with the majority traveling via air rather 
than crossing at the land border (Turkish Statistical Institute). Turkish citizens tended 
to travel to the KRI for business purposes, whereas Iraqi Kurds traveled to Turkey for 
leisure, medical treatment, and business operations. 
 
Some respondents mentioned that the overlapping cultural traits and social relationships 
facilitated the increase in companies from Turkey doing business in the KRI. Many of 
the Turkish citizens involved in business activities in the KRI were either from the 
southern part of Turkey, which is a predominately Kurdish region, or had Kurdish ethnic 
ties. Despite the different Kurdish dialects spoken across the region, most 
representatives who had Kurdish connections were able to understand one of the two 
main dialects spoken in the KRI, Sorani or Kurmanji. Respondents who were not 
familiar with Kurdish mentioned that it was common for Iraqi Kurds to speak Turkish 
or English. Therefore, respondents indicated that it was relatively easy to communicate 
with their counterparts in the KRI. For company representatives who did not share 
Kurdish cultural traits, they remarked that they still felt culturally close to their Iraqi 
Kurdish counterparts, and were able to understand one another’s perspectives. The one 
challenge that arose regardless of ethnic origin, among company representatives from 
Turkey, is that Turkish corporate officials often felt their Iraqi Kurdish counterparts did 
not place the same value on time management and professional conduct as might be 
expected in the Turkish work environment.  
 
  
142 
 
During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, from 2003-2011, the KRI was commonly known as 
the most secure environment in Iraq. Many businesses utilized the region to not only 
trade with and operate from within the KRI, but also served as a destination to store 
goods, which were then re-exported to other provinces in Iraq, Iran and Syria. The 
economic relationship between Turkey and Iraq, including the KRI, shifted briefly when 
in June 2014, Daesh seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, blocked major 
trade routes south, kidnaped Turkish truck drivers, occupied the Turkish Consulate in 
Mosul, and captured the consulate staff, their family members, and the security 
detachment. Both the KRG and international community were in disbelief when in 
August 2014, Daesh engaged in an offensive towards the capital of the KRI, advancing 
within approximately 22 kilometers of Erbil (Aydintasbas, 2014, Filkins, 2014). The 
inability of the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi military to defend its territories against 
Daesh, without international support, and the ongoing political wrangling in Baghdad 
over the new Parliament and power-sharing arrangements, raised concerns regarding 
the future of a unified Iraq, and even the future of the KRG. The Iraqi government 
stopped paying the KRG the constitutionally mandated 17 percent share of the budget 
in early 2014 (UNDP 2009). Due to the unexpected rise and expansion of violence in 
Iraq, trade from Turkey to most provinces in the country, including the KRI, lessened 
from June to August. However, by September 2014, Turkish exports to Iraq had equaled 
$909,123,273 million (Turkish Statistical Institute). Therefore, despite the uncertain 
security situation in Iraq, trade between the KRI and Turkey remained relatively on 
track.  
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Conclusion  
Mohammed Ayoob explored the subsequent coming storm and chaos that ensued from 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and questioned whether Iraqi Kurds were more 
secure just because they were “emancipated” from the Saddam regime (Ayoob, 2003). 
He argued, “Continuing occupation and rule by an American satrap is bound to rekindle 
past images of colonial rule in Iraq, to make the Americans deeply unpopular, and even 
eventually to lead to a bloody uprising against the United States and any regime it 
supports in Iraq” (Ayoob 2003, 35). Despite the eruption of violent conflict in most 
governorates in Iraq, the KRI remained relatively safe and stable. Respondents indicated 
that in part because of the secure, liberal, and relatively untapped market, the companies 
they represented were eager to undertake business operations in the KRI. According to 
KRG officials the creation of a liberal business atmosphere attracted the Turkish private 
sector, particularly the construction and import sectors, as well as other business 
initiatives that supported these two sectors, and in turn persuaded the international 
private sector to invest in the long-term stability and security of the KRI (Hava 2012). 
Erbil struggled to maintain relations with the Iraqi central government, led by Nouri al-
Maliki, who was not at ease with the growing autonomy of the KRG, which perceived 
Turkey as its best possible ally in an unstable region. In line with the AK Party’s 
strategic depth approach to foreign policy making and due to the influence of the 
Turkish private sector, Ankara pursued a multi-dimensional approach, with diplomatic, 
economic, and security aspects as the main pillars of relations with the KRG. The lines 
of communication grew even stronger between Ankara and Erbil as trade and 
investment flows increased and diplomatic correspondence widened. The following two 
empirical chapters will provide insight on the measurement and impact of Turkish 
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private sector activity in the KRI from 2004 to 2014 against the economic security 
indicators.  
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Chapter 4 – Impact of the Turkish Construction Sector on Economic Security in 
the KRI  
Introduction  
The chapter will begin with an overview of infrastructure development in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq (KRI) followed by the engagement of the Turkish private sector in the 
KRI. The central focus of this chapter is the empirical data which arose from interviews 
with representatives from the Turkish construction sector. The information in this 
chapter provides crucial insight into the Turkish private sector’s engagement in the KRI.  
 
Infrastructure development in the KRI  
The neglect of the infrastructure of the KRI began in the 1980’s when Saddam Hussein 
redirected government-spending priorities to support his aggressive war against Iran 
(1980-1988) and to suppress Kurdish insurrections against his government. Neglect 
continued after Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the subsequent war with the U.S. 
(1990-1991), the failed Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi government (1991), the 
massive refugee flights to Iran and Turkey (1991-1992), and cessation of Iraqi 
government assistance to the KRI (1992), which forced the people of the KRI to 
immediately begin governing the region without support from Baghdad. The 
debilitating double embargo, one imposed by Saddam Hussein on the KRI, and one 
enacted by the United Nations upon all of Iraq (1992-2003), the chaos and ineptitude of 
the American occupation of Iraq (2003-2011) and resulting resistance, terrorism and 
civil war, roughly following confessional lines of the Sunni and Shia Iraqis further 
devastated the region. Without the interference of Saddam Hussein’s regime and with 
American humanitarian assistance and military support, the KRI avoided the turmoil 
and terrorism that existed in the rest of Iraq. 
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Iraq was a unitary state under the Ba’athist Arab Socialist Party and reflected a highly 
centralized allocation of resources based on the priorities of the Baghdad central 
government. The Ba’ath party government not only closely controlled the ministerial 
bureaucracies, but also wide-ranging state owned industries, universities, hospitals and 
other social institutions normally associated with private sector ownership and 
management. From 2003-2004, the initial year of American occupation, most central 
government entities were looted, and their senior administrators dismissed from their 
positions due to their obligatory membership in the Ba’ath Party that was required as a 
condition for employment. The Iraqi government had essentially collapsed and, even 
after the establishment of a constitutional government in 2005, the new governing body 
in Baghdad provided little assistance for the KRI.  
 
As in many developing states, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) conducted 
many of the functions of the private sector such as leading infrastructure asset 
management and the administration and operations of industrial and commercial 
enterprises. However, prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, the KRG lacked 
the appropriate financial, human, institutional, and material capacity to begin effective 
infrastructure reconstruction. With the establishment of a unified KRG in 2005, the 
region began a concerted effort to rehabilitate existing, and construct new infrastructure 
and to restore basic services. The KRG adopted the Bush Administration’s neoliberal 
agenda concerning the ease of doing business in the region. Although state socialism 
still dominated, there was willingness to allow market capitalism to emerge in 
conjunction with the rise of the oil industry as the economic driver for the economy. 
Transfers of 17 percent of the national oil revenues from Baghdad to the KRG 
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accelerated reconstruction efforts. Given the low level of human capital and 
infrastructure development resulting from 30 years of war, ethnic cleansing, neglect, 
embargoes and terrorism, the KRI, with the help of Turkish construction and 
management companies, made significant progress in infrastructure recovery and 
restoring access to basic services over the last decade. However, the KRI still appeared 
constrained by its almost total reliance on oil revenues for continuance of government 
operations and economic activity.  
 
In coordination with Baghdad, the KRG only recently began to charge customs duties 
on imported materials and products; however, profits of foreign corporations doing 
business in the KRI were not universally taxed (Fowlie 2014, Cosan 2015). Therefore, 
when deprived of their share of the total Iraqi oil revenues, the KRI experienced 
economic turbulence and financial crisis when the KRG could not execute the budget 
as planned. Furthermore, the local private sector expanded in part as a dependent entity 
of Turkey’s domination of business activities, which compromised its independence 
and made it more vulnerable to economic shocks. Providing hefty sums of government 
subsidies, and keeping large numbers of civil servants on the pay roll, posed challenges 
to encouraging economic growth and diversification of the economy. A local private 
sector, independent of the KRG’s business activities, could optimize the allocation of 
resources, all the while supporting competitiveness, innovation and productivity in the 
local economy. However, it takes a significant amount of time, cash and support to 
develop successful businesses especially in fragile and conflict-affected environments.  
 
Furthermore, the KRG implemented key investment-related legislation to attract the 
international private sector, and devised strategies for socioeconomic growth in the 
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region. The main government entities responsible for the construction of commercial 
and institutional housing and infrastructure projects were the: Board of Investment; 
Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction; Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism; 
Ministry of Electricity; Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Trade and Industry; Ministry 
of Transportation and Communication; Ministry of Finance and the Economy; and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. By January 12, 2014, the KRG 
“Investment Board had approved 642 projects with a capital value of $36.4 billion, 
which encouraged schemes in the following sectors: agriculture, banking, 
communications, education, environment, health, housing, information technology, 
insurance, irrigation and dams, manufacturing, power generation, roads and bridges, 
science and technology research, tourism and transport” (Meed 2014). 
 
Presence of the Turkish construction sector in the KRI 
When the Turkish construction sector began operating in the KRI shortly after the U.S.-
led invasion in 2003, there was a lack of private and public sector indigenous capacity 
in construction management, human resources and material resources. Therefore, the 
KRG accepted investment proposals and later opened a tender process to international 
companies for major infrastructure projects. The Turkish construction industry was well 
positioned to win most bids, due to its depth of experience; proven track record of 
performance in Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa; contiguous land 
borders with the KRI for low-cost transport of equipment and materials; availability of 
Turkish Kurds to act as intermediaries with Iraqi Kurds; and similar cultural values. 
Respondents, interviewed for this research project, indicated that they implemented 
projects in the KRI, in part, because of the quick and safe return on investments. 
Respondents indicated that their major concerns about working in the construction 
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sector in the KRI related to the following factors: lack of a highly qualified labor force, 
questions over land acquisition and site development, unclear building codes and 
permits, and quality control standards. Respondents also noted that the development 
and implementation of sound government policies were essential for the construction 
sector to prosper and to facilitate human capital development associated with the sector. 
 
In the beginning of the economic up-turn (2005-2006), infrastructure investments 
strengthened the economy and ensured the provision of public services. The 
construction sector experienced above-average employment growth and a substantial 
share of employment since 2003, despite the limited amount of job opportunities offered 
by Turkish companies (Shatz et al. 2014). Private firms were the driving force of the 
construction sector, the fastest growing economic sector in the region. Roads, bridges 
and tunnels were either renovated or constructed from scratch, providing faster and safer 
transportation access within the KRI. Energy supplies increased and water supply 
systems became more widespread. The number of schools and universities increased to 
meet the demands of a growing young population. Public and private hospitals, 
including primary health centers expanded, but lack of qualified medical personnel 
posed challenges to meeting the health needs of the people in the KRI (Anthony, Moore, 
Hilborne, Mulcahy 2014). During the timeframe of this research project, the 
engagement of the Turkish construction sector was arguably the cornerstone of the 
infrastructure development experience in the KRI. In 2008, Turkish dominance of the 
construction activity in the KRI was estimated to be 95 percent (USAID 2008). 
According to a Finnish-Swiss report, approximately 75 percent to 80 percent of the 
construction business, be it roads, tunnels, silos, dams, housing projects, and major 
airports, were undertaken by Turkish companies (SEM 2012, 20).  
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It is important to note that at the time the interviews concerning the construction sector 
were conducted, from May 2014, until August 2014, a significant security threat 
emerged in the KRI. The ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq allowed Daesh to secure a 
dominating presence in the region, which highlighted the immediate need for human 
security, as well as military security (KRG and UN 2014a). Many respondents noted 
that the companies they represented had begun to reconsider their engagement in the 
KRI due to: increase costs associated with the construction sector, particularly in labor 
and materials; the precarious security situation resulting from the advancement of Daesh 
in the KRI; and the ongoing dispute between the KRG and the central government in 
Baghdad over revenue sharing, which resulted in delayed KRG payments to the private 
sector. Aydin Toprakli, Kalyon Construction Industry and Trade Corporation, noted, 
“We are having problems convincing some international companies that the area 
governed by the KRG is safe. The company has made purchases from foreign 
companies and we are waiting for those companies to send representatives to ensure the 
quality of the products and also to guarantee the proper installation of the items” (Aydin 
Toprakli, Kalyon Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
 
Turkish companies operating in the KRI  
The Turkish Contractors’ Association (TMB) is the main nonprofit professional 
organization that supports the construction sector in Turkey. Member companies are 
medium to large-scaled corporations who undertake projects in both Turkey and abroad. 
Although the TMB is a private organization, it frequently works with the Turkish 
government. For instance, the TMB often arranges meetings between foreign private 
sector representatives and government representatives from the Ministry of Economy 
and the Ministry of Trade. Concerning the subject matter of this research project, the 
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TMB frequently provided information regarding the opportunities and challenges 
facing its members in the Turkish construction sector who operate in the KRI. Due to 
the 2014 spike in violence in Iraq, TMB members regularly convened to discuss security 
concerns and the possible impact on their operations in the region.  
 
Economic security spectrum findings  
The following section presents the empirical data from interviews with Turkish 
construction companies that operated in the KRI. The aim of the interviews was to 
investigate Turkish private sector activity in correlation with the thirteen economic 
security indicators. Chapter 6, entitled, Conclusions, will provide an analysis of the 
impact of Turkish private sector activity on economic security in the KRI.  
 
1. Public-private relations 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, during the conduct of the interviews on 
the construction sector, the economy and security environment in the KRI was severely 
compromised. The recent advance of Daesh in the KRI and the political conflict and 
dispute between Baghdad and Erbil caused financial instability, which negatively 
affected the entire economy in the Kurdish Region, the delayed processing of KRG 
payment certificates and had a ripple effect on all private sector operations. The majority 
of respondents indicated that strong public-private relations contribute to the 
development and implementation of sound government and private sector policies, and 
ensure good governance particularly in a conflict and post-conflict environment 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2014b). The major themes that emerged regarding 
public-private relations related to the various aspects of working with different clients 
for the project; interfacing with a consulting firm, versus dealing directly with the KRG; 
  
152 
 
and how to incorporate recommendations by KRG representatives, as well as the one-
year guarantee period; process of acquiring a project; and the importance of upholding 
a framework of contracts and standards.  
 
Type of client 
Generally Turkish companies interfaced with three types of clients: first, the KRG itself; 
second, an international development agency, such as the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA); or third, a private sector entity.  
 
The KRG as the main client 
Most of the companies that undertook large infrastructure projects were hired directly 
by the KRG. According to Suleyman Ciliv, “We did not work with a contractor, who 
often act as a middleman. We worked directly with the KRG” (Suleyman Ciliv, 77 
Construction and Contracting Company, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Erdal Yenigun 
advised, “Yenigun Construction worked directly with the government rather than with 
a consultant. The client was the KRG Ministry of Construction and Housing. The 
Ministry tasked local engineers to follow the development of the project” (Erdal 
Yenigun, Yenigun Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Tepe Construction dealt 
directly with the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Reconstruction and 
Housing through a Supervision Board. Yuksel Construction, Makyol Construction, Sa-
Ra Energy, Ilci Holding, and Renas Company all worked directly for the KRG on the 
projects that are included in this dissertation. In the beginning of the research timeline, 
many Turkish construction companies acquired infrastructure projects solely due to 
their positive reputation and personal contacts with officials from the KRG. In the 
second half of this research timeline, the KRG began to require companies to undergo 
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a pre-qualification vetting procedure “for any project with a budget in excess of $5 
million” (Invest in Group 2013a), to ensure that only companies which had the capacity, 
capital, and expertise to successfully complete projects applied for tenders. 
Streamlining the tender process weeded out companies that lacked the capacity to 
accomplish a project per the specifications listed in the KRG tender. 
 
International development agency as the main client 
The Fernas-Kalyon-STFA Water Supply Improvement Project in Erbil and Dohuk, 
funded by JICA, was one of the few Turkish companies to work directly for an 
international development agency. Despite the economic crisis in the KRI, Fernas-
Kalyon-STFA were not hurt financially since they received their payments directly from 
JICA, rather than the KRG.  
 
Private sector entity as the main client  
It was common for smaller construction companies or companies unwilling to assume 
large responsibilities to perform professional functions as sub-contractors. For instance, 
Enka Construction was hired by Mass Group Holding to undertake the Erbil Combined 
Cycle Power Project in the KRI.  
 
Interfacing with a consulting firm versus dealing directly with the KRG 
In theory, a consultant served as an intermediary or mediator between the client and the 
foreign company from Turkey. Cuneyt Karacasu, noted, a consultant was assigned to 
track and “evaluate the progress on behalf of the KRG” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). However, many respondents perceived the 
consulting firms as advocates or spokesperson for the government and rarely 
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represented the concerns of the company from Turkey. It was apparent from interviews 
that respondents felt consulting firms performed as if they were an extensions of the 
government. Several company representatives interviewed indicated that even though 
project planning and work schedules were agreed upon between the client and the 
company at the beginning of the contract, consultants still lacked understanding of the 
project details. One respondent mentioned that the consulting firm did not have the 
technical knowledge or capacity to consult on specific aspects of their project. One 
respondent revealed that professionals from the consulting firm, hired by the KRG, 
could not prepare basic progress/status reports. Another respondent noted that he 
created all of the monitoring and evaluation templates for the consulting firm to use. 
Respondents noted, therefore, instead of evaluating the progress of the project based on 
specific technical benchmarks defined in the planning and work schedule, they focused 
their evaluations on the project costs. Another challenge to working with consultants 
was that they often interjected their own opinions regarding the implementation of the 
project. One representative noted that the consultant who was assigned to them often 
questioned the quality of materials the company had chosen to purchase for the project. 
The consultant wanted the company to change the materials that were already agreed 
upon at the beginning of the project, and to instead procure materials from abroad, 
which were more expensive and would take longer to import. Another representative 
noted that the consulting firm’s delays often extended the decision-making process, 
which in-turn delayed the completion of the project and the final payment. Sometimes, 
companies who worked with consulting firms still had to interact with representatives 
from the relevant KRG ministry, as well. Although hired by JICA, representatives from 
Kalyon-Fernas-STFA frequently met with a Lebanese consulting firm, Khatip and 
Alami, as well as with the KRG Water Authority, to discuss progress on the Water 
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Supply Improvement Project in Erbil and Dohuk. Several respondents offered that the 
KRG was a relatively new government, and appeared not to have adequate human 
capital, technical knowledge and capacity to track all its construction projects in detail. 
Still, many respondents who worked with a consulting company indicated that it would 
have been a more positive working experience if they had interfaced more often with 
officials from the KRG, rather than a consulting firm.  
 
Input of KRG representatives and the one-year guarantee period 
Some respondents indicated that they experienced bureaucratic issues because the KRG 
was still a relatively novice government. One respondent noted that the KRG was 
unable to process residence permits in a timely manner. The same representative noted, 
that even when residence permits were issued, the movements of their employees within 
the KRG were often limited. Another representative noted some KRG bureaucrats were 
unfamiliar with the professional business standards of large Turkish companies, which 
posed challenges when a final inspection of the project was required.  
 
Other respondents indicated that they had a positive experience working with officials 
from the KRG. Timucin Onogur, from Sa-Ra Energy, noted, “We mainly dealt with the 
KRG Ministry of Energy for our project. They provided the necessary permissions, for 
the execution of the work. Since the KRG authorities were familiar with the Turkish 
contractors, there was no serious conflict or problem during the execution” of the 
project (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Tepe Construction 
worked closely with the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Housing. (Associate, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
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Another respondent commented that KRG officials were hard working and were 
committed to the development of the KRI. 
 
Some company respondents mentioned they represented interfaced with KRG 
inspection teams on a regular basis. According to Suleyman Ciliv, from 77 Construction 
and Contracting Company, “Engineers from the Highway Department worked closely 
with our project team in order to ensure that the project was completed in accordance 
with required standards” (Suleyman Ciliv, 77 Construction and Contracting Company, 
2014, Interview, Istanbul). According to Cuneyt Karacasu, from Yuksel Construction, 
“A Planning and Work Schedule was agreed upon between the client and the company 
at the beginning of the project” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, 
Interview, Ankara). Furthermore, Karacasu noted, “a company needs to be careful about 
the performance and progress of the project,” so that there are no major disputes with 
the KRG (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
 
However, other respondents commented that KRG inspection teams rarely provided any 
guidance or observations during the operations of the project. Rather, according to 
respondents, KRG officials provided remarks once the construction company deemed 
the project complete and the one-year guarantee period began during which the client 
could evaluate and raise any disputes regarding the quality of the project. In some cases, 
the KRG did not sign an initial completion agreement because of disagreements over 
the completion of the project. A few respondents indicated that even though their 
projects were completed, disputes over minor details of the project allowed the KRG to 
delay or withhold the final payment. A few respondents noted their companies 
experienced delayed final payments due to a dispute between the KRG and the 
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implementing company, which in-turn faced severe financial burdens on their 
companies. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of respondents noted it was crucial 
that the implementing company constantly communicate with either the appropriate 
KRG ministry or the assigned consultant in order to reduce the possibility of major 
disputes arising at completion of the project timeline.  
 
Process of acquiring a project  
The process of acquiring a project in the KRI depended on the sector and whether or 
not a company was interested in performing services or supplying goods directly to the 
government or private sector entity. Some respondents commented that the company 
they represented secured the tender through a formal and solicited process. Other project 
contracts were bestowed due to personal relationships between a corporate 
owner/official and an influential KRG representative. A few respondents advised that 
the company they represented acquired a project as a subcontractor and, therefore, 
bypassed government procedures as the main client had already gone through the formal 
tendering process. For instance, according to Aykut Altin, Enka Construction, “Enka 
was invited by Mass Group Holding, an Iraqi Jordanian company, to undertake a 
turnkey project. Enka undertook all of the design works, logistics, supply, and other 
tasks on the project” (Aykut Altin, Enka Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime). 
Recently, the KRG began to implement a more efficient and transparent tendering 
process by requiring companies to register to partake in a pre-qualification stage for 
large strategic projects that have budget greater than $5 million (Invest in Group 2013a). 
The KRG grades companies according to technical and financial capabilities, as well as 
their experience working on similar projects in the past five years (KRG, Ministry of 
Finance 2010, 4). The pre-qualification process was meant to eliminate companies who 
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did not meet the requirements of the tender, and highlight companies that were most 
likely able to complete the project regardless of its national origin. 
 
Framework of contracts and standards  
Respondents indicated it was important for all involved parties to adhere to an 
internationally recognized contract and high-level business standards. According to 
Article 17 of Investment Law No.4, issued by the President of the Kurdistan Region in 
July, 2006, “investment disputes must be settled in accordance with the contract 
concluded between both parties, and if there is no clause in the contract in this regard, 
the disputes should be settled amicably between both parties. If they fail to reach an 
amicable settlement, they may refer the matter to arbitration in accordance with the laws 
applicable in the Kurdistan Region, or in accordance with the rules of dispute settlement 
mentioned in any of the mutual or international conventions of which Iraq is a member” 
(Amereller 2010, 40). Despite the legal framework, there was a perception among some 
of the respondents that existing dispute mechanisms were neither reliable or transparent. 
Other respondents were under the impression the KRG did not respect international 
contracts when it was not in their favor. One respondent mentioned that his considered 
opening a case against the KRG in an international arbitration court due to delayed 
payments. 
 
2. Basic income and poverty alleviation 
Very few respondents commented on whether their projects had any impact on assured 
access to basic income and poverty alleviation. According to Renas Elci, from Renas 
Company, noted his project “helps the basic income level for an individual or citizen” 
(Renas Elci, Renas Company, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Timucin Onogur, from Sa-Ra 
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Energy, noted there was “no measured affect, but surely the project contributed to the 
budgets of the employees who worked in the project” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 
2014, Interview, Ankara). The KRG Ministry of Planning adopted a multi-year strategic 
plan called the Regional Development Strategy for Kurdistan Region for the years 2013-
2017 to better enhance and inform the development process, capital investment projects, 
and the annual KRG budget. The study indicated that three quarters of the KRI’s 
population live in urban areas yet 77.6 percent of the economically deprived households 
live in rural areas (KRG, Ministry of Planning, 171).  
 
Several respondents believed their projects contributed to poverty alleviation. 
According to Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, “The project affected the income of the 
people who were employed and their families in a positive manner” (Timucin Onogur, 
Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Bilal Guzel, from Ilci Holding, noted, “Surely, 
our project increased the economic level in the region” (Bilal Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, 
Interview, Skype). One respondent noted that their project had an impact on poverty 
alleviation as many of the employees were from rural areas where there were not many 
job opportunities. Another respondent noted their unskilled employees, particularly, 
experienced some degree of poverty alleviation. According to Renas Elci, from Renas 
Company, “Regular employment provides a steady income which contributes to poverty 
alleviation” (Renas Elci, Renas Company, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
 
Framework for social security and pensions  
Some respondents indicated that their payments into the KRG Social Security and 
Pensions Contributions Program (SSPC) for their local employees would have a lasting 
impact on poverty alleviation. Respondents had the impression that the social security 
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program ensured that long-term economic development was sustained, and encouraged 
employees to remain engaged in the private sector, since they would receive pension 
benefits long after they have stopped working. Until recently, the social security and 
pensions laws were based on Iraqi national laws, which were outdated and not 
applicable for the transition from a public sector-driven economy, to one focused on an 
expanding market driven private sector. Eli Doosky noted, “The pensions and social 
security have been modified so those in the private sector will have similar benefits as 
government employees” (Doosky 2001). A few respondents indicated a strong and 
secure market-oriented social security program might encourage potential job seekers 
to consider employment in the private sector.  
 
In order to participate in the Social Security and Pensions Contributions Program 
(SSPC) a company was required to register at the General Directorate for Labor and 
Social Security, an office affiliated with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 
Employers were also required to register non-Iraqi workers, who could apply for an 
exemption if they did not want to pay into the SSPC program. Expat workers have to 
provide evidence that they are contributing to an alternative social security program, 
which can be either a state-owned or private pension plan. Expatriate workers have to 
contribute to the local social security program in the KRI if they fail to provide adequate 
proof. By law, a total of 17 percent of an employee’s monthly salary must be paid into 
the SSPC. A total of 5 percent of the monthly salary is paid by the employee and 12 
percent of the salary by the employer. Companies have the right to pay the entire 17 
percent of the amount without employees deducting anything from their salaries. 
However, among respondents there were mixed responses concerning how much a 
company was required to contribute to social security (Deloitte 2013).  
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It was apparent that many of the companies included in this research project paid into 
the SSPC in the KRI; however, their perspectives and contributions were significantly 
different based on when they did business in the KRI. For those companies working in 
the KRI at the beginning of my research timeframe, they usually paid a lump sum to the 
government. One representative noted that at the end of the project, the company simply 
counted how many workers they had employed, and provided the appropriate 
compensation to the KRG. Another respondent noted that they did not keep close track 
of how many people they employed, so they approximated how many local employees 
they had hired. Companies that were actively involved in a project towards the middle 
to end of my research timeframe, contributed to each individual employee’s social 
security package. The employer had to declare the payroll information and actively pay 
into the SSPC on a monthly basis for employees with formal contracts. However, it was 
apparently difficult to track daily laborers, as they were often not hired under a contract. 
Aykut Altin, from Enka Construction, commented, “Enka pays into the social security 
program of the KRG for its Iraqi Kurdish employees. The required amount is less when 
compared to the Turkish social security program. Enka always reviews and complies 
with the local regulations e.g. paying into social security at the start of the project” 
(Altin Aykut, Enka Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime).  
 
According to an expert on KRI social security and pension laws, despite the progress 
made on establishing a framework, challenges still exist concerning the “lack of an 
Information System to enter data electronically rather than the paper based system, the 
lack of sufficient inspection teams to ensure companies and employees comply with the 
laws and regulations. The continued existence of a mindset, based on the old socialist 
model, that the government should provide economic security for citizens either by 
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government handouts or by allocating civil servant positions, which entitles an 
employee to benefits after they retire” (Anonymous Tax Expert, Tiller, 2014, Interview, 
Telephone). An overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that the lack of an 
automated system made it difficult to contribute to the program. Respondents noted that 
establishing a modern and user-friendly automated social security system would 
encourage younger generations to seek employment with the private sector. One 
respondent noted that employees had to keep their pay stubs to prove their work history. 
Another respondent commented that not all local employees wanted to contribute to 
social security, as they did not have the disposable income to do so, nor did they trust 
the system.  
 
3. Public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment 
Very few respondents commented on whether there was an increase in public and 
private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment. Renas Elci, from 
Renas Company, commented, “The project we worked on contributed to this strategy 
because in the beginning of our work in the region the wages were low compared to the 
wages in developed countries, but over time the wage scale had tripled” (Renas Elci, 
Renas Company, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Elci also noted that some individuals had 
to rely on self-employment in certain rural areas due to the lack of industry and jobs. 
Timucin Onogur, from Sa-Ra Energy, noted, “Yes, projects that have been implemented 
impacted the public sector and the private sector” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 
2014, Interview, Ankara). Onogur expanded his comments by saying, “Taking into 
consideration the subcontractor teams and other local people employed in the scope of 
the project, an impact on the employment during the execution of the project may be 
considered. Furthermore, the KRG Ministry of Energy contributed directly to an 
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increase in employment by employing people for the operation and maintenance of the 
system. Also, the development of the energy system indirectly contributed to 
employment in other sectors, because they also developed in parallel to the energy 
supply” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
 
4. Rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector  
Since the early 2000s, the KRG strived to reinvigorate the agriculture sector (UNDP, 
2012, KRG, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2010, University of 
Salahaddin 2007, USAID 2006). According to the KRG Board of Investment, “the 
Kurdistan Region features more than 1.5(ha²) hectares of arable land, a great abundance 
of water resources, a qualified workforce and a pleasant climate” (KRG Board of 
Investment, 2012, 4). Only one respondent provided comments on whether their project 
contributed to the rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector. Timucin 
Onogur, from Sa-Ra Energy, noted, “Since energy is used in irrigation, it is assumed 
that it will improve agricultural rehabilitation” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, 
Interview, Ankara). As was mentioned in previous sections of this dissertation, the 
agriculture sector was neglected in the past in large part due to decades of war and abuse 
in Iraq and the KRI. The lack of proper rehabilitation and diversification of the 
agriculture sector reflects the urbanization of the KRI due to war, immigration, 
dislocation of the rural populace, and concentration of jobs, services, health care, and 
education in major cities. “Today however, the Kurdistan Region is largely dependent 
on food imports from various countries in the greater Middle East and beyond” (KRG 
Board of Investment, 2012, 4). 
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5. Infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services 
Since the end of the United Nations sanctions and overthrow of the Saddam regime, 
rehabilitating existing and constructing new infrastructure was the key to economic 
recovery. The KRG emphasized ensuring the electrical power generation grid was 
functional so that the oil industry and almost every other aspects of modern life could 
return to normal productivity. The Hawler International Airport was modernized and 
linked the KRI with regional and international communities, and to bypass land 
corridors which were under threat by terrorist attacks. Key roads, bridges and tunnels 
were reconstructed or constructed to facilitate economic recovery and military defense 
needs. The construction of schools, universities, hospitals, clinics, water systems, 
sewage facilities, and housing directly supported human development, a healthy 
population, and sheltered citizenry. Government investments in infrastructure were 
designed to enhance human security needs while relying on foreign direct investments 
to privately fund infrastructure efforts, such as housing, hospitals, schools, and shopping 
centers. Much of the FDI supported new developments such as: construction of 
pipelines to transmit oil and gas to foreign consumers, creation of essential support 
roads, electrical power and procurement of training skilled workers - all were necessary 
for private oil industry firms to conduct their exploratory, extraction and export 
activities. Some respondents indicated that there were projects which directly 
contributed to infrastructure recovery and restoring access to basic services, such as 
wastewater management projects and electricity energy distribution lines. Other 
respondents noted there were projects, such as Sulaimani University, that likely had an 
indirect impact, as the KRG issued infrastructure recovery, and restoring access to basic 
services, in conjunction with international private sector activities. 
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Projects that directly contributed to infrastructure recovery and restoring access to 
basic services 
Yasar Giregiz stated that the project Fernas-Kalyon-STFA undertook directly 
contributed to infrastructure recovery and restoring access to basic services by, 
“upgrading an existing water treatment plant and by expanding the existing water 
supply network” (Yasar Giregiz, Fernas Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
Regarding the same project, Tahsin Bagci, from STFA Construction, noted, “This 
project consists of extending the existing Erbil water supply network and also upgrading 
the network with new lines in Erbil and Dohuk” (Tahsin Bagci, STFA Construction, 
2014, Interview, Istanbul). Furthermore, Halil Dilek noted, “This project provides a 
basic necessity to local people, water. Local people see our project as essential. The 
KRG even recently asked us to extend the water supply in Erbil so that more people 
may benefit from the water project” (Halil Dilek, STFA Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul).  
 
The Kora-Shaqlawa-Qandeel highway project, a 51-kilometer highway, as well as two 
major tunnels, significantly improved the transportation links of a crucial trade route 
for the region. Cuneyt Karacasu, noted, “The section of the highway that we are 
constructing is on the way to Iran, and the existing single carriage highway is not 
sufficient to carry the traffic load between the Kurdistan region and Iran, which enables 
most of the trade from Iran” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Ankara). 77 Construction and Contracting Company directly contributed to 
infrastructure recovery by “providing an upgraded highway and bridge for people to 
cross a major body of water” (Suleyman Ciliv, 77 Construction and Contracting 
Company, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). According to Timucin Onogur, “As a result of 
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this project the quality and sustainability of the utilized electricity has increased. Since 
energy is used in agriculture, irrigation, communication and industry the project has an 
indirect impact on infrastructure recovery” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, 
Interview, Ankara). 
 
The Erbil Combined Cycle Power Project aimed to be the first combined cycle power 
plant to provide approximately 25 percent of the power demand of the KRI. This project 
is important to ensure the KRI becomes self-sufficient and electricity becomes more 
frequent, widespread, and reliable. According to Aykut Altin, from Enka Construction, 
the Erbil Combined Cycle Power Project, “directly contributes to infrastructure 
recovery and restoring access to basic services by providing electricity” (Aykut Altin, 
Enka Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime). Furthermore, Altin, commented that, 
“The KRG is in need of a lot of power to produce electricity, therefore, the KRG has 
other projects besides this one to meet the needs of its people” (Aykut Altin, Enka 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime). Towards the second half of the research 
timeframe, infrastructure including electricity and power supply came under great stress 
from the increase in IDPs and refugees who sought sanctuary in the KRI (World Bank 
2015a).  
 
Commenting on the Park View project, a mixed residential and commercial complex 
built for the new rising middle and upper class, Bilal Guzel, from Ilci Holding, noted, 
“With the intelligent systems that have been designed in our project, the sources of the 
major necessities which will have been used economically and thus infrastructure will 
be recovered and restored” (Bilal Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, Interview, Facetime). 
Affordable housing was still difficult to acquire, leaving many young people struggling 
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to find an apartment to rent, let alone purchase. High-end housing complexes were not 
suitable for the average citizens of the KRI; rather, only a very small minority were able 
to afford large amounts of up-front cash payments, or were credit worthy. Regarding 
the construction of the University of Sulaimani, a respondent from Tepe Construction, 
noted, “Undertaking such a big and strategic project in the region is a contribution in 
building the country and a direct contribution in providing a better educational 
environment. The project is appreciated by both the public and the government 
administrations” (Anonymous associate, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Ankara).viii  
 
Projects that indirectly contributed to infrastructure recovery and restoring access to 
basic services 
The construction of Sulaimani University appeared to have had an indirect impact on 
infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services. The KRG constructed 
additional support infrastructure, such as major roads, electricity lines, and water 
systems surrounding the campus. Arslanoglu noted, “the local government also built 
offices for the Police Department and Fire Department to support the university 
community” (Ali Arslanoglu, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara).  
 
6. Dismantling of a war economy and illegal economic networks 
It was apparent that the majority of respondents were uncomfortable to comment on 
whether or not their projects had an impact on the dismantling of a war economy and 
illegal economic networks. Only one respondent, Timucin Onogur, from Sa-Ra Energy, 
indicated that the project did not have a substantial impact, “but contributed” (Timucin 
Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
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7. Expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills development, and 
empowerment 
Over the past few decades, the economy shifted from a reliance on the agriculture sector 
to an overdependence on oil exports as the region’s main source of revenue. Destruction 
of rural villages and the agricultural system in the KRI, by the Saddam regime, and 
subsequent flight of rural populations to sanctuaries in neighboring Iran and urban 
centers, such as Baghdad, Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah, resulted in the collapse of 
the agriculture sector as an important employer. Due to the Iraqi tradition of state-owned 
enterprises, and the influx of shared oil revenues from Baghdad, the KRG became the 
largest single employer with more than half of the employable population working as 
civil servants (KRG, Ministry of Planning, 2013). The investment in basic, secondary, 
and post-secondary education was critical to socioeconomic growth since a generation 
of students lost the opportunity to learn in formal educational settings due to war, the 
UN and Saddam Hussein embargoes, collapse of the Iraqi state and terrorism. Due to 
the aforementioned challenges, a trend emerged which saw young workers seek secure 
and relatively easy government and service industry jobs (Anthony, Hansen, Kumar, 
Shatz and Vernez 2012, Lister, 2014) A SEM report indicated, “Approximately 70%-
75% of the KRG budget was used to pay the salaries of civil servants” (SEM 2012, 20). 
Workers appeared ready for employment, but many international employers, including 
many of the companies from Turkey surveyed for this research project, reported that 
workers from the KRI, both secondary and post-secondary graduates, were unprepared 
or lacked the experience necessary for employment in the private sector (Kalkan 2011, 
7). Respondents indicated secondary school graduates lacked the necessary technical 
and communication skills required by the private sector, and post-secondary graduates 
lacked practical work experience. A Rand assessment undertaken for the KRG Ministry 
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of Planning pointed out that employers perceived workers with post-secondary 
education needed “practical technical experience” (Shatz et al. 2014, 33). Over the last 
decade, the labor market in the KRI experienced a burgeoning youth population, high 
unemployment, high public sector employment, small to medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) vulnerable to economic shocks, scarce apprenticeships and internship 
programs, and weak job placement systems.  
 
Many respondents indicated that the companies they represented expected to hire 
managers, technicians, and workers ready to perform the functions associated with 
established job descriptions. Oftentimes, the salary and benefit packages for the KRI 
workers were lower than that of the Turkish workers, so we would expect the KRI 
workers to be the first hired, if qualified and if the Turkish company wanted to cut costs. 
However, studies, together with the data collected from interviews, found that many 
international employers found a considerable percentage (upwards of 40 percent) of 
KRI secondary school graduates inadequately prepared for work (Shatz et al. 2014, 25). 
To address human capital demands, international development agencies, such as the 
Korea International Cooperation Agency, the Japanese International Development 
Agency, and the UK National School of Governance provided training for government 
employees in areas, such as administrative data management, administration statistics, 
auditing, environment policy, firefighting and prevention, quality assurance, personal 
computer maintenance, water resource development and management, and women’s 
health and rights (KRG, Department of Media and Information 2009, KRG, Ministry of 
Planning 2009). These trainings were organized, in part, to ensure public sector workers 
could compete for employment in the private sector as the KRG plans to phase out 
public service jobs in the future.  
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Respondents provided an array of insight on their project’s contributions to the 
expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills development, and 
empowerment. The main themes that emerged from interviewees were: providing a 
structured training component for employees; supervised on-the-job training; 
employees job-hopping; employment continuity; and training via internship and site 
visits.  
 
Structured training component for employees 
It was apparent that companies which perceived their operations in the KRI as either 
crucial to their company’s success, or undertook highly sophisticated projects, such as 
the Hawler Airport in Erbil, the Park View mixed-residential and commercial real estate 
project, the Erbil Cultural and Convention Center, the Energy Electricity Distribution 
Project and the Erbil Combined Cycle Power Project, provided structured training 
components for local employees. Because the construction and operation of the Hawler 
Erbil Airport required a diverse group of workers, including those that performed hard 
labor tasks, engineers, and those with sophisticated understanding of how to manage an 
airport after the completion of the project, Makyol Construction worked closely with 
the KRG to provide structured training to essential personnel. Timucin Onogur, from 
Sa-Ra Energy, indicated that a “substantial amount of training was given to the KRG-
Ministry of Energy personnel, both on-site and abroad at various factories, including 
ours as part of the project” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
The majority of respondents rated knowledge of English or Turkish language skills as 
one of their highest priorities for professional workers with post-secondary educations, 
precisely so the workers could attend/participate in off-site and out of country training 
(RAND 2014, 34-35). Bilal Guzel, from Ilci Holding, noted that employees were given 
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training on safety requirements by the company’s Safety and Health Department (Bilal 
Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, Interview, Facetime). Aykut Altin, noted, “Enka has been 
training Iraqi citizens who work for the client, Mass Group Holding that will manage 
the project once it is complete for the last six months. Representatives from Enka 
traveled to Erbil three years prior to the start of the Erbil Combined Cycle Power Project 
to help train the team that eventually worked on the upgrade project” (Aykut Altin, Enka 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime).  
 
On-the-job training  
Some respondents commented that instead of providing structured training components, 
the companies they represented expected local unskilled employees to learn the desired 
expertise and knowledge through supervised on-the-job training. Projects, such as the 
Qandeel Bridge, and approaches Highway, built by 77 Construction and Contracting 
Company, the Kora-Shaqlawa-Qandeel highway project, built by Yuksel Construction, 
the Erbil Culture and Convention Center built by Yenigun Construction, and the Water 
Supply Improvement Project, built by Fernas-Kalyon-STFA, all paired local, unskilled 
employees with expat employees to learn the required skills through on-the-job training. 
One respondent noted that rather than providing formal training, the company assumed 
that required job skills would naturally transfer from their unskilled, yet knowledgeable, 
Turkish expat workers to locally hired unskilled co-workers. On-the-job training was 
successful because the local workers were eager to learn skills that they knew would 
help them advance in their companies and the job market in general (Ali Arslanoglu, 
Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Bilal Guzel, noted, “We are working with 
people from different professions in the construction industry. Employees, over time, 
develop and begin to master” (Bilal Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, Interview, Facetime) 
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their respective positions. One respondent commented that when the company he 
represented first began working in the KRI, the knowledge gaps between local unskilled 
and skilled workers with that of their expat counterparts were significant. He further 
noted that as time passed, the knowledge gap decreased as the expertise of the Iraqi 
Kurds increased as a result of on-the-job training. Some respondents noted that they 
preferred supervised on-the-job training, rather than investing in formal professional 
development programs, since it was highly likely employees would resign soon after 
acquiring further skills.  
 
Job-hopping  
Respondents noted job-hopping as a concern, for both skilled and unskilled employees, 
and for recipients of both structured training programs, and on-the-job training. 
Respondents indicated that local employees were more inclined to take advantage of 
better job openings, and resign from firms that had hired them and had provided 
professional development opportunities as soon as they learned a marketable skill. One 
representative noted that once some of their local skilled workers gained qualifying 
experience, they went to work for competitors or the government. Another 
representative noted that even members of a government-organized project 
management team left their positions for better job opportunities once they had 
completed a private sector training program.  
 
Employment continuity  
Respondents remarked it was imperative to enhance employment continuity among 
personnel in the KRI. One respondent noted that there was a continuing need for 
knowledgeable and skilled workers, such as architects, engineers, and technicians, 
during the project construction phase, and then during subsequent daily operation of 
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facilities, such as airports, dams, shopping malls, universities, or power generation 
stations. Therefore, many of the skilled project team members were retained because 
they knew the ins and outs of the project, and were deemed essential personnel for its 
continuing operation.  
 
Training via internship and site visits  
At the beginning of the timeframe of this research project, the construction methods 
used in the KRI were often not as sophisticated or advanced as the methods used in 
Turkey. A few respondents indicated that developing robust apprenticeship programs 
for secondary school graduates would provide the skills required by the private sector. 
Internships, traineeships, and site visit programs would enhance the students’ 
understanding of international management styles, materials, and construction methods. 
A few respondents indicated that the companies they represented provided informal 
training opportunities for people living in the KRI and that most of them were arranged 
through personal contacts with an administrator or teacher at a nearby school. Ilci 
Construction frequently invited students from the engineering and architecture 
departments of local universities to intern on the Park View project. At the Erbil Culture 
and Convention Center, mostly architect and engineering students regularly visited the 
worksite to learn various construction techniques that Yenigun Construction utilized on 
the project (Erdal Yenigun, Yenigun Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Aside 
from the training programs that the Ministry of Natural Resources established, the KRI 
was also in need of formalized college internship programs with businesses, so students 
could receive the practical experiences that large employers desired of their professional 
employees (KRG, Ministry of Planning 2013, 73, Shatz et al. 2014). Enka 
Construction’s in-house training program invited a hundred students to intern on 
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projects in both Turkey and abroad each summer including Erbil (Aykut Altin, Enka 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime). This program was a good example of how 
the KRG could promote apprenticeship programs with the private sector.  
 
8. Development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and 
impoverished groups 
The majority of respondents were uncomfortable to comment on whether or not their 
project had an impact on the development of productive activities for ex-combatants, 
returnees and impoverished groups. Timucin Onogur, noted, “Among the subcontractor 
teams, people from those groups were employed but not evaluated in detail” (Timucin 
Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). A respondent from Tepe 
Construction commented, “Yes, this project contributed to social renewal of the region 
providing better higher education facilities and environment” (Anonymous Associate, 
Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). There appeared to be no intentional 
programs to ensure the private sector addressed the specific needs, or provided job 
opportunities, for individuals from these groups. However, since a high portion of the 
population experienced dislocation, or had served as soldiers during the Saddam regime, 
it was highly likely that ex-combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups benefited 
from human capital development.  
 
9. Provision of microfinance opportunities 
During the timeframe of this research project, it was difficult for new local 
businesspersons in the KRI to acquire a loan without previous credit history or property 
for collateral. Therefore, as part of strategies to eradicate poverty alleviation and 
promote socioeconomic development, the KRG attempted to attract microfinance 
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opportunities for SMEs who had limited or no access to microfinance (USAID 2011). 
In 2007, the KRG, in partnership with Global Communities, launched an international 
development and humanitarian aid organization, called the “Bright Future Foundation,” 
an NGO geared to providing opportunities to learn about how to develop business plans, 
administer loans, collect debts, and manage finances. Global Communities launched the 
Access to Credit Services Initiative to finance loans to entrepreneurs and home-owners 
to advance their livelihoods or develop their businesses. The Iraq Middle Market 
Development Foundation was mandated to give loans to large and promising companies 
of up to $5,000,000 (CHF International 2008, 19). The Iraqi Microfinance Network 
served as an online portal to share information on the microfinance industry and 
potential opportunities in the region. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the 
U.S. government’s development finance institution, likewise provided countrywide 
support to microfinance institutions and borrowers. According to Peter Batchelor, 
UNDP’s Country Director, “Limited access to institutional finance is found to be one 
of the key constraints to private sector growth in Iraq. A stronger private sector, able to 
provide jobs for the Iraqi people will ultimately contribute to Iraq’s welfare and poverty 
alleviation” (Iraq-Business News 2012). No respondents commented on the provision 
of microfinance opportunities.  
 
10. Clarification of property rights  
It was difficult to acquire detailed information related to the KRG’s framework to 
clarify property rights (Heritage Foundation, 2014). Most of the public material stressed 
the availability of free or inexpensive land to utilize for agriculture, industry, and 
housing, rather than the clarification of property rights. One government report simply 
stated, “We will also review other aspects of land use in the Region so that we may 
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ensure that agriculture, industry, housing, and all other sectors have sufficient and 
appropriate land available” (KRG Ministry of Planning 2013, 34). Therefore, a 
considerable amount of information in this section was collected by interviewing 
representatives from the private sector and experts familiar with the KRG’s operations. 
Only a few respondents indicated that their project had an impact on the clarification of 
property rights. Some respondents indicated that it appeared there was adequate 
protection of property rights for the private sector. Giregiz, STFA, noted, “It is a 
government investment project” (Yasar Giregiz, Fernas Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Ankara), inferring that property rights were clarified; whereas Cetin Dayioglu, simply 
noted, “Yes it [property rights] has been clarified” (Cetin Dayioglu, Makyol 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Commenting on whether property rights were 
clarified because of Yuksel’s Kora-Shaqlawa-Qandeel Highway project, Cuneyt 
Karacasu noted, “I think so, because some obstacles like buildings, gardens, etc., were 
allowed for our access after the government solved the property rights issue, which 
really took some time” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Ankara). 
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Housing and the private sector in the KRI  
In 2010, the KRG enacted a strategic development plan for all infrastructure projects in 
the region, and has since focused on two different models for housing: private sector 
investment and government investment. The process for awarding private sector versus 
public sector housing projects differed greatly. For instance, private sector housing 
projects were typically unsolicited and did not have to go through a formal tender 
process. Rather, they were considered investment projects where a company submitted 
a proposal for approval by the KRG. Public housing and other public infrastructure 
projects were awarded through a formal tendering process. The Ministry of Housing 
and Reconstruction, the Ministry of Finance and municipalities are the main 
government bodies responsible for overseeing the construction of roads, housing 
projects and all other public service buildings and distribute state land (Faraj, 2014). 
Under Law No. 7, public housing units were built for people with limited incomes, and 
included the construction of sanitation and electricity systems and roads (Zebari, 
2013a). For limited low-income housing, the budget was $42 million in 2011; the 
budget increased to $172 million in 2012, and remained the same in 2013 (Invest in 
Group 2013b, Mumtaz 2009). Regarding the clarification of property rights, Bilal Guzel 
noted, “Yes. Title Deed is not very common here, that is why this period is moving very 
slowly. We will deliver phase one of the Park View complex and hopefully we will also 
be given the title deeds over the next few months” (Bilal Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, 
Interview, Facetime). It was unusual for title deeds to be given to clients before the 
entire property was paid for in full. However, apparently, towards the end of the 
research timeline, the KRG lifted restrictions on the requirement to acquire the title 
deed, and, as Guzel mentioned, started to allow clients to receive the title deeds once a 
certain percentage of the total amount was paid.  
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Land and the private sector in the KRI  
According to a USAID study, there were three main land tenures in Iraq and the KRI 
region: “(1) private ownership, in which the landowner has the right to buy and sell land 
and to raise capital against the value of the land; (2) land leased from the government 
on a long-term basis; and (3) inherited land, which has been passed from generation to 
generation but frequently results in an unmanageable number of owners” (USAID 2008, 
15). One of the main challenges facing the clarification of property rights was how land 
was zoned in the KRI. Discussing the acquisition of land for the private sector, Timucin 
Onogur, noted, “KRG-Ministry of Electricity executed land acquisition and access to 
the site prior to start of the project. However, in some areas, landowners objected, 
claiming that the money paid to them for land acquisition was insufficient; however, 
Ministry of Electricity staff solved all of these conflicts, because we were not involved 
in such work. For some parts of the line within cultivated areas, we negotiated and 
agreed with landowners, if there are crops on the route that would be damaged, we then 
bought their crops and paid them for their losses. It was done smoothly and without any 
problem” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). One 
representative noted that the KRG needed to initiate legal reforms and streamline the 
process of land titling and the sale of land. A considerable portion of land originally 
zoned for the agriculture sector was re-zoned for non-agro purposes because of the 
expansion of the infrastructure and industry of the KRI (CIPE). Although this might not 
pose a problem for the current status of the agriculture sector in the short-term, it raises 
concerns about the ownership and usage of land in the long-term.  
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11. Macroeconomic development and job creation  
During the 1980s, Iraq was a net creditor, as well as a donor country, and was considered 
as one of the region’s most advanced economies (Jiyad 2001). Robert Looney noted, 
“Per capita annual income was around $4,000 and with a growing middle class and the 
start of a modern industrial sector, the country was poised for take-off to high-sustained 
growth” (Looney, 2003b, 60). However, the negative effects of the Iraq-Iran War, the 
prioritization of government spending on the security forces, the long deterioration of 
major industries, Saddam’s incompetent economic liberalization program, Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, and the United Nations sanctions and subsequent chaos after the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq all served to cripple the economy (Alnasrawi 1986, Alnasrawi 
2001, Donovan 2011, Neff 1991). Jim Lacey noted that by the time of the U.S.-led 
invasion in 2003, “Industry has ceased to exist and unemployment may be as high as 50 
percent. The agricultural sector is in complete disarray, leaving more than 60 percent of 
the population to rely on the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. About 40 percent 
of the nation’s children are suffering from malnutrition” (Lacey 2003). The income gap 
had become more apparent, as it “was further widened as a result of the failure of the 
government to continue to provide the social services which it had traditionally supplied 
freely to lower income groups” (Graham-Brown 2000, 11). The strain on the people had 
become increasingly difficult, as access to basic resources was inadequate. Clean 
drinking water was scarce and the generation of electricity lagged. The banking system 
disappeared, and Iraq had accrued massive foreign debts, war reparations, and 
outstanding contractual arrangements (Looney 2003b, 60, Economist 2003, Barton and 
Crocker 2003).  
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During the timeframe of this research project, the KRG focused on three main areas to 
ensure economic development stayed on track: provide a stable and secure environment 
for business to operate; develop the infrastructure of the region, both physical and 
human; and establish a liberal business environment to expand energy development, 
and encourage private sector development in the KRI (Invest in Group 2013c, 23). 
Many respondents noted that their projects had contributed to macroeconomic 
development in the region. Cuneyt Karacasu, noted, “As usual, we are trying to employ 
the local people as much as possible; therefore, some of our employees, usually 
unskilled, are locals, and this may be a contribution. We utilized local resources for 
food, fuel and car rentals, which all might be contributions to economic development 
as well” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Regarding 
Tepe Construction’s involvement in the development of Sulaymaniyah University, “We 
contributed to economic development of the region by employing a large number of 
local staff, procuring many kinds of construction products and other goods from the 
local market, and by providing employment opportunities even after the completion of 
the project” (Anonymous Associate, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Ali 
Arslanoglu, further noted, “After the university project began, the KRG started to 
rehabilitate the major roads surrounding the university and small shops that catered to 
students and the university staff opened. A considerable amount of the project budget 
was spent on local companies, thus contributing to the local economy” (Ali Arslanoglu, 
Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). The Park View project combined 
residential and commercial complex provided employment opportunities for the 
indigenous workforce and subcontractors in the region. According to Timucin Onogur, 
from Sa-Ra Energy, the Electricity Distribution project, “increased the quality and 
sustainability of electricity in the Dohuk district and surely contributed to economic 
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development of the area, since energy is the basic input for all sectors” (Timucin 
Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Renas Elci, noted, “Yes, the project 
contributed to the economic well-being of the community” (Renas Elci, Renas 
Company, 2014, Interview, Ankara).  
 
In addition to the contribution to macroeconomic development in the region respondents 
indicated their projects supported job creation. Furthermore, respondents observed the 
influence of the standardization of customs regulations on business activities, the 
development of the banking and finance sector, and the impact of projects on the local 
economy once they were complete. 
 
Customs regulations  
Respondents mentioned that customs problems were rampant prior to the 
standardization of customs regulations for Iraq including the KRI. The Investment Law, 
approved in 2006, No. (4) stipulated, “An Investor may, under the provisions of this 
Law, import all his Project’s needs, including the equipment and machinery. Such 
imports shall be exempt from all customs duties as they cross the Region’s borders, 
provided that they are used exclusively for the Project’s purposes” (KRG, Law of 
Investment 2006, KRG, Board of Investment 2012). In May, 2011, the Pre-Import 
Inspection, Testing and Certification Program of Goods into Iraq (ICIGI) extended to 
the KRI and, on January 15, 2012, the Certificates of Conformity required the inspection 
of goods at the KRI land and air entry points (Bureau Veritas Data Sheet). Until the 
KRG made an agreement with Bureau Veritas to implement the program, the Kurdistan 
Standardization and Quality Control Administration was the main body that oversaw 
customs regulations and the importation of goods to the KRI. Several respondents 
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commented that the companies they represented benefited from the establishment of 
liberal and standard customs regulations for foreign companies. Some respondents 
indicated that prior to the standardization of customs regulations they had experienced 
longer delays at the Habur-Zakho border crossing because it was up to the discretion of 
customs officials which trucks and goods to inspect. Now, according to respondents, 
due to the pre-inspection process, corruption and abuse of the system at the air and land 
border crossings are less rampant. Still, some respondents expressed concern that the 
pre-inspection process itself might become corrupt as there are only a few companies 
that have the authority to determine what items require pre-inspection assessments. 
 
Banking and finance sector 
During the timeframe of this research project, despite the significant progress of the 
private sector, the KRI still lacked a modern banking and finance system to replace a 
largely cash-based economy. The Ministry of Planning Director of Quality Control for 
Gold noted, “Given the weak banking sector in the Region, as well as the lack of a 
market for securities, stocks, and bonds, citizens have no options for storing and saving 
money, other than buying gold and keeping it in their homes” (Zebari 2013b). During 
the years of 2004-2009, the number of private banks increased from 16 to 24 banks, 
which “raised the size of their capital to about ID 2,012.280 billion by the end of 2009” 
(KRG, Ministry of Planning 2011).ix The banking sector received 16.67 percent of the 
economy’s overall capital investment. Five major Turkish banks were approved by the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency to open branches in Erbil: Ziraat Bank, 
Vakifbank, Is Bank, Al-Baraka Bank, Bank Asya (Today’s Zaman 2011).  
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Respondents who worked on projects at the beginning of the research timeframe 
commented that they had severe problems receiving and sending funds due to the lack 
of a sophisticated banking sector. According to Cetin Dayioglu, Makyol Construction, 
at the time of the development of the Hawler International Airport, it was difficult to 
send funds from the KRI to Turkey, because there was no viable banking structure in 
the KRI. Erdal Yenigun, Yenigun Construction mentioned, “At the beginning of the 
project, the banking sector in northern Iraq, was underdeveloped. Yenigun Construction 
had difficulty figuring out the safest way to transfer payments to Turkey” (Erdal 
Yenigun, Yenigun Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Most respondents indicated 
that the companies they represented operated on a cash basis or utilized an informal 
wiring system.  
 
Most of the respondents who undertook projects towards the later portion of the research 
timeframe indicated that there were inconsequential challenges regarding the banking 
and finance sector in the KRI. Cuneyt Karacasu noted, “Yuksel gets paid through a local 
bank and then is able to wire funds to a bank in Turkey” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Karacasu further mentioned, “Yuksel gets paid 
in USD because the project is in USD. Yuksel pays local staff in the local currency, the 
third country staff in USD, and the Turkish staff in Liras based on the exchange rate at 
payday” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). It was 
apparent that basic retail banking had expanded in recent years, however, more 
sophisticated consumer banking, private banking and commercial banking were still 
undeveloped in the KRI. Aydin Toprakli, noted, “It is a challenge to work with banks 
in the region because they are very cautious and do not give credit very easily” (Aydin 
Toprakli, Kalyon Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Therefore, Turkish 
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companies often acquired capital or loans from banks in Turkey or third countries such 
as the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Impact on the local economy 
Another theme that emerged from the interviews was that respondents believed their 
projects had a positive impact on the local economy after the project was completed. 
Ali Arslanoglu, asserted, “The University we built has continued to benefit the local 
economy by providing employment opportunities even after the completion of the 
project. Many of the former personnel such as architects, engineers, and technicians 
who worked on the project were hired because they knew how to maintain and operate 
the university campus” (Ali Arslanoglu, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
Major infrastructure projects, such as the Water Supply Improvement Project in Erbil 
and Dohuk; Hawler International Airport in Erbil; and the Electricity Distribution 
Project, all needed skilled workers to maintain the upkeep of the sites and manage daily 
operations, which in-turn had a lasting impact on job creation. 
 
Companies who assumed projects towards the beginning of the research timeframe 
(2004-2008), appeared to not have had as much of an impact on the local economy as 
compared to more recent projects. As was mentioned earlier in this dissertation, under 
the Saddam regime, and due to economic sanctions, the KRG lacked access to finance, 
capital and the international market to purchase critical items needed to undertake large 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, most of 
the materials that were used in early infrastructure projects were brought in from Turkey 
or other neighboring countries. Regarding the Erbil Culture and Convention Center, 
Erdal Yenigun, from Yenigun Construction, commented, “The majority of the materials 
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were trucked in from Turkey as there were few local companies who could supply the 
necessary materials at that time. Approximately 470 trucks were used over the course 
of the project” (Erdal Yenigun, Yenigun Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Regarding the Qandeel Bridge and approaches highway, 77 Construction and 
Contracting Company, transported large machinery such as cranes on trucks from 
Turkey to the KRI. TemSA exported machines that were not available and were 
required for construction projects in the KRI. Turkish export companies that delivered 
equipment to the KRI were not required to pay tax on the items if they were to be utilized 
on an approved project site.  
 
Companies who commenced projects in the middle to the end of the research timeframe 
(2009-2014), most likely had more of a positive impact on economic development. 
Although the majority of respondents indicated they still purchased a significant amount 
of material from Turkey they also acquired materials from the local economy, and/or 
hired local subcontractors to perform specific duties for the project. Ali Arslanoglu, 
noted, “Most of the finishing materials were imported from Turkey and small amounts 
of materials were imported from Iran. Tepe Construction also bought materials from 
local companies who had previously imported the goods from Turkey. Food was 
procured from local markets. Construction materials, such as cement, were purchased 
locally. Many of the subcontractors who performed structural and/or finishing work 
were local Kurdish companies” (Ali Arslanoglu, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Ankara). Furthermore, “The new campus has greatly contributed to the local economy. 
Many small companies, such as service buses, taxis, and restaurants opened to serve the 
university community” (Ali Arslanoglu, Tepe Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
Yasar Giregiz, noted there was an impact on the local economy as the project team 
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worked with “local suppliers of rental equipment” (Yasar Giregiz, Fernas Construction, 
2014, Interview, Ankara). Suleyman Ciliv, noted, “77 Construction and Contracting 
Company contributed to the development of the local region because previously there 
was no industry where the construction site was located” (Suleyman Ciliv, 77 
Construction and Contracting Company, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Ilci Holding 
worked with different types of subcontractors. The main subcontractor was responsible 
for managing the personnel for the construction site, and providing them with 
accommodation and food; whereas, another subcontractor led the training component 
for professional employees. Ilci Holding also worked with subcontractors for specific 
tasks or procuring products, such as wooden doorframes, tile panels, paint and other 
materials. It was also apparent that companies who undertook projects in the KRI 
towards the end of the research timeline conducted detailed market analyses about what 
products and services could be procured locally before entering the market.  
 
Job creation  
The labor force within the area governed by the KRG changed dramatically over the 
last three decades (KRG Regional Statistics Office 2012, KRG Regional Statistics 
Office 2013). Previously, the labor market consisted of a sizeable agricultural sector 
and rural population, but that changed in the 1980s when the Saddam regime destroyed 
approximately 4,000 rural villages and forcibly relocated hundreds of thousand Kurds 
from their farms into resettlement centers. Many Kurds became refugees and fled to 
Iran, Turkey and Europe, while others remained internally displaced persons, and 
sought sanctuary in urban centers where some social services and job opportunities were 
available (McDowall 1996b, 28). Data on employment is varied depending on which 
resources one reviews. For instance, international development agencies generally 
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indicate that the unemployment rates are higher than data provided by Kurdistan Region 
Statistics Office. The SEM report indicated, “The unemployment rate in the KRG area 
varies between 30 percent and 80 percent, depending on how it is computed” (SEM 
2012, 22). 
 
During the timeframe of this research project, many people living in the KRI did not 
have the professional qualifications and experience needed to ensure their 
competiveness and employment in the international private sector. A RAND study 
found that “of all the jobs in the region, only 20 percent are wage-paying jobs in the 
private sector” (Anthony, Hansen, Kumar, Shatz, and Vernez 2012, 3). Therefore, an 
effort to move the economy toward private sector employment will presumably take 
time. The KRG launched a series of initiatives to universalize education to bridge the 
gap in human capacity. In 2007, the KRG raised the compulsory school level from grade 
6 to grade 9. The number of post-secondary education institutions expanded, and the 
enrollment in both two-year and four-year higher-education institutions increased. A 
recent RAND study projected that, “from 2012 to 2020, approximately 85,000 people 
(9,500 annually) will enter the labor market immediately after leaving the education 
system with two-year secondary degrees” (Shatz et al. 2014, xiv). Furthermore, the 
RAND study projected that “in the same period, approximately 130,100 people (around 
14,500 annually) will enter the labor market immediately after leaving the education 
system with four-year post-secondary degrees” (Shatz et al. 2014, xiv). The focus on 
improving education sector created an opportunity to positively impact future labor 
market entrants as they developed the skills necessary to compete in a growing private 
sector. 
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Several initiatives were established to stimulate job creation and reduce unemployment 
over the past few years. There were private sector programs, such as “MSelect,” 
government programs, such as “Kurdistan Works” and “Jobs for Everyone Programme” 
and NGO-development initiatives, such as the USAID Foras program (Foras). x 
Occasionally, private sector initiatives, such as MSelect collaborated with NGOs, such 
as the Danish Refugee Council, to conduct a Foras training programme. According to 
Toon Bijnens, an expert in the field of employment creation, MSelect, “also set up a job 
seekers program, which is mostly geared towards providing humanitarian support, but 
it also targets host-communities. I am sure many of the IDPs the project targets are well 
educated” (Toon Bijnens, Iraq Civil Society and Solidarity Initiative, 2014, Interview, 
Skype). Toon Bijnens, further noted, “the USAID funded “Foras” program, which 
besides advertising vacancies offers courses in several fields. Foras built relations 
especially with smaller companies/enterprises to gather employment information and to 
get approval to post vacancies on their website. This has not been easy, mostly since 
employers are not used to using the internet to find job seekers and companies with less 
than 10 employees prefer to give jobs to people within their own family circle” (Toon 
Bijnens, Iraq Civil Society and Solidarity Initiative, 2014, Interview, Skype). Foras also 
organized a few job fairs per year with partner institutions in Iraq, including the KRI, 
the most recent of which was organized by American University in Sulaymaniyah. 
MSelect also conducted a Foras program to provide training in employability and 
specialized skills. One may question the long-term impact, since a course typically 
lasted only two-four days or was offered through the Internet. Therefore, the value of 
such a certificate is very little compared to a University degree or years of professional 
experience. Toon noted, “I feel this is mostly about getting a certificate as quickly as 
possible. However, a certificate is not always sufficient for a company who is looking 
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to hire someone” (Toon Bijnens, Iraq Civil Society and Solidarity Initiative, 2014, 
Interview, Skype). In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs launched an 
initiative called, “Jobs for Everyone programme,” and “expected to create around 3,000 
business opportunities for companies in the private sector over the next three years” 
(Doosky 2001), by pairing unemployed graduates of colleges and vocational institutes 
with private sector jobs. The KRG offered to provide 150,000 Iraqi Dinars (around 
$135) to business owners for each job they created.xi In 2013, the Prime Minister’s 
Office launched a website called “Kurdistan Works” to pair job seekers with employers 
in the private sector, provided tips and guidance on how to create resumes, how to apply 
for open positions, and listed the benefits of working in the private sector. In addition, 
the website The website also aggregated job listings by local employers, recruitment 
agencies, internships and volunteer opportunities. In 2013, a “Kurdistan Careers” event 
was launched, which facilitated interactions with potential employers from the private 
sector and job seekers during a two-day event. Research into all of the employment 
initiatives did not reveal statistical information on whether any jobs were created as a 
result of the programs and, if so, how many. Toon indicated, “This is a big issue with 
all of the job creation programs. I worked on a Foras project and spoke to many people 
from the initiative. They have little or no numbers on how many people actually roll 
into a job” (Toon Bijnens, Iraq Civil Society and Solidarity Initiative, 2014, Interview, 
Skype).  
 
Many respondents believed their projects contributed to job creation in the KRI. 
Regarding the Water Supply Improvement Project in Erbil and Dohuk, Yasar Giregiz, 
commented, “There will be some job creation” (Yasar Giregiz, Fernas Construction, 
2014, Interview, Ankara). Bilal Guzel, noted that, “Yes, the project provided job 
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opportunities” (Bilal Guzel, Ilci Holding, 2014, Interview, Facetime). Because of the 
completion of the Hawler Erbil International Airport, Cetin Dayioglu, commented, “Yes 
there has been development and job creation in lots of different fields” (Cetin Dayioglu, 
Makyol Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). One company representative 
indicated that his company did not differentiate between the ethnicity, nor the 
nationality of an employee, rather the company aimed to hire hardworking people. 
Commenting on the hiring of local staff, Tahsin Bagci, said, “We believe we should 
maximize local resources as much as possible. You save money by not bringing as many 
Turkish employees, and you also become more sympathetic to locals by working with 
them” (Tahsin Bagci, STFA Construction, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Another 
respondent noted that the project did not provide as many job opportunities as would be 
expected, considering the relatively high-level of education in the KRI as compared to 
other neighboring regions. An overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that the 
Turkish companies had difficulty finding locals with the necessary professional skills. 
According to some respondents, the companies they represented only hired a handful 
of local residents, because most applicants were not adequately prepared, or lacked 
professional experience. Therefore, many respondents, whose companies were 
interested in hiring local employees, worked with regional employment agencies to 
recruit professionals with the required skills.  
 
Skilled labor 
Four major observations emerged regarding respondent’s interactions with skilled labor 
from the KRI. Respondents indicated that local skilled professionals had an 
advantageous knowledge of indigenous and regional languages. According to most 
respondents, local professionals lacked extensive work experience and managerial 
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skills. Furthermore, respondents noted that professionals were deficient in technical and 
English language skills and often demanded unrealistic salary earnings. Skilled 
employees in the construction sector in the KRI usually consisted of technicians, 
engineers, translators and administrative staff.  
 
Knowledge of local and regional languages 
Respondents noted that often local skilled staff spoke indigenous languages and dialects 
and were also able to communicate in regional languages, such as Turkish and Arabic, 
as well. Knowledge of local languages proved crucial for Turkish companies operating 
in an ethnically diverse region. During the Saddam regime, Arabic was taught and used 
widely throughout the KRI. However, since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, 
Arabic was no longer emphasized and the new generation of Iraqi Kurds were not as 
familiar with the language as previous generations. One respondent noted that the IT 
technician that his company interfaced with spoke fluent Turkish, which he had learned 
from watching Turkish television shows since he was in high school. Arguably, the 
increase in viewership of Turkish television shows, popularity of singers including 
Kurds from Turkey, expansion of Turkish brands and companies and construction of 
Turkish schools intensified Turkey’s visibility in the KRI, and influenced many young 
people from the surrounding regions to learn Turkish over the last decade (Yoruk and 
Vatikiotis 2013, Akgun and Gundogar 2011, Akgun, Gundogar, Levacak, and 
Percinoglu 2010, Akgun, Percinoglu and Gundogar 2009, Aydin 2012, Butler 2009, 
Cagaptay 2009a, Grigoriadis 2010b, Rousselin 2013). 
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Work experience and managerial skills 
Respondents noted that oftentimes, new entry local skilled staff did not have a 
significant amount of work experience, and lacked professional managerial skills. One 
company representative noted that the civil engineers who were designated by the KRG 
to follow the progress of the project had little experience working on major projects. 
Another respondent mentioned that new entry skilled personnel had more of a 
theoretical perspective, rather than a practical approach to the project. The respondent 
further noted that local skilled staff did not understand how to manage a project within 
required timeframes, thereby prolonging the project timeline. It was however, 
noticeable that respondents had more confidence in the capability of local mid to senior-
level professionals.  
 
Technical and English language skills 
Some respondents commented that local skilled staff often had weak technical and 
English language skills. One respondent cited the lack of basic vocational and higher-
level technical departments in the local universities as a major reason that the labor 
market was not populated with skilled persons who could compete with foreign 
professionals in the international private sector. Another respondent commented that 
the demand for higher-level technical skills in the private sector did not match the skills 
available within the local workforce. 
 
Salary earnings  
Respondents indicated that oftentimes, new entry local skilled staff demanded they earn 
the same wage as their more knowledgeable and higher qualified Turkish counterparts. 
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Most respondents indicated that it was not feasible nor was it a good business model to 
offer a similar salary to new graduates who lacked equivalent professional experience. 
 
Unskilled labor 
Respondents expressed three major observations concerning local unskilled staff. 
According to respondents, local unskilled personnel were able to communicate in local 
and regional languages. One challenge working with local unskilled staff was that they 
sometimes lacked a proficient understanding of international products and modern 
construction techniques. Lastly, due in large part to the over bloated public sector the 
size of local unskilled labor in the KRI was very small. Unskilled positions in the 
construction sector in the KRI usually consisted of laborers, drivers, delivery assistants 
and kitchen staff.  
 
Knowledge of local and regional languages 
Respondents commented that local unskilled staff usually had a good command of both 
local and regional languages, such as Turkish and Arabic. A company representative 
noted that because the unskilled staff worked alongside a more knowledgeable 
supervisor, usually from Turkey, they quickly learned basic Turkish, as well as the skills 
necessary to become more marketable in the construction sector. Due to the ethnic 
diversity in the KRI, a few respondents noted that it was important to have employees 
who could communicate with one another. In addition, some respondents noted that it 
was beneficial when local unskilled workers understood English, since many companies 
hired laborers from third countries, such as Bangladesh, where English is widely 
spoken.  
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Knowledge of international products 
Respondents indicated that at the beginning of this research timeframe, oftentimes, local 
unskilled staff were unfamiliar with international products and equipment utilized at 
worksites. However, as knowledge transfer between employees from Turkey and the 
KRI increased over time, the local labor force became more aware of international 
products, and how to operate imported machinery. In general, respondents were more 
comfortable hiring local unskilled laborers towards the end of the timeframe because 
there was more likelihood that they had already worked on complex construction sites 
and were familiar with modern construction practices.  
 
Size of local unskilled labor force in the region  
Respondents remarked that it appeared there were not many local unskilled laborers 
willing to work in the private construction sector due to the dominance of the public 
sector, job security and financial support that were associated with working for the 
KRG. It seemed Turkish companies were willing to hire whomever they wanted from 
the labor market and in-turn employed refugees, IDPs and expat laborers on 
construction sites. Respondents did not disclose how much financial compensation they 
offered to unskilled laborers.  
 
Mixed labor force 
The majority of the respondents commented that the companies they represented 
employed a combination of local skilled and unskilled staff. Yasar Giregiz, noted, “We 
hired local engineers, administrative persons, and laborers” (Yasar Giregiz, Fernas 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Timucin Onogur, noted, “Translators, drivers 
and subcontractor teams (approximately 200 people) were employed” (Timucin 
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Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Halil Dilek, commented that 
although they mostly hired Turkish engineers to work on their project, “we also hired 
engineers from all over the world. The site manager in Dohuk is from Syria. Because 
of the conflict in Syria, many Syrians have fled to northern Iraq to seek refuge. STFA 
also hired some of them to work as laborers, tea clerks, drivers, and in other positions. 
These Syrian refugees are all of Kurdish origin” (Halil Dilek, STFA Construction, 2014, 
Interview, Istanbul).  
 
Ali Arslanoglu, noted, “In the beginning of the project, approximately 90 percent of 
employees were Turkish, since there were not very many locals who had the kinds of 
skills that Tepe Construction needed for the project. However, after a few years into the 
project, around 40 percent of the senior and juniors staff were locally employed. 
Personnel included administration, personnel chief, electrical chief, health safety 
environment chief, finance chief, a variety of electricians, civil engineers, architects, 
technicians, operators, mechanics, security, and unskilled labor” (Ali Arslanoglu, Tepe 
Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 77 Construction and Contracting Company 
hired approximately 250 employees to work on the Qandeel bridge and approaches 
highway project. Unskilled laborers were hired from the surrounding villages and 
skilled employees were brought in from Turkey. According to Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra 
Energy, “A team consisting of six expatriate officers, project manager, site manager, 
accountant and three project engineers at the Erbil office and the site office in Dohuk 
managed the project, and the actual work was executed by local subcontractors” 
(Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Furthermore, Onogur, 
mentioned, “We contributed to job creation for about two hundred local people during 
the execution of the project. Around thirty people were employed to operate and 
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maintain the project which also contributed to job creation” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-Ra 
Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, noted, “The 
Roads and Bridges authority assigned resident engineers for controlling the project 
progress and quality. We employed as many local people as we could depending on the 
skills we needed and that were available among the local workforce” (Cuneyt Karacasu, 
Yuksel Construction, 2014, Interview, Ankara). 
 
Majority non-Iraqi Kurdish worksites  
Some respondents commented that it was difficult to find local people with the right 
skills required for their projects and, therefore, hired mostly non-Iraqi Kurdish 
employees. According to Aykut Altin, “At the peak of the project, there were two 
thousand, two hundred employees on the Erbil site. The majority of approximately 70 
to 80 percent of unskilled employees were Indian nationals. There were also some 
Indian technicians and foremen, and the rest of the skilled staff were Turkish” (Aykut 
Altin, Enka Construction, 2014, Interview, Facetime). One respondent noted that the 
major infrastructure project he managed hired approximately two thousand people, with 
the majority of workers coming from outside Iraq. One project hired more than thirty-
five engineers from Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, Scotland, Spain, United 
Kingdom and the United States. Another respondent noted that his infrastructure project 
hired eight hundred people at the peak of the project, with most of the employees 
coming from countries other than Iraq including the KRI.  
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12. Establishment of social safety nets 
The majority of the working-age population in the KRI were public servants and 
received benefits from the government (DeWeaver 2015, 7, KRG, Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs 2013). A RAND study noted, “Wages in the civil service are 
generally below those in the private sector for comparable occupations; however, health 
care coverage, retirement benefits, paid vacation, and regular working hours are more 
prevalent in the civil service” (Anthony, Hansen, Kumar, Shatz and Vernez 2012, 7, 
RUDAW 2015, Mamoun 2015). In 2009, the KRG, in conjunction with the national 
government of Iraq and the World Bank, created a poverty reduction strategy that 
marked the need to establish social safety nets for the economically disadvantaged 
(KRG, Ministry of Planning 2013). Only a few respondents commented on whether or 
not their project had contributed to the provision of social safety nets. Timucin Onogur, 
noted, “The project, by nature, is not the kind to create such impact. As our company 
policy, we checked the provision of work safety of subcontractors and corrected their 
mistakes, and provided high level of work safety (no accidents, injury or death took 
place although the character of the work was highly dangerous). Before making final 
payments to subcontractors, we checked to ensure that they paid the wages of all of their 
employees, and that they do not have any debt of such nature” (Timucin Onogur, Sa-
Ra Energy, 2014, Interview, Ankara). Overall, it appeared as if respondents were not 
completely certain about the framework to contribute to social safety nets in the KRI.  
 
13. Provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid  
In large part due to the debilitating effects of the economic sanctions enacted by the 
United Nations on Iraq in the early 1990s the international community committed funds 
and provided technical assistance to the KRG (KRG, Ministry of Finance and UNDP 
  
198 
 
Iraq 2010, KRG, Ministry of Planning 2010). According to Dilshad O. Abubakir, “Such 
funds were basically focused on reconstruction and rehabilitation of the rural areas in 
the KRI and never yielded in long-term sustainable development in the region. 
However, a dramatic shift happened when the UN Security Resolution 986 was passed 
in 1996 to allow Iraq to sell oil for food items and other humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people” (Dilshad O. Abubakir, USAID/Iraq, U.S. Consulate General Erbil, 2015, 
Interview, Skype). However, under the Oil-for-Food Programme “the aid community 
further fragmented the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan by creating price differentials 
between different regions, which in turn set off internal rivalries and power struggles 
among entrepreneurial elements of the KDP and PUK” (Chorev 2015, 4). The strict 
restrictions imposed on what items were allowed into Iraq severely compromised the 
expansion of the local private sector and industry leaving the region dependent on 
imports to meet the needs of people in the KRI. The stunted agriculture sector threated 
food security forcing many to depend on food rations and witnessed a decrease in 
nutrition levels across the region. Several years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, in 
2008, development practitioners and KRG government representatives decided to 
establish “rules, regulations, processes and institutions to guide design, quality control, 
strategic orientation, effective and efficient implementation, monitoring, evaluation of 
projects, as well as recording and reporting on funding to the general public” (KRG, 
Ministry of Planning 2008, 7), to try to avoid disastrous failure of development 
assistance that transpired under the Oil-for-Food Programme. The creation of the 
External Resources Management Unit and the General Directorate for Coordination and 
Cooperation Development in the Ministry of Planning were tasked to coordinate the 
provision of well-coordinated, predictable and multifaceted aid. In addition, to the 
management and organization of assistance by international aid agencies, the United 
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Nations, and others, the directorate, sought to learn best practices from the local and 
international private sector that might be useful for administering aid in the KRI 
(Dilshad O. Abubakir, USAID/Iraq, U.S. Consulate General Erbil. 2015, Interview, 
Skype). No respondents commented on whether or not their projects had an impact on 
the provision of well-coordinated, predicable, and multifaceted aid in the KRI.  
 
Conclusion  
The KRI suffered many of the same ills, as did all of Iraq, which compromised advances 
in human security, particularly economic security. By the time of the U.S.-led invasion 
in 2003, all aspects of major infrastructure needed to be overhauled. Deficiencies 
included inadequate electrical power generation and power distribution networks to 
support human needs, and the underproduction of the oil and gas sector; unclean water 
supplies; inadequate waste water treatment systems; subpar public health and medical 
care institutions; substandard local roads and regional highways; the need for road 
bridges and tunnels to reduce transit times and improve safety; insufficient human 
capital and infrastructure at international border crossings; lack of internationally 
approved airports to facilitate trade within the region and with Europe; insufficient 
infrastructure and human resources for all levels of education; and absence of affordable 
housing, particularly in the booming cities of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah. The 
legacy of the KRG, playing a dominant role in the economy, manufacturing and 
business, clearly made it the key player in rebuilding infrastructure, damaged from two 
wars, decades of a two-sided embargo - one by the United Nations on all of Iraq, and 
an internal embargo imposed by the Saddam regime, as well as the debilitating impact 
of the American occupation. However, the KRI’s dependence on Baghdad for 
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uninterrupted transfers of oil revenues reduced its ability to support human security 
needs in a steady manner.  
 
Economic security in the KRI, during the timeframe of when interviews were conducted 
with representatives from the Turkish construction sector, was severely compromised. 
For one, the ongoing dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, the central government of 
Iraq, over the KRG’s authority to market and sell their own natural resources, 
particularly oil, negatively affected economic growth. Baghdad’s refusal to disperse 17 
percent of the federal budget to the KRG, an amount, defined in the Iraqi Constitution, 
and based on the population size of the region, forced the KRG to withhold payments 
to both the international and local private sectors, leaving many international firms 
scrambling to operate without being paid for months (Raval 2014). Second, the swift 
advance of the Daesh militants towards the KRI in June and July 2014, constituted a 
significant existential security threat, and raised questions about how safe the region 
actually was for international private sector investments and operations (Solomon 
2014). Furthermore, the cutting off of the major trade route by Daesh from Mosul going 
to Baghdad increased shipping costs dramatically, and left many companies questioning 
if it were still profitable to operate in Iraq and the KRI (Zalewski 2014). Commenting 
on the recent rise of insecurity Aydin Toprakli, noted, “The recent spike in violence in 
Iraq due to the takeover of Mosul by Daesh has forced us to change our departure points 
for materials for the project” (Aydin Toprakli, Kalyon Construction, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). By the end of August, 2014, some companies had decided to reroute their 
delivery trucks through Iran and back into Iraq. The rerouting of goods meant 
companies would have to spend more time and money delivering goods. This was not 
feasible for some companies who had already suffered economically because of the 
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disruption of trade. Therefore, only companies who had the funds available or access to 
credit were able to proceed with a new route. By the end of 2014, many companies 
reverted to pre-crisis business activities, as the U.S. and coalition airstrikes pushed 
Daesh back far enough for the Peshmerga to establish a safe, yet porous, border along 
the key areas of the KRI. Even though there were significant short comings of the 
Turkish private sector in the KRI, the infrastructure recovery and restoration of access 
to basic services that were undertaken by Turkish companies allowed the KRI to absorb 
some of the shocks of the humanitarian crisis that ballooned in 2014. 
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Chapter 5 – Impact of the Turkish Export Sector and Associated Business 
Initiatives on Economic Security in the KRI  
Introduction  
The chapter will begin with an overview on the overdependence on imports followed 
by the engagement of the Turkish private sector in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). 
The major concentration of this chapter is the empirical data, which emerged from 
interviews with representatives from the Turkish export sector and associated business 
initiatives. The information in this chapter provides crucial insight into the Turkish 
private sector’s engagement in the KRI. 
 
The KRI’s overdependence on imports 
The collection of oil and gas fees and royalties ensured Baghdad’s central role in the 
previous statist economy, and the distribution of nation-wide political patronage 
(Springborg 1986, Stork 1982). Iraq had become a ‘rentier state’ in the sense it was 
overwhelmingly dependent on foreign sales of oil to generate state revenue. The state-
run industries under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party government of Iraq were never able 
to provide consumer and food items desired by the Iraqi people; therefore, the country 
imported an array of goods and services. Despite the proximity of Turkey to Iraq, 
according to one Turkish executive, many senior-level Iraqi government officials were 
unfamiliar with the productive capabilities of Turkish industry in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Serif Egeli, Foreign Economic Relations Board, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Perceptions changed during the administration of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (1983-
1989) when Turkish business representatives invited Iraqi government leaders to visit 
Turkey to witness their emerging industrial capabilities for production of durable and 
soft goods. Visiting Iraqi delegations started to understand that Turkish factories could 
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produce high-quality products at a fair price, and deliver them relatively quickly, when 
compared to countries outside the Middle East (Serif Egeli, Foreign Economic 
Relations Board, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). In a move to support an emerging export 
sector and integrate Turkey into the global economy, the Turkish government enacted 
trade policies to reward export companies in the form of tax rebates, export credits and 
credit subsidies. 
  
As was mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the agricultural productivity of the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) continued to decline after the Anfal Campaign 
(Leezenberg 2004, 395), displacement of the rural population by the Saddam regime 
and the U.S.-led sanctions on Iraq as punishment for Saddam’s 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait. Turkey suspended pipeline operations due to the UN embargo on Iraqi oil 
exports. (Beam 2014). The Iraqi Kurdish support of American troops and subsequent 
defeat of Iraqi forces in the 1991 war with the American-led coalition sparked anger in 
Baghdad among Ba’ath loyalists. To punish the Kurds, Saddam enforced an internal 
trade embargo against the KRI and, in effect, created a two-sided embargo on the region. 
This disrupted the cohesion of the economy, and further destabilized the precarious 
status of the agricultural sector in the KRI. Consequently, most Iraqis became dependent 
upon the UN administered food-rationing program for survival. The Iraqi agricultural 
sector could not compete with the flood of free international food products, much of 
which were sold on the black market. The KRI agricultural sector was seriously crippled 
and has remained stunted. The 1995 United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme was 
established in response to international criticism that the economic sanctions had a 
detrimental effect on the average person in Iraq. The Oil-for-Food Programme was 
designed to allow Iraq to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian items, such as medicine 
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and food (Alnasrawi 2001, Mazaheri 2010, Cortright and Lopez 2000, Dreze and 
Gazdar 1992, El-Bayoumi 2000, FAO 1993, FAO 1997). A portion of the revenues 
from the program was dispersed directly to the KRG to alleviate budget pressures and 
allow for development projects (Natali 2005, 163, Tripp 2000, 262). However, there 
were accusations that by the time of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, $4 billion 
was still owed to Kurds under the UN Oil-for-Food Programme, but was apparently 
held up in a UN-controlled French bank account (Talabani and Barzani 2003).  
 
Concurrent with the UN Embargo on Iraq was the rise of the so-called “Anatolian 
Tigers,” small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey, whose initial capital 
formation derived from the remittance of expat Turkish workers in Germany, France 
and Belgium. The rise of SMEs in Southeast Turkey, started in the 1970s and prepared 
the way for continuing robust export sales of food, textiles, and even white goods to 
Iraq and the KRI in the 1990s. For instance, the private sector in cities like Gaziantep, 
located in Southeastern Turkey, benefited from both remittances, as well as extensive 
trade with Iraq, Iran and Syria.  
 
The CPA and the new government in Baghdad did not prioritize the revitalization of the 
KRI immediately after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Large income transfers from 
Baghdad to the KRG, derived from oil revenues, began with the signing of the Iraqi 
Constitution in 2005 and the Parliamentary selection of Nouri al-Maliki as the Prime 
Minister. Transfers of 17 percent of the Iraqi central budget to the KRG provided the 
financial capacity to begin reconstruction of inadequate infrastructure in the KRI. In 
addition to state security, priority of funding went to the construction of airports, 
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bridges, clinics, electrical power and distribution networks, hospitals, housing, roads, 
schools, and water and sewage systems.  
 
Presence of the Turkish exports sector and associated business initiatives in the 
KRI 
Turkey was hesitant to develop close relations with the central government in Baghdad, 
as well as with the KRG after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. As Iraqi 
reconstruction gained momentum, and the KRG secured international recognition as a 
safe and viable partner in the region, Turkey’s approach to Iraq transitioned from a 
narrow security cooperation relationship to an economic and foreign policy centered 
approach. Turkish companies were well positioned for the establishment of a friendlier 
business environment, as many already had extensive experience operating in Iraq, 
particularly in the KRI. Furthermore, companies in Turkey manufactured higher quality 
products, and offered lower prices as compared to other regional industries. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 3, entitled the Contextual Framework, during the renewal of 
diplomatic relations, Turkish business associations and business representatives, 
especially those already working in the KRI, encouraged Ankara and Erbil to deepen 
economic cooperation (Kirisci 2006, 47, Park 2012b). Furthermore, the Turkish 
government and private sector worked closely to strengthen Turkish economic activities 
in the KRI. Many respondents noted that the presence of the Turkish private sector also 
contributed to an increase in cultural understanding between professionals from Turkey 
and the KRI. Bilal Demirler, noted, “Turkish support is important since it has a special 
“converter effect” between Europe and Middle Eastern mindsets” (Bilal Demirler, 
Faruk Medical City, 2015, Interview, Istanbul).  
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Turkish Companies Operating in the KRI 
Many respondents noted that when compared to other regional and international 
companies, Turkish companies had an advantage to working in the KRI. Ulas Gulbay, 
noted, “The Iraq market is strategic for Kale Ceramic since Iraq is a neighboring 
country. Turkish and Kurdish people share a similar culture and history. Regarding 
advantages compared to European products, the quality of Turkish products is high, 
cheap and reliable, transportation is easy and the Iraq market is one of the biggest 
ceramic importers in the Middle East” (Ulas Gulbay, Kale Ceramic, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). Onur Acar, commented, “When compared to other countries, Turkey has an 
advantage because it is a bridge for the region” (Onur Acar, Tamek, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). During the timeframe of this research project, from 2004-2014, the presence 
of Turkish products in the KRI arguably made up the majority of imports in the KRI. 
According to Turkish government figures, Turkish exports to Iraq were between $2.8 
and $3.5 billion in 2007, with approximately 75 to 80 percent of goods sent to the KRI. 
With annual exports worth over $8.2 billion in 2011, Iraq ranked as the third largest 
export market for Turkey (Turkan, 2014, 24). In 2013, Turkey’s trade with Iraq 
amounted to $11.9 billion, making Iraq Turkey’s second-biggest export market, while 
Turkey became Iraq’s largest external trading partner. This relationship was not only 
significant because of exports, but when compared to trade with Germany, Turkey’s 
largest trading partner, with exports equal to $13.3 billion, and imports equal to $24.1 
billion, Turkey only imported $145 million from Iraq in 2013, thus tilting the balance 
of trade in Turkey’s favor (UN COMTRADE, Turkey Ministry of Economy, Turkish 
Exporters Assembly, Turkish Statistical Institute). By 2013, more than 1,500 Turkish 
companies operated throughout Iraq, and exported a wide array of goods, such as 
diapers, doors, food items, furniture, milk, and pipes. During the first five months of 
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2014, exports to Iraq had already amounted to $5.4 billion, an increase of 11 percent 
(Cagaptay, Bache Fidan, Sacikara and Baste 2015, Turkish Statistical Institute). The 
KRI also served as a destination for storing Turkish exports before being re-exported to 
other provinces in Iraq, which made it difficult to determine exact quantitative trade 
figures between Turkey and the KRG.  
 
Respondents indicated that they either exported products to the KRI, or conducted 
business activities in the KRI, in part, because of the relatively low costs associated with 
logistics and transport, and the likelihood for high profits. However, in June, 2014, 
Daesh seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, blocked the major route south 
to Baghdad, kidnaped Turkish truck drivers, overtook the Turkish Consulate in Mosul, 
and captured the consulate staff, their family members and the security detachment, thus 
changing the political, military and economic dynamics in the region. On 2 July 2014, 
the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) reported that Iraq had dropped to Turkey’s third 
largest trading partner, falling behind Britain. Within a short time period, trade with Iraq 
had decreased 21 percent, compromising trade relations between Turkey and Iraq. Many 
respondents noted that consumption and spending decreased considerably, which had a 
negative impact on the already strained economy and local private sector in the KRI. 
The KRG had promoted itself as a safe environment in which to do business with and 
to do business from. However, with the advance of Daesh, many Turkish companies 
questioned whether it was safe to trade inside Iraq, even from the KRI. Onur Acar, 
commented, “Security is the main challenge of working in northern Iraq” (Onur Acar, 
Tamek, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Many companies stockpiled goods inside the KRI 
with the hope that the road to Baghdad, and onward to the south of Iraq, would 
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eventually open. Furthermore, transportation costs increased, in response to security 
considerations.  
 
Economic security spectrum findings  
The following section presents the empirical data from interviews with Turkish 
companies that engaged in the export of goods and services to the KRI, or led business 
initiatives in the KRI.  The aim of the interviews was to investigate Turkish private 
sector activity in correlation with economic security indicators. The Conclusion Chapter 
6, will provide an analysis of the impact of Turkish private sector activity on economic 
security in the KRI. 
 
1. Public-private relations  
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991, the United States, United Kingdom and France 
established a no-fly zone over the KRI, to prevent continued oppression by Saddam’s 
regime upon the Iraqi Kurds. The purpose of the Northern No-Fly Zone was to provide 
a security umbrella for the Iraqi Kurds so that they would not feel compelled to seek 
sanctuary in nearby Turkey and, instead, govern themselves in the KRI, independent of 
the central government in Baghdad (McIlmail 1994, Cockayne and Malone 2006, 
Silliman 2002, Cook 1995). Saddam ordered the withdrawal of all central government 
administrators, including both civil and military personnel, ceased paying the salaries 
of public servants, and inflicted his own trade embargo on the KRI (Roberts 1996). The 
population of the KRI faced the debilitating double embargoes of both the UN and the 
Saddam Hussein regime (Banai 2012, 271). Wars, human devastation, economic 
destruction, and the embargoes forced the people living in the KRI to become almost 
completely dependent on UN food assistance, and stunted the development and 
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revitalization of the formally robust agricultural sector. The positive outcome during 
this time period was that the KRI laid the groundwork for the political, institutional and 
legal pillars of a functioning democracy (Gunter 1993). Within the last decade, the KRG 
established a multidimensional structure that oversaw public administration and 
management of the region. In addition, the KRG founded key government institutions, 
such as the Board of Investment and ministries to enhance economic security.  
 
Respondents were asked if there was their project had an impact on public-private 
relations. Only a few respondents interfaced with at least one of the following KRG 
ministries: Ministry of Electricity; Ministry of Finance and the Economy; Ministry of 
Housing and Reconstruction; Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs; Ministry of 
Municipalities and Tourism; Transport and Communications, albeit not on a regular 
basis. The majority of respondents indicated that the company they represented did not 
interface with officials from the KRG on a regular basis. According to Mehmet Erman 
Atik, “We did not have any special need to be in close relations with the local 
authorities, other than registering an official company in Erbil” (Mehmet Erman Atik, 
Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Soner Cakilkaya, noted, “Ege Ceramic has not 
interfaced with the KRG, as the local distributors deal with them directly, and only when 
it is necessary” (Soner Cakilkaya, Ege Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Another 
respondent noted that most Turkish export companies only dealt with the KRG when 
they first began operating in the region to establish a formal business entity. In that case 
some Turkish companies worked with consulting companies to register their business 
for them. Regarding public-private relations, respondents indicated their business 
operations varied depending on the type of export and business initiative they undertook 
in the KRI. The modernization of the inspection process for goods imported into the 
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region, although confusing during the initial implementation of the program, served to 
standardize and ensure only quality goods entered the marked. Respondents noted that 
it was relatively easy to establish a presence in the region. Respondents also noted that 
it was crucial the KRG implement and uphold a strong internationally recognized legal 
framework to reassure the international private sector that the KRI was a transparent 
and business friendly environment.  
 
The type of export and business initiative 
Turkish companies followed a particular business model according to the type of export 
or business initiative they undertook in the KRI. Respondents indicated that the 
companies they represented worked closely with a business entity positioned in the KRI, 
if the market generated a significant amount of revenue or was an important source of 
business activity. Regardless of the structure of the company, it was crucial that the staff 
positioned in Turkey and the KRI had significant professional experience and 
knowledge of the local business climate. One respondent noted that the local Iraqi 
businessmen knew the market well and were able to navigate political and cultural 
aspects of the region. Another respondent noted that they relied heavily on their 
company representative, located in Erbil, to manage operations and interface with the 
relevant KRG ministries. It was apparent that regardless of the size and age of the 
Turkish venture, export and business initiatives were dependent on strong relations with 
representatives in the same industry, positioned in the KRI, as the local partner often 
led the business development in the region. One respondent noted that the local entity’s 
network greatly influenced the magnitude of sales and success of their business. 
Companies in this category often empowered their partners to make placement and 
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product decisions that were best for the local market, cross-trained employees to do 
multiple tasks, and standardized operational systems.  
 
Turkish companies who did not perceive the KRI market to be a significant source of 
revenue or company activity did not work closely with a business entity positioned in 
the KRI. Therefore, many companies did not interact with the business entities located 
in the KRI, unless they requested to purchase items from the company in Turkey. Then, 
communication concentrated on the financial and logistical aspects of the procurement 
of the requested items. It appeared as if the Turkish companies that followed this trend 
assumed a short-term business approach, rather than focusing on how to strengthen 
relations with partners positioned in the region.  
 
Concerning the type of exports and business initiatives, respondents indicated, the 
standardization of the inspection process contributed to the increase in the quality of 
goods that were imported legally to the KRI. Respondents also remarked that the 
transport of goods varied depending on the business model and the significance of the 
KRI market to the Turkish business entities included in this research project.  
 
Inspection process 
Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the end of the United Nations economic embargo 
on the country and the high tariffs of the Saddam regime, imports flooded the market, 
which stifled the local private sector. In 2010, the central government of Iraq approved 
laws, “that introduced import tariffs, protections for local products and consumers and 
anti-monopoly laws” (Al-Ansary 2011). However, it was not until 2011 that the central 
government in Baghdad began a serious debate about the necessity to impose 
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regulations to track imports more closely. The Central Organization for Standardization 
and Quality Control was designated as the institution responsible for overseeing the Pre-
Import Inspection, Testing and Certification Program of Goods into Iraq (ICIGI). 
Within the KRI, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
the Kurdistan Board of Investment, Importers and Exporters Union of Iraq, Kurdistan 
Region, Kurdistan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the 
Kurdistan Standardization and Quality Control Administration were assigned to 
regulate and oversee imports. The new product conformity assessment program that 
took effect on January 15, 2012 was meant to “protect the country, consumers and local 
manufacturers from: substandard products that may endanger public health, safety or 
the environment; counterfeit or unsafe products; and unfair competition from imported 
goods which do not comply with the approved standards” (SGS website). Imported 
goods must comply with Iraqi national and/or approved international standards or 
technical requirements. Soner Cakilkaya, observed that, “Within the last few years, the 
Iraqi government started to require that certain products be inspected and certified 
before entering into Iraq” (Soner Cakilkaya, Ege Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Another respondent noted that before the inspection process was established, Iraq used 
to import more products from Iran and China. Harun Ulfi, noted, “The Iraq inspection 
regulations are based on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
system” (Harun Ulfi, SPK Pipes and Fittings, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Ulfi further 
noted, “A company can only print the ISO logo and serial number if they have been 
given the permission to do so” (Harun Ulfi, SPK Pipes and Fittings, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul), thereby reducing the possibility of counterfeit or substandard materials from 
entering into Iraq. The Turkish government required products for both domestic 
consumption and foreign distribution to meet certain standards to regulate the 
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authenticity and quality of products and services. Therefore, because Turkish 
companies were already familiar with quality control, it made it easier for companies 
who wanted to export to Iraq to clear the pre-inspection process. Many respondents 
indicated that the companies they represented were well-positioned for the inspection 
procedures since they were experienced in exporting to other countries who had similar 
regulations. Soner Cakilkaya, noted, “All Ege Ceramic’s materials meet the required 
standards. Each box that is shipped to northern Iraq is labeled to show at which factory 
the products were made, the materials that are inside the box, and when they were 
produced. This is helpful to track the materials in case a distributor or customer inquiries 
about the quality of the product” (Soner Cakilkaya, Ege Ceramic, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul).  
 
In order to acquire a certificate of conformity a company was required to undergo a 
review of the company’s documents, control testing of products, if required, physical 
inspection of goods, and other facilitation procedures. The KRG appointed Bureau 
Veritas, SGS, Cotecna, Baltic Ctl and TUV Rd to perform conformity assessments of 
goods exported to Iraq including to the KRI. In Turkey, companies were able to choose 
between two main inspection companies, Bureau Veritas and SGS, to inspect, test and 
certify goods before being exported to Iraq (Bureau Veritas, SGS). Ulas Gulbay, noted, 
“The central government has contracted the oversight of imports to third party 
inspection companies, mainly Bureau Veritas and SGS. Now companies who want to 
export to Iraq have to work with a third party inspection company to have their goods 
inspected and approved before exporting them to Iraq” (Ulas Gulbay, Kale Ceramic, 
2014, Interview, Istanbul). Gulbay further indicated, “When the new regulations began, 
Kale paid Bureau Veritas to inspect their entire factory and products. Now, Kale pays 
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Bureau Veritas to inspect products and for the certificates for each shipment of goods” 
(Ulas Gulbay, Kale Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul).  
 
Many respondents remarked that export procedures were modified after the 
implementation of the inspection process. According to Ulas Gulbay, “With regard to 
the Iraq market, the customs regulations have changed dramatically over the last two 
years. In an attempt, to ensure only high quality goods are imported to Iraq, the central 
government, in cooperation with all border provinces, enacted strict regulations for 
imports” (Ulas Gulbay, Kale Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). As the central 
government in Iraq and the KRG strengthened and improved the requirements on 
imports, the list of regulated products was revised and updated regularly. The 
standardization of inspection requirements included adding and removing products, and 
their related standards from the inspection lists. The following products required 
mandatory inspection under the ICIGI program before entering Iraq, including the area 
governed by the KRG: toys; electric and electronic products; vehicles, bicycles, tires 
and parts; construction products; food products: alcoholic beverages of all kinds, and 
energy drinks; cosmetics, personal hygiene products; household hardware; 
kitchenware; chemicals; textile and footwear; household burning fuel appliances; and 
all kinds of metallic cans and metallic covers. Under the ICIGI program food products 
other than alcoholic and cleaning agents and any type of product, except for banned 
products were inspected on a voluntary basis (Bureau Veritas). The following goods 
were prohibited from entering Iraq: genetically modified foods; food products that 
include pork, pork fat and pork derivatives in their ingredients; all products originated 
from Israel; used vehicle spare parts; counterfeited products; and non-compliant goods. 
Exempted goods included medical products of therapeutic effects, ATVs – All-terrain 
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vehicles (4-wheel bikes) and commercial vehicles designed and constructed for the 
carriage of goods of which the maximum mass was over 3 tons (Bureau Veritas). 
 
Many respondents indicated that one negative effect of the inspection process was the 
possibility of prolonging the overall shipping process. One respondent noted the 
company he represented had experienced delays when the inspection process first began 
due to a lack of proper awareness about which items required pre-inspection. Ulas 
Gulbay, commented, “The new inspection process certainly ensures that higher quality 
and legitimate products are exported to Iraq; however, it might prolong the shipment of 
materials, particularly at the beginning of the inspection process” (Ulas Gulbay, Kale 
Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Some respondents commented that the companies 
they represented faced difficulties when the new export regulations first began, as the 
inspection process was not clear. Respondents indicated that when the export 
procedures were first introduced, inspection companies and officials working at the 
Habur-Zakho border crossing were not always certain which materials needed to be 
inspected, nor which paperwork was required. Respondents also indicated that the 
inspection companies themselves were often unsure about which products needed to be 
examined. Some respondents noted that the uncertainty of the list of goods that required 
inspection made it difficult for companies to trust the process. Over time, it appeared 
that the respondents felt more confident about the inspection process once there were 
fewer revisions to the regulations.  
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Transport activities  
The majority of Turkish companies relied heavily on local counterparts to develop 
export and distribution strategies from Turkey to the KRI. Most companies operated on 
an “Ex Works” basis, meaning they did not arrange for a logistics company to transport 
goods, and the associated costs and insurance were covered by the business entity who 
sent the goods to the Iraq market, and not by the company that manufactured or 
produced the products. Soner Cakilkaya, noted, “Generally, distributors pay for 
shipping from Turkey to northern Iraq and then within Iraq” (Soner Cakilkaya, Ege 
Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Most respondents in this category indicated that it 
was easier for the companies they represented to not interfere in transportation activities 
particularly since the shipping process became more uncertain, and the associated costs 
increased with the Daesh advance in Iraq, in 2014 (Prothero 2014).  
 
Some Turkish companies who perceived the KRI as an important region for their 
business activities assisted with logistics even if the main business entity posited in the 
KRI made the final arrangement and covered the costs to transport goods to Iraq. It was 
apparent that the companies in this category had a close relationship with the company 
positioned in the KRI. One respondent noted that his office often called different 
trucking companies to negotiate the best shipping price on behalf of the main 
distributor, which was located in the KRI. Another respondent indicated that his 
company relied on personal contacts with other shipping companies to secure the most 
cost effective price for the local distributor in Iraq. Some companies worked with the 
same transport company; whereas, other companies worked with the transport company 
that offered the best price. There were differences among trucking companies 
concerning whether the company delivered the products all the way to the KRI market, 
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or only to the Turkey-Iraq border. In the second case, another trucking company would 
load the products at the Habur-Zakho border crossing point and deliver them to the KRI 
market. Mehmet Erman Atik, noted, “The Turkish trucking companies know the Iraq 
market well, especially those companies who exist along the Turkey-Iraq border” 
(Mehmet Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). According to one respondent 
from the transport sector, the truck fleet in Turkey was larger than the fleet in all of 
Europe and the largest temperature-controlled truck fleet in the region was based in 
Turkey. Some respondents indicated that sometimes, even reliable trucking companies 
did not meet international standards. For instance, cargo might arrive to the port of 
destination broken, or the delivery times might not coincide with what was originally 
agreed upon with a client. One respondent noted that sometimes drivers were more 
concerned with getting paid rather than following regulations. Therefore, some 
respondents revealed that it was safer to hire a reliable company even if it cost more to 
transport goods to the KRI.  
 
Respondents indicated that the wait time at the Habur-Zakho border crossing point 
between the Turkey-Iraq border significantly delayed the delivery of products. 
Therefore, an overwhelming number of respondents recommended that Ankara and 
Erbil pursue the opening of additional border crossings to allow the flow of goods and 
people to move more freely and easily. One respondent noted that the company they 
represented fell behind in their delivery time when the Habur-Zakho border crossing 
was closed for two months in 2013. In particular, companies that exported fresh food 
items, such as vegetables and fruit, lost several tons of produce since they were not 
delivered to the market and therefore rotted instead of being consumed.  
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Many of the respondents interviewed noted that the business representatives they 
worked with, who were positioned in the KRI, also distributed goods to the rest of Iraq. 
The Daesh takeover of the major distribution routes going south towards Baghdad and 
Basra, during the summer of 2014, significantly reduced Turkish exports to central and 
southern Iraq. Turkish trade that passed through Iraq to the Gulf States was also affected 
by the insecurity and disruption of the land routes. With transportation lines also severed 
in Syria, alternative routes through, Iran or shipping goods on sea freight carriers 
through the Suez Canal, were discussed, but these were not viable options, as they 
would increase the transportation costs substantially, and extend the time it would take 
to deliver goods. Truck owners began to charge double to transport goods south of 
Mosul, and were subject to Daesh transit fees. Costs to ship goods to Dubai via the 
Egyptian sea route were triple the cost of the old overland route through Iraq. Lower 
cost shipping via Roll On / Roll Off ferryboats on the Mediterranean route from 
Iskenderun, Turkey to Haifa, Israel, and then by truck through Jordan was not an option 
since Saudi Arabia forbade the entry of goods that transited through Israel. Furthermore, 
Iraq was suspicious about goods that transited through Israel. Another possibility was 
crossing the eastern border with Iran at Gurbulak, near the Turkish city of Agri, using 
an alternative Iranian route to Baghdad and southern Iraq. In addition to the concern 
over the increase in costs and extended routes to transport products to non-KRI regions 
in Iraq, many respondents interviewed for this research project were concerned that it 
was not feasible to guarantee on-time delivery of goods due to political and war risks 
because of the Daesh advance in Iraq. One respondent noted that his company was 
afraid that they would lose customers if they increased the price for products due to the 
security situation. Another respondent indicated that they decided to stop distribution 
to areas outside of the KRI because it had become too costly and unsafe. One respondent 
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commented that their truck drivers had to pay bribes to Daesh-associated groups along 
the dangerous route to Mosul. Respondents indicated that, in 2014, many 
manufacturers, distributors, and logistics companies, especially those that were 
positioned in the KRI, experienced lower profit margins because of a decrease in 
spending flows and an increase in transportation costs in order to safely deliver products 
from the KRI to other regions in Iraq. Respondents indicated that customers would 
likely opt for another product if their companies increased price points significantly. 
Surprisingly, trade figures between Turkey and Iraq remained at normal levels in 2014.  
 
Establishing a presence in the KRI 
Some respondents indicated it was important for Turkish companies to establish a 
presence in the KRI. According to Mehmet Erman Atik, “When a company understands 
the local environment it increases the quality of engagement in the market” (Mehmet 
Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Atik further noted the, “KRG is an 
emerging market and a local presence is of crucial importance to be a part of the growing 
business environment. We decided to open an office in Erbil in order to register our 
name in the region by using a reputable background where we are already trading in” 
(Mehmet Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Another respondent noted that 
the company he represented decided to open an office in Erbil to track their business 
activities more closely. Most of the respondents that were interviewed noted that the 
company they represented worked with either a Turkish or local Iraqi business entity 
rather than operating on their own in Iraq. Turkish companies who choose to either 
register their company, or an entirely separate company under their control, usually 
worked with local law firms or consulting agencies to manage the registration process.  
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Implement a strong internationally recognized legal framework  
The majority of respondents indicated that it was important that the KRG implement a 
strong and universally recognized legal framework for the international private sector. 
Respondents noted that it was essential the international business community felt 
assured that if any problems arose, including financial ones, foreign companies could 
rely on an independent and fair judicial system to make a just ruling. A few respondents 
noted that the existing local legal framework was not adequate to address financial 
conundrums in the KRI. In 2014, the KRI witnessed a domino effect of Baghdad’s 
withholding of the KRG’s 17 percent share of the federal budget. Within a few months, 
the KRG was unable to pay for public servants’ salaries and the overall welfare state 
was compromised. Due to not being paid by the KRG, some Turkish companies began 
to withdraw personnel while others ceased projects in the KRI. The local private sector 
was severely damaged with some even going bankrupt. The economy contracted and 
consumption decreased significantly.  
 
2. Basic income and poverty alleviation  
The majority of respondents did not believe their export or business initiative had an 
impact on basic income and poverty alleviation. Mehmet Erman Atik, noted, “No, it 
would be unrealistic to expect such results from our initiative at this stage” (Mehmet 
Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul).  
 
3. Public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment 
Only a few respondents commented on the impact of their project on an increase in 
public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment. 
Respondents noted their business activities, in particular, contributed to an increase in 
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wage employment and to the development of SMEs due to their business relationships 
with local KRI commercial entities. It was difficult to gage whether there was a direct 
impact on indigenous business entities solely based on interviews with members of the 
Turkish private sector.  
 
4. Rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector  
Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the KRG tried to prioritize the revitalization 
of the agriculture sector, albeit with competing priorities, such as securing the 
development of the oil and gas sector and infrastructure projects. The KRG Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources, Ministry of Planning and Board of Investment were 
the main government bodies that were responsible for the development of the 
agriculture sector (KRG, Board of Investment 2012). Several international aid agencies, 
such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, U.S. Agency for 
International Development, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Korea 
International Cooperation Agency collaborated with the KRG to undertake 
development studies specifically tailored to the revitalization of the agriculture sector 
(FAO and Islamic Relief 2014, FAO and ACF International 2014). On a smaller scale, 
local NGOs initiated small development projects geared towards promoting self-
sustaining home gardens to provide basic food items (Representative from American 
faith-based organization, based in the KRI, 2014, Interview, Skype). During the time of 
the writing of this dissertation, supply chains, including adequate transportation routes 
that supported small size farms to ensure food security still needed to be developed 
(Rashid 2014). In 2013-2014, the availability and access to nutritious food became more 
uncertain with the escalation of conflict and displacement of persons in Iraq and the 
influx of Syrian refugees to the KRI (UN FAO 2014, GIEWS 2014, IOM 2015).  
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Concerning the rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector several 
Turkish companies that exported food items, including chicken and meat products, were 
contacted to be included in this research project. However, representatives from these 
companies either declined to be interviewed, or simply failed to attend meetings that 
were previously confirmed. Respondents indicated that their business activities did not 
have an impact on the rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector. 
However, some respondents remarked that the nexus of farmers, traders, processors and 
markets grew stronger because of the Turkish private sector’s contributions to the 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and the road network in the KRI.  
 
5. Infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services 
Only a few respondents commented on their project’s impact on infrastructure recovery 
and restoration of access to basic services. One respondent who represented a company 
that provided transport services noted that a team from the company surveyed both 
major and minor roads, tunnels, and other infrastructure networks to determine the best 
routes and the load capacities to deliver materials to the designated work sites when the 
company first started working in the KRI. Another respondent commented that it was 
vital adequate roads existed in order to transport products safely and quickly to project 
sites. Apparently, the opening of additional border crossing points would reduce the 
delivery time of products from Turkey to the KRI and other governorates in Iraq. 
Another respondent from the oil and gas sector noted the KRG utilized financial 
contributions from the Oil Fund to rehabilitate the infrastructure in the region, such as 
roads, sewage and electricity systems surrounding their project sites (International Oil 
and Gas Expert, 2012, Interview, Istanbul). Since this thesis did not focus on the oil and 
gas sector, it would be interesting to research whether or not the Ministry of Natural 
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Resources was able to leverage the international private sector to contribute to 
infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services in the KRI in another 
study.  
 
6. Dismantling of a war economy and illegal economic networks 
Extensive criminal organizations, based on tribal and ethnic identity, already existed in 
Iraq including the KRI, but they became active and central to the effort to sidestep 
United Nations sanctions and trade embargo in the 1990s. To avoid the crippling 
sanctions and generate financial resources to sustain Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
development program and lavish life styles of the elites, Saddam Hussein outsourced 
the sales and transportation of illicit sanctioned oil to criminal networks associated with 
his son, Uday Hussein, or otherwise controlled by the regime. They transferred the oil 
to Iraqi Kurds who transported the oil to the border for taxation by the KRG, and 
subsequent smuggling into Turkey, while giving the regime deniability of involvement. 
Natali indicates, “The once remote border post of Zakho became a regional hub for oil 
smuggling and its lucrative related industries” (Natali 2005, 163). The Kurds in the KRI 
and Southeastern Turkey were well placed to facilitate oil smuggling due to their 
historic cross-border tribal associations and common regional Kurdish languages.  
 
Only a few respondents commented on whether their export or business initiatives 
contributed to the dismantling of a war economy and illegal economic networks. 
Mehmet Erman Atik, noted we “cannot sense an impact on the dismantling of a war 
economy and illegal economic networks. Our initiative is simply targeting the 
commercial, civil and legal environment. This could be a good reason to strengthen civil 
and legal environment against any possible war economy and illegal networks” 
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(Mehmet Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). However, even though 
respondents did not perceive the connection, it was highly likely that the introduction 
of a formal pre-inspection and registration of goods reduced the possibility of illegal 
networks from smuggling counterfeit or defective goods from Turkey to the KRI. 
Therefore, Turkish companies had an impact on the dismantling of a war economy and 
illegal economic networks by participating in the pre-inspection process.  
 
7. Expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills development, and 
empowerment 
Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, many of the companies operating in the 
KRI were from southeastern Turkey, with only few numbers of personnel and generated 
small trade volumes. Over the following decade, the Turkish private sector widened its 
scope to include companies from different provinces in Turkey and companies that 
generated large trade volumes in the KRI. Therefore, one might assume that there would 
also be a significant expansion of opportunities through training, skills development, 
and empowerment for local personnel who were employed by Turkish companies in the 
KRI. This claim was reiterated by many respondents who further highlighted that the 
companies they represented provided professional opportunities based on their business 
model in the region. Some companies organized structured training components for 
employees whereas; other companies pursued on-the-job training. Some respondents 
noted that they hoped to provide more structured training to their employees once their 
companies became more established in the KRI. According to Mehmet Erman Atik, 
“This is one of our targets, and I expect we will do more once our organizational 
structure becomes mature enough in Erbil; however, our company philosophy 
encourages investing in local content and this is what we will do more of in the future” 
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(Mehmet Erman Atik, Catoni, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Respondents also indicated 
that companies experienced a high turnover of personnel and that employment 
continuity was important to their business operations in the KRI. 
 
Structured training component for employees 
The majority of companies that provided a structured training component for employees 
either perceived the KRI as a major market or engaged in a highly specialized sector, 
such as health or aviation. Arcelik A.S., Eti, Kale Ceramic, F.H. Bertling Logistics, 
Acibadem Healthcare Group and Atlas Global all provided structured training 
opportunities for employees working on their export or business initiative in the KRI. 
Many of these companies frequently invited employees who were based in the KRI to 
participate in company-wide training sessions in Turkey. According to Idris Sariaydin, 
“At the beginning of the development of the hospital, Acibadem Healthcare Group sent 
numerous personnel to train the local staff. The Turkish staff stayed approximately six 
months to ensure the local staff were capable of managing their respective departments” 
(Idris Sariaydin, Acibadem Healthcare Group, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Employees 
who worked for the Faruk Medical City were also invited to attend courses and seminars 
at Acibadem University, located in Istanbul, Turkey. Considering that the aviation 
sector was highly technical, Atlas Global provided training for local staff in airline 
safety management systems, air traffic control, air transportation systems, and airline 
schedule planning. Baybars Velibeyoglu, from Eti, noted, “Eti provides training for 
local employees working for Nur Gida and subcontractors on the bonus system, general 
sales and marketing techniques, how to utilize the ESCO computer system and our 
company regulations” (Baybars Velibeyoglu, Eti, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Arcelik 
A.S. organized structured training components on sales techniques, product 
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information, marketing techniques, and customer service for distributors from the KRI 
in Turkey.  
 
During the timeframe of this research project, the service sector in the KRI was still in 
a development phase, which made it difficult for companies to maintain the upkeep of 
machines properly. Therefore, TemSA regularly sent members from their technical and 
service teams in Turkey to inspect and maintain the machines for the companies in the 
KRI. TemSA also delivered training on how to repair machines and equipment, and, as 
well as provided information on products to local distributors. F.H. Bertling Logistics 
created a structured training component that highlighted the company business model, 
IT system, commercial activities and practical functions, such as how to open up new 
files and how to create packing lists. The company’s safety team also created 
opportunities for local personnel to learn through experiential learning. Employees 
learned how to load materials properly onto freight carriers and how to operate safely 
around large machines. Kale Ceramic provided a combination of structured and on-the-
job training. Ulas Gulbay, noted, “Kale Ceramic invites employees who work for the 
local distributor to attend exhibitions and to visit Kale’s factories in Turkey. Members 
of Kale’s export team usually meet at one of our ceramic factories in Turkey to learn 
about new products and discuss challenges and opportunities regarding their respective 
markets over a two-day period” (Ulas Gulbay, Kale Ceramic, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul).  
 
On-the-job training 
Usually companies that did not work closely with business initiatives in the KRI 
indicated that instead of providing a structured training component, the companies they 
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represented expected local employees to learn the desired skills and knowledge through 
structured on-the-job training.  
 
Job-hopping 
A few respondents who worked in the sales sector noted that their business partners, 
positioned in the KRI, experienced a high turnover of sales representatives. One 
respondent noted that the clothing company he represented frequently had to rehire and 
train new employees because they were not able to find individuals who were willing 
to remain employed in the retail sales sector. Another respondent noted that many young 
people were not interested in a long-term retail position. Therefore, his company 
preferred to hire more mature sales representatives with the hope that they would remain 
in the position longer than younger hires.  
 
Employment continuity  
There was a general trend among companies who perceived the KRI market to be 
significant to their business activities to witness a high level of employment continuity. 
Within this group of companies, it appeared that many of the senior level managers 
created a cohesive and friendly work environment for employees to provide regular 
feedback, and to share ideas and concerns about private sector activities. One 
respondent noted that if a company appreciated their employees, they would pray for 
the success of the company. The same respondent commented that managers “needed 
to carry employees on their shoulders” and support their professional development. It 
was apparent that a few companies created a team oriented environment for employees 
from the KRI and Turkey. A few respondents indicated that many of the employees who 
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worked with the main distributors in the KRI had worked with the companies for a long 
time in part because of the friendly work environment.  
 
8. Development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and 
impoverished groups  
Human security in the KRI from 1992 to 2003 was challenged by both Saddam’s 
security services and by intra-KRG power struggles between the KDP and PUK. The 
rise of the Kurdish “de facto State” (Voller 2012, 1002), independent, from the Iraqi 
central government of Saddam Hussein (1991-2003), was characterized as a period 
lacking a formal peace agreement, conflict resolution process, serious democracy 
building and economic reconstruction. During this time period, Kurdish militias, 
making up the Peshmerga, were under the control of either the Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP), led by the Barzani family, or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
party, led by the Talabani family. Their centers of power were the Erbil and Dohuk 
(KDP) and Sulaymaniyah (PUK) governorates of the KRI, respectively. Under the 
protective air cover of Operation Northern Watch, Coalition air forces based in Turkey 
protected the Iraqi Kurds from the wrath of Saddam’s security forces. During this 
period, the Kurdish militias provided security for their party leaders in a “no war-no 
peace” unresolved post-conflict power struggle between KDP and PUK. The infighting 
served to postpone institutional state building and economic development, despite the 
absence of governance and control from the Baghdad regime. The KRG was formally 
established on 19 May 1992, but both Barzani and Talabani refused to participate in the 
new government, preferring to continue to operate their respective mini-states, each 
with their own armed militias, outside the formal control of the KRG. Cooperation 
between the two dominant parties collapsed in 1994 when disputes over property, and 
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control of lucrative revenue and embezzlement opportunities at the Turkey-Iraq border 
turned violent (Qadir 2007). The rivalry between the two main Kurdish political-
military groups morphed into a civil war from 1994-1996 in which thousands were 
killed (McDowall 1996b, Gunter 1996). The estrangement of the two parties became 
frigid as foreign patrons supported the polarization of the KRI by providing arms to the 
actors and intervening in the conflict. The United States and Turkey supported Barzani 
and the KDP, while Iran and Syria assisted Talabani and the PUK. Turkey mediated 
between the KDP and PUK when they engaged in armed conflict and invited the parties 
to Ankara in 1996. Barzani and the KDP allied itself with Saddam Hussein to drive the 
PUK out of Sulaymaniyah, and seized control of most of Iraqi Kurdistan, before the 
PUK could recover (Roberts 1996, Yildiz 2007). Those that cooperated, with one of the 
two ruling parties benefited from patronage relationships, such as government 
appointments, jobs, loans, scholarships and gifts of government-owned property (Qadir 
2007, Leezenberg 2006). 
 
The KDP and PUK militias cooperated extensively with American forces during the 
2003 defeat of Saddam Hussein’s armed forces and the subsequent U.S. occupation of 
Iraq. The active role of the Peshmerga militias, in cooperation with U.S. Army Special 
Forces, drastically reduced the need for coalition conventional forces to participate in 
the invasion of Iraq. The Peshmerga militias were armed, trained, and equipped by U.S. 
Special Forces leading up to and shortly after the U.S.-led invasion. The U.S. perceived 
the Kurds as the only reliable American ally in Iraq. The dissolution of the Iraqi security 
forces and the de-Ba’athification and demobilization decrees of Ambassador Bremmer 
in April, 2003, reinforced the importance of the Peshmerga to the coalition forces in 
Iraq (Diamond 2004). After the defeat of the Ba’athist regime, the U.S. never conducted 
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a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process for Iraq that included 
the Kurdish and Shia militias. Instead, priority was given to create a new Iraqi National 
Army and Iraqi National Police. The result was free reign for the KDP and PUK to 
control existing KRG territories and joint control, with the Baghdad government over 
Kirkuk and other disputed areas. Some Peshmerga units even served with the new Iraqi 
Army organized by the United States.  
 
During this research timeframe, it appeared persons from vulnerable groups, such as 
widows and children, dislocated farmers, the uneducated, impoverished groups, IDPs, 
refugees, and skill-less continued to experience only marginal improvements in their 
conditions. To reduce unemployment and social discontent, much of the workforce was 
employed by the KRG in a “Saudization” like effort to buy public allegiance and 
passivity with government appointments, scholarships to foreign universities and other 
patronage benefits. Many farmers and formerly rural people continued to remain 
impoverished under the KRG prioritization of urban development over rural 
development. Many of the rural IDPs remained marginalized due to the lack of capacity 
building opportunities, poor access to education, and the failure to revitalize the 
agriculture sector.  
 
After the 2003 invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, most violence 
emanating from terrorists and anti-occupation armed groups (ranging from al-Qaeda 
terrorists to former military officers of the Ba’ath regime) was prevented from spilling 
over into the KRI by effective security measures. The situation remained safe and calm 
until 2014 when the robust military forces of Daesh became an existential threat to the 
KRG. The ongoing sectarian conflict, and the recent Daesh advance in Iraq and Syria, 
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exacerbated the IDP and refugee situation, forcing many in the region to seek refuge in 
the KRI (Romano 2005). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) claimed 
that from January 1 until November 24, 2014, there were two million IDPs in Iraq with 
nearly half having sought refuge in northern Iraq (IOM 2014). A joint KRG-UN press 
release, claimed, “The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has become a refuge for nearly a 
million people of the over two million people displaced in Iraq in just over ten months. 
This is placing a huge burden on the region’s host community and is severely stretching 
its social services” (KRG-UN 2014a, KRG-UN 2014b, KRG-UN 2014c). One analysis 
indicated that Iraq hosted some 214,000 Syrian refugees with the vast majority residing 
in the KRI (UNHCR 2014b). International aid agencies conducted needs assessments 
to evaluate the impact of and capacity required for hosting refugee communities in the 
KRI (WFP 2013, FAO 2013). Some respondents were troubled by the negative impact 
of the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the civil war in Syria on the resilience of local 
communities. They noted that the region was known as one of the most tolerant and 
multi-cultural regions in Iraq. Furthermore, respondents indicated that multiple 
religions were practiced peacefully in the KRI; however, this peaceful coexistence was 
likely to disappear as many members of the minority communities immigrated to seek 
refuge.  
 
Only a few respondents commented on the impact of their project on the development 
of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups. Some 
respondents noted that the companies they represented contributed to the development 
of productive activities by working with local companies and hiring people from the 
KRI, including IDPs and refugees who sought sanctuary in the region. Several 
respondents noted that either the company they represented, or the company they 
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collaborated with in the region, hired Syrian refugees, for both skilled and unskilled 
positions, due to their lower wage demands and willingness to work, even in difficult 
conditions. Most respondents noted that as far as they were aware, either the companies 
they represented, or the companies they collaborated with in the KRI, tended to hire 
more men than women in the KRI. Respondents indicated that it if women were hired, 
it was not common for them to be offered managerial or technical positions for 
companies working in the KRI (Dadparvar 2013, Muhammad 2009). However, it was 
common for women to be part of the managerial team, in Turkey. Respondents noted 
that female employees tended to fill positions, such as retail sales representatives or 
kitchen staff in the KRI.  
 
9. Provision of microfinance opportunities 
Access to credit is crucial for economic growth, especially in developing regions. By 
providing small loans or micro loans, people without capital, land or access to 
conventional loans are able to develop income-earning businesses (KRG, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water 2010). In the KRI, the provision of microfinance opportunities 
was linked to the development of the banking and finance sector, and to the KRG’s Law 
of Investment, enacted in 2006. One of the benefits of the Investment Law was that 
business representatives, such as factory owners or farmers, could apply to the KRG to 
utilize land rent-free. According to the Investment Law, the government allocated free 
or reduced-price land to investment projects that fulfilled the criteria (KRG, Investment 
Law 2006, Article 4). Further research into whether or not local SMEs own land or 
equipment would prove supportive for future studies on the provision of microfinance 
opportunities. During the writing of this dissertation, the banking and financial sector 
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in the KRG provided minimal commercial and retail banking services. No respondents 
commented on the impact on the provision of microfinance opportunities. 
 
10. Clarification of property rights 
No respondents commented on the clarification of property rights.  
 
11. Macroeconomic development and job creation  
Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the people living in the KRI experienced 
the detrimental effects of decades of war, sanctions and repression. More specifically, 
the people of Iraqi Kurdistan experienced forced migration, frequent attacks by the 
Saddam Hussein regime, including complete destruction of thousands of villages, farms 
and arable land, (UNDP 2005) as well as a civil war between the two main Kurdish 
factions, KDP and PUK (Gunter 1996, Stansfield 2005, Stansfield 2010). Furthermore, 
Iraqi Kurdistan was wedged in between two embargos. Saddam Hussein did not send 
the goods that were allowed into Iraq under the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Programme, to the KRI. Although a formal and competitive business environment was 
virtually non-existent in the KRI, the private sector developed with modest systems of 
trade flourishing across Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran (Graham-Brown 1999, 172). Many 
of the small-scale traders formed formal business entities once the international 
economic sanctions were lifted, in conjunction with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.  
 
During the timeframe of this research project, economic development was one of the 
strategic goals of the National Development Strategy and the International Compact for 
Iraq. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the KRG highlighted four main areas to 
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ensure macroeconomic development: a stable and secure regional environment for 
businesses to develop; physical and human infrastructure development of the region; 
establishment of a liberal business environment conducive for expansion of private 
sector energy exploitation; and facilitation of private sector development (Invest in 
Group 2013c, 23). According to Dilshad O. Abubakir, “An underdeveloped private 
sector in the KRI created a big window of opportunity for companies and institutions 
from neighboring countries in terms of helping the region to build and progress albeit 
while earning huge monetary revenues” (Dilshad O. Abubakir, USAID/Iraq, U.S. 
Consulate General Erbil, 2015, Interview, Skype). Many respondents remarked that 
their export and business initiatives contributed to economic development in the KRI. 
It was apparent the expansion of the education, energy, finance, health, and transport 
sectors aided economic growth. Respondents indicated that the modernization of 
customs regulations had a significant impact on their business activities and the 
availability of quality of products and services. Respondents also stressed government 
support to local businesses and collaboration with local partners, and the development 
of the banking and finance sector and emergence of the insurance sector were important 
to strengthening the local private sector and ensuring growth in the KRI.  
 
Modernization of customs regulations 
 All serious legal cross-border traffic between Turkey and Iraq passed through the 
Habur-Zakho border crossing point, located near the towns of Sirnak in Turkey and 
Dohuk in the KRI. Although officially part of Iraq, the border crossing point was 
operated by the KRG, specifically by the cadres responsive to the KDP under the 
leadership of the ruling Barzani family (Demir 2007). The control of the only major 
land border crossing between the two counties by the KDP, since the early 1990s, was 
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indicative of how traditional networks remained powerful in the KRI. Any customs 
duties collected at the border crossing went only to that portion of the KRG controlled 
by the KDP. The PUK had a similar arrangement for the other border crossings with 
Iran. Other than oil remittances from the central government in Baghdad, customs duties 
on legal and illicit trade, estimated at $750 million annually, were the largest source of 
income for the KRG (Chorev 2007, 4). The diversions of customs duties, away from the 
public treasury, was problematic and, undoubtedly, reduced available revenues needed 
for both human capital and infrastructure development in the KRI.  
 
Within Turkey, there was a serious effort, led by TOBB, to facilitate efficient 
management of trade flow by initiating a modernization process at Turkish border 
crossings over the last decade. In a presentation given to an international transport 
conference, a representative from TOBB indicated that through a private-public 
partnership, the modernization of border crossings is an, “effective fight against 
smuggling and human trafficking” (TOBB 2013, 13). There were zero costs to the 
government as the project was undertaken by private investment and routine customs 
control was led entirely by customs officials and border police (TOBB 2013, 13). 
Companies exporting to Iraq needed to possess two sets of customs documentation, one 
for each country. Several respondents commented that it was important to complete all 
of the forms correctly and to keep all of the required documentation for customs 
clearance organized in order to not to slow down the customs process. Another 
respondent noted the company he represented utilized a local consultant to expedite the 
inspection process and delivery time.  
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Every day, thousands of trucks, transporting Turkish goods to the KRI and greater Iraq, 
clogged the Habur-Zakho border crossing. At times, truck traffic transit into Iraq via the 
Habur Gate was backlogged for as much as 21 days (USG, Adana 2007). Since 2011, 
the media reported that the Turkish government, in cooperation with Iraq, planned to 
open four additional border crossing points into the KRI (Serez 2011, Anatolia News 
Agency 2011). One border crossing was supposed to open in 2013; however, to date, 
none of the announced border crossings into Iraq have been opened for mysterious 
unknown reasons. Apparently, the Iraqi central government prevented the opening of 
additional border crossings in order to leverage Turkey and the KRG to agree to 
Baghdad’s terms on oil sales (Anonymous Expert on Cross Border Issues, 2014, 
Interview, Telephone). While the automation of custom forms expedited exports from 
Turkey, there were suspicions that the customs process remained corrupt (Oktay Salih 
2009). One report on public perceptions of bribery and corruption indicated that Turkish 
people rated customs bribes as the most widespread and expensive of all bribes 
(Adaman, Carkoglu, and Aenatalar 2001).  
 
Banking and finance sector 
The banking and finance sector in the KRI expanded significantly over the past decade. 
From 2004-2009, the number of private banks increased from 16 to 24 banks, which 
“raised the size of their capital to about ID 2,012.280 billion by the end of 2009” (KRG, 
Ministry of Planning 2011, 41).xii The banking sector received 16.67 percent of the 
economy’s overall capital investment. Five major Turkish banks (Ziraat Bank, 
Vakifbank, Is Bank, Al-Baraka Bank and Bank Asya) were approved by the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency to begin operations. The KRI did not experience a 
downturn in growth during the 2008-2009 global economic slowdown because, at the 
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time, investors did not rely on the banking system, and the booming oil sales and an 
expanding housing market contributed to high and relatively quick gains for investors. 
However, despite the development of the banking and finance sector, the region 
continued to face difficulties, due to the lack of an advanced financial infrastructure and 
capital markets, and over dependence on the oil sector for GDP, making it complex and 
risky for investors to secure growth. The economic crisis that hit the KRG in March, 
2014, resulted in banks depleting their cash, local contractors filed for bankruptcy, and 
some Turkish companies stopped working in the KRI, either temporarily or 
permanently. Furthermore, the need for sophisticated retail banking to meet the 
demands of the economy, including providing lending opportunities to keep businesses 
afloat, remained.  
 
Respondents who undertook export or business initiatives at the beginning of this 
research project commented that they had difficulties receiving and sending funds 
to/from Turkey, particularly payments, due to the lack of a modern banking sector in 
the KRI. One respondent noted that he resorted to carrying cash payments in black bags 
across the border while another respondent would bring cash back to Turkey on 
airplanes. Respondents who operated at the latter portion of the research timeline 
indicated that the companies they represented benefited from the development of the 
banking and finance sector. Several respondents noted that it became easier to operate 
in the KRI because of the presence of Turkish banks. Turkish companies were able to 
receive and send payments easily through bank wire transfers. Oftentimes, distributors 
collected cash from their subcontractors or retailers, and then wired payments through 
a bank to the main parent company in Turkey.  
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Respondents argued that given the uncertain business environment in the KRI, it was 
more secure to operate on a prepayment or cash basis. Several respondents noted that 
the companies they represented only provided goods after they had received prepayment 
for the items. One respondent noted, “Don’t touch northern Iraq unless you are paid in 
cash before doing business” (Anonymous Senior Executive, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Many representatives noted that they worked with either bank guarantees or letters of 
credit to ensure payments. Letters of credit ensured that a transaction proceeded as 
planned; whereas, a bank guarantee reduced the loss if the transaction did not proceed 
as planned. Banks provided a letter of credit, which then made a payment once certain 
financial criteria was met, and as long as the services agreed to be performed. A bank 
guarantee, also given by banks, was a line of credit guaranteeing a sum of money be 
paid only if the opposing party did not fulfill the stipulated obligations under the 
contract. According to Baybars Velibeyoglu, “The distributor in Iraq, Nur Gida, works 
with bank guarantees with local distributors” (Baybars Velibeyoglu, Eti, 2014, 
Interview, Istanbul). Jeff Hakko, from Vakko, noted, “Vakko requires the distributor to 
work on a credit basis of 90 days with a Turkish bank. This also includes providing a 
bank guarantee” (Jeff Hakko, Vakko, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Soner Cakilkaya, 
commented, “Ege Ceramic works with ten year guarantee periods” (Soner Cakilkaya, 
Ege Ceramic, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Muzaffer Akboga, “Turkish banks, located in 
northern Iraq, usually did not provide lines of credit or bank guarantees, which made it 
difficult to work with local distributors and clients” (Muzaffer Akboga, TemSA, 2014, 
Interview, Istanbul). Another respondent commented that because of the lack of 
sophisticated banking in the KRI, some companies worked with banks from Dubai 
instead of Turkish banks. 
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Insurance sector 
The development of the insurance system was another theme that emerged from the 
collection of empirical data. The regulation of the insurance sector in Iraq dated back to 
Law No: 74 in 1936; however, the insurance sector became almost non-existent in the 
1980s due to the economic and security crises that hit the country due to the Iraq-Iran 
War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, international sanctions, and the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 1991. Even though several amendments were made to provide better 
regulation of the insurance industry, the sector only saw a revival after the U.S.-led 
invasion in 2003. Since 2005, the insurance sector was regulated by the Insurance 
Business Regulation Act, which broadened the scope of the sector (World Bank, 2005). 
The Iraqi Insurance Diwan was the sole authority capable of granting licenses, and 
provided the legal framework for the Iraqi central government to oversee insurance 
activities in Iraq (Al-Jumaili 2012). 
 
Within the KRI, the Ministry of Finance was designated to oversee the framework for 
licensing procedures, and to hold insurance companies accountable to the laws of the 
KRG. Foreign and local insurance companies were allowed to operate within the KRI, 
so long as they adhered to the laws of the region. Regulation No: 19 of 2011 required 
insurance agencies to formally register with the KRG to obtain a license to practice all 
insurance activities. An insurance company was required to submit an application, 
provide a non-refundable payment of 5 million ID,xiii pay 30 percent of the annual profit 
to the Ministry of Finance, employ at least 50 percent of the citizens of the KRI for the 
first three years, and ensure employees were trained in the insurance sector. Foreign 
companies had to have experience in the insurance sector of not less than 10 years. 
Local companies had to be joint stock companies and have a minimum share capital 
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amount of 25 billion ID, which could be made in two installments within a period of 
two years for all types of insurance.xiv 
 
Despite the growth of the economy and increase in commercial activity within the KRI 
over the last decade, the insurance sector remained largely underdeveloped. One 
respondent noted, “The nonexistence of insurance and the security situation makes it 
difficult for companies to work in Iraq” (Muzaffer Akboga, TemSA, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). Another respondent noted that it was possible to acquire insurance, but it was 
either too expensive or did not provide the kind of coverage the company needed. 
During the timeframe of this research project, the following types of insurance were 
available: insurance for assets including property insurance, political risk insurance, 
marine cargo and goods in transit insurance, inherent defects insurance, erectors all risks 
insurance, and constructors all risks insurance; insurance for operations including 
directors and officers liability insurance, comprehensive general liability insurance, 
employers liability, and auto liability; insurance for individuals including: personal 
accident/medical and gap cover on personal insurances; and specialist classes including 
trade credit, bonding and surety, and energy and aviation (MDC Holding – Iraq 
Development Company 2010). Respondents noted that auto insurance, health insurance, 
and transport insurance still needed to provide a higher level and more encompassing 
coverage in the KRI. 
 
Auto insurance 
Even though the automotive sector expanded and the amount of cars that were 
purchased increased, auto insurance was still a relatively new concept. Several 
respondents noted that the KRG ought to require eligible drivers to acquire auto 
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insurance. Another respondent commented that large companies in the region usually 
had company cars, and would be more secure if the cars were insured for theft or 
damage. Another respondent noted that the KRG might consider providing car owners 
a minimum level of coverage.  
 
Health insurance 
In part, due to the government providing public health care, and the expansion of private 
hospitals, the demand for private health insurance only recently emerged. Usually, 
families who could afford to would travel abroad or paid cash for medical treatment. 
Idris Sariaydin, noted, “Patients usually use cash to pay for hospital visits because there 
is no viable insurance system in place” (Idris Sariaydin, Acibadem Healthcare Group, 
2014, Interview, Istanbul). Another respondent noted that patients often felt 
apprehensive to pay for medical insurance since they might not benefit from the 
coverage unless an unexpected emergency arose. Some respondents commented that it 
was important the KRG develop an inclusive policy framework to provide equitable and 
modern health care to people living in the KRI (Tawfik-Shukor and Khoshnaw 2010, 
20). The public health sector in the KRI became overburdened due to the economic 
crisis and increase in IDPs and Syrian refugees beginning in late 2013/early 2014 
(Kulaksiz 2015). 
 
Transport insurance  
Many respondents noted that the company they represented did not pay for transport 
costs or insurance for products transported from Turkey to Iraq. Acquiring insurance in 
Turkey, particularly transport insurance, was easy and affordable; however, respondents 
noted that they were unable to acquire full coverage for goods once they were 
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transported inside Iraq. Muzaffer Akboga, noted, “TemSA usually pays for the 
insurance of products from Turkey to Iraq. Then, the local distributor covers the 
products and arranges the transportation from the border to their showroom in Erbil or 
to local clients” (Muzaffer Akboga, TemSA, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Therefore, the 
clients based in Iraq generally accepted full responsibility of transporting products from 
factories in Turkey to the KRI market. However, oil and gas companies were willing to 
hire companies, such as F.H. Bertling Logistics and Catoni, to transport highly sensitive 
materials the entire route from Turkey to the KRI and vice versa.  
 
Increase in standards and quality of products and services  
Another theme that emerged was the perceived impact of an export and business 
initiative on the increase in standards and quality of products and services that were 
expected by the KRI market. One respondent noted that the company he represented 
demonstrated the necessity to demand high standards and inspect products to local 
distributors. Muzaffer Akboga, commented that, “The services sector in Iraq is still 
developing. Oftentimes, it is difficult for companies to maintain the upkeep of machines 
properly. Therefore, our company regularly sends technical and service teams to inspect 
and maintain the products for the companies in northern Iraq. Our company has 
contributed to economic development, increased the level of quality of products, 
standards and regulations in the region” (Muzaffer Akboga, TemSA, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). Harun Ulufi, argued, that by simply gaining visibility in the KRI, “SPK has 
increased the standards for pipes and associated materials in the northern Iraq market” 
(Harun Ulufi, SPK Pipes and Fittings, 2014, Interview, Istanbul).  
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Support for local businesses 
Several respondents noted that the company they represented supported local businesses 
in the KRI. Most companies who exported to the KRI used labels in Kurdish and Arabic; 
however, only a handful of Turkish companies interviewed insisted on supporting local 
companies within the KRI to develop and grow their own brands. One company owner 
indicated that he recommended local distributors create their own brand, use labels with 
Kurdish, Arabic and English written on them, and sell the products with their own 
labels, rather than the Turkish company’s brand name. The respondent believed it was 
important to contribute to the promotion and development of local companies in the 
region. Some respondents indicated that it was crucial for the growth of the economy to 
see an expansion of the local private sector and its detachment from business activities 
of the government. A few respondents argued that it would be beneficial to the local 
private sector if the manufacturing capability especially for low-cost products improved 
in the KRI.  
 
Collaboration with local partners 
Some respondents indicated that the companies they represented worked closely with 
their partners positioned in the KRI. In order to increase sales and gain a competitive 
advantage in the KRI, Arcelik A.S., Eti, and Tamek, in partnership with their partners 
positioned in the KRI, established marketing strategies each year. Respondents noted 
that their marketing plans included a market analysis of the KRI, product development, 
branding, pricing and implementation of business strategies. Many respondents who 
contributed to joint marketing efforts noted that members of their company marketing 
teams often traveled to the KRI to decide on product placement and display locations 
for billboards, television ads, and radio advertisements in collaboration with their local 
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partners. Regarding the KRI market, Aybars Velibeyoglu, noted, “Eti and Nur Gida 
advertised their products over the radio, on billboards, and on the television” (Aybars 
Velibeyoglu, Eti, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Some companies, which perceived the KRI 
to be significant for their business activities, worked with consulting firms to better 
understand the local market. 
 
It was apparent that oftentimes, companies in Turkey relied heavily on their business 
partners positioned in the KRI to provide insight on which products were the most 
marketable in the local market. Furthermore, respondents indicated the business entity 
positioned in the KRI understood local purchasing behaviors and preferences and, 
therefore, had a good understanding of which products would sell best in the KRI and 
in the other Iraqi governorates. According to one respondent, the local distributor would 
choose which items to sell in Erbil, because they had a better grasp of local consumer 
preferences. One respondent commented that they only exported products that the local 
staff believed were appropriate for the region. One respondent gave an example that 
clients from the KRI generally preferred grey and white pipes; whereas, clients from 
other regions in Iraq preferred green pipes. Another respondent noted that his clients in 
the KRI preferred colorful tiles. Another respondent noted that in general, local affluent 
customers preferred to buy high-end items. Respondents confirmed that it was 
important to work closely with the business entities positioned in the region as they 
usually had a better understanding and insight into the culture and consumer 
preferences.  
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Job creation  
Over the past few years, the KRG initiated several programs to create job opportunities 
in the private sector and reduce unemployment. In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs, in partnership with the private sector, launched a program called, “Jobs 
for Everyone Programme,” and was expected to create job opportunities for 
unemployed graduates of colleges and institutes from the region (Doosky 2001). In 
2013, a “Kurdistan Careers” event was launched to facilitate introductions for job 
seekers with potential employers from the private sector. In addition, in 2013, the Prime 
Minister’s Office launched a website called “Kurdistan Works” to pair job seekers with 
employers in the private sector. Research into these three initiatives, “Jobs for Everyone 
Programme,” “Kurdistan Careers,” and “Kurdistan Works” did not produce quantitative 
data on whether any jobs were created because of the programs and, if so, how many. 
Respondents believed that they contributed to job creation by either working directly in 
the KRI or with a partner positioned in the KRI. Respondents indicated that the 
witnessed changes in the labor force and commented on hiring local staff. Apparently, 
local skilled employees had an advantageous knowledge of local and regional languages 
including a high-level proficiency in English. Local professional personnel had work 
experience yet, lacked adequate managerial skills and knowledge of international 
products. Furthermore, respondents noted that the most recent political and security 
developments created a diverse labor market in the KRI. 
 
Changes in the labor force 
The labor force in the KRI changed significantly over the past three decades. In the 
1980s, the destruction of the agriculture sector, and forced migration by the Saddam 
Hussein regime, caused many Iraqi Kurds to flee to surrounding countries, such as Iran 
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and Turkey, and to Europe, while others became IDPs and sought refuge in urban 
centers in the KRI. As mentioned in Chapter 4 – Impact of the Turkish Construction 
Sector on Economic Security in the KRI, the quality of education in the KRI increased 
dramatically over the last decade. In order to meet the demands of the increased 
compulsory school levels, the KRG expanded the number of secondary and 
postsecondary education institutions. Since its self-governance in the 1990s, the KRG 
strived to provide educational opportunities for both girls and boys. For instance, the 
enrollment of female students in both two-year and four-year higher-education 
institutions also expanded to meet the demands of the international private sector (Shatz 
et al. 2014, American University of Sulaymaniyah 2013). In 2012, women accounted 
for fifty-four percent of total enrollment in post-secondary technical education, an 
increase from forty-six percent in 2007. In 2012, women accounted for fifty percent of 
enrollment at the university level, up from forty-five percent in 2007 (Shatz et al. 2014).  
 
In order to prepare the local labor force to meet the demands of the international private 
sector, the Turkish private sector respondents noted that the development of the 
education sector was the most important factor. One respondent noted that it was crucial 
for the KRG to invest in human capital development. Another respondent commented 
that he noticed the importance given to the expansion of higher-level education since 
he started to work in the KRI in the 1980s. Mete Gurel, noted, “The KRI will have a 
strong local workforce because of the investment the KRG is putting into human 
capital” (Mete Gurel, Dogan Holding, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
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Hiring local staff 
One trend that was apparent among the Turkish companies who undertook export or 
business initiatives in the KRI was that they were willing to hire local personnel. Many 
respondents commented that they preferred to work with locals rather than expatriate 
employees. One respondent noted that local staff understood the market better and were 
able to navigate cultural sensitivities. Many of the Turkish companies who perceived 
the KRI market to be important for their business activities encouraged partners, 
positioned in the region, to also hire local staff. One respondent commented that in the 
KRI, the distributors mostly hired Iraqi Kurds. Mete Gurel, noted, “Our partner 
company, DNO, hired local staff to fill positions as managers, administrative staff, 
secretaries and drivers” (Mete Gurel, Dogan Holding, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). 
Another respondent noted that sales associates, accountants, employees in warehouses, 
logistics, and marketing associates were mostly Iraqi Kurds. Jeff Hakko, noted, “The 
distributor hires local Iraqi Kurds to work in the W Collection and Vakko stores” (Jeff 
Hakko, Vakko, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Other respondents such as Bilal Demirler, 
indicated there was, “low quality of human resources in the region” (Bilal Demirler, 
Faruk Medical City, 2015, Interview, Istanbul), however the company he represented 
changed hiring practices over time. Demirler further noted, “In partnership with Faruk 
Holding, we mostly employed Turkish citizens at the beginning of our project timeline. 
We started to employ more local staff as the hospital project progressed” (Bilal 
Demirler, Faruk Medical City, 2015, Interview, Istanbul). Another respondent noted 
that the company he represented had two main criteria for hiring locals: One - the 
family; and Two - their credentials, such as knowledge of multiple regional languages.  
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Skilled labor 
Three major observations regarding local skilled labor emerged from the data. 
Respondents indicated that local skilled professionals had a good command of local and 
regional languages. Apparently, new entry local skilled personnel had little work 
experience and weak managerial skills. However, they had strong technical and English 
language skills. Concerning positions within the export sector and other related business 
initiatives in the KRI, local skilled employees usually filled positions, such as sales 
associates, managers, accountants, translators, marketing associates and administrative 
staff.  
 
Knowledge of local and regional languages 
Respondents were generally satisfied with the ability of local skilled staff to speak local 
languages and other regional languages, including Turkish. xv  One respondent 
commented that there were many opportunities to take language courses at local 
universities or cultural centers. Another respondent noted that it appeared, young 
people, especially, those with university experience, were willing to learn another 
language, particularly if it helped them increase their employment opportunities. One 
respondent noted that his brother took a Turkish language course before applying to 
Turkish companies because he believed it would help his employment prospects if he 
had a good command of Turkish. Subsequently, the gentleman obtained a senior-level 
position with a Turkish company in Sulaymaniyah. One company representative 
commented that the company he represented had an IT system, in Turkish, which sales 
representatives positioned in the KRI utilized on a daily basis, without difficulty. 
Another respondent noted that the company he represented hired a Syrian Kurdish 
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employee to manage the local office in Erbil, in part, because he had considerable 
professional experience and was fluent in several regional languages.  
 
Work experience and managerial skills 
Another trend that emerged from the interviews was that although local staff had 
previous work experience, they often did not have adequate managerial skills. One 
respondent noted that the people in the KRI were well educated, particularly the 
younger generation, yet, they still needed more practical experience to fill senior-level 
positions in the international private sector. Respondents noted that local skilled 
employees needed to improve their computer skills and communication techniques. 
Oftentimes, local skilled employees learned new computer applications, such as how to 
create Power Point presentations, and how to use flow charts by working closely with 
their Turkish colleagues. A few respondents who worked closely with partners 
positioned in the KRI believed that the managerial skills and professionalism of their 
local counterparts increased after working closely with the Turkish parent company.  
 
Technical and English language skills 
Although only a few respondents commented on the technical and English language 
skills of local skilled staff, the responses were positive. One respondent noted he visited 
public schools and was impressed with the proficiency of the student’s English skills. 
Apparently, many of the teachers were native or fluent English speakers, so the students 
learned how to speak properly, and not only learned grammar, but were also able to 
speak well. Another respondent commented that the local skilled staff usually had a 
good understanding of English and had very little difficulty speaking in English.  
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Unskilled labor 
Two main themes regarding local unskilled labor in the KRI emerged from the empirical 
data. Respondents noted that local unskilled labor were proficient in both local and 
regional languages. Respondents also indicated that the population of the KRI increased 
significantly because of the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The influx of IDPs and 
refugees expanded the numbers of job-seekers and talent pool in the labor market. Local 
unskilled labor positions within the export sector and related business initiatives usually 
consisted of truck drivers, delivery assistants, laborers at a warehouse, stock persons in 
grocery stores, and security guards.  
 
Knowledge of local and regional languages 
Respondents noted that local staff generally had a good command of indigenous and 
regional languages, including Turkish. Oftentimes, respondents did not interact with 
unskilled employees as often as with skilled employees. Therefore, respondents 
indicated that it was not as important for local unskilled employees to be highly 
proficient in Turkish and other regional languages. 
 
Diverse labor force from the region  
Due to the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the civil war in Syria, there was an influx of 
refugees and internally displaced persons in the KRI. The Turkish business entities 
engaged and positioned in the KRI oftentimes hired unskilled workers from these 
communities to fill positions, such as drivers, kitchen staff, laborers at a warehouse or 
stock persons in grocery stores.  
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12. Establishment of social safety nets 
Only one respondent commented that the companies represented in this research project 
contributed to the establishment of social safety nets by paying into the social security 
and contributions program.  
 
13. Provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 –Impact of the Turkish Construction Sector on Economic 
Security in the KRI, in 2008, a group of development practitioners and government 
representatives, convened to establish “rules, regulations, processes and institutions to 
guide design, quality control, strategic orientation, effective and efficient 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation of projects, as well as recording and reporting 
on funding to the general public” (KRG, Ministry of Planning 2008, 7). In 2008, the 
KRG established the External Resources Management Unit within the General 
Directorate for Development Coordination and Cooperation at the Ministry of Planning. 
A Donor Assistance Database was installed to oversee the project funding flow and to 
generate reports, charts and maps to document the development impact of the projects 
funded by external resources. The Kurdistan Development Management System, a 
comprehensive web-based application that managed the whole cycle of government and 
donor-funded development projects in the KRI, was established by the Ministry of 
Planning, USAID/Tatweer, the UNDP and Synergy International Systems and was 
owned and hosted by the General Directorate for Development Coordination and 
Cooperation. Similarly, international non-governmental organizations and local NGOs 
collaborated with the KRG to implement capacity building projects in the KRI (Genot 
2009-2010). The General Directorate for Development Coordination and Cooperation 
published a series of reports on the contributions of the donor community to ensure the 
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proper implementation of strategies to promote human security and to prevent wasting 
of resources. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Vision 2020 Development Strategy provided 
strategies to enhance and reform the following areas: agriculture and agro-industry, 
budget, civil service, communications, education, effective and honest government, 
electricity, environmental protection, health, housing, inclusive society, labor market, 
private sector development, transportation, water and sanitation (KRG, Ministry of 
Planning 2013). According to Abubakir, “Working with international institutions such 
as the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, South Korea 
International Cooperation Agency, Japan International Cooperation Agency, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, and others has made the KRG think about 
setting standards for development as well as learn best practices to develop its Kurdistan 
Vision 2020 Development Strategy. The lack of indicators and standards in the KRI 
make it almost impossible to measure the impact of development and humanitarian aid. 
With the Kurdistan Vision 2020 Development Strategy in place, the KRG wanted to 
empower itself to build up and develop not only the infrastructure and economy of the 
region but also to build and develop the capacity of the population too. Given the 
continuous political tensions between Baghdad and Erbil over oil and gas issues as well 
as the security situation and the country’s engagement with a counterterrorism war, it is 
too early to see any tangible results of the implementation of the Kurdistan Vision 2020 
Development Strategy” (Dilshad O. Abubakir, USAID/Iraq, U.S. Consulate General 
Erbil, 2015, Interview, Skype). No respondents commented on whether there was an 
impact of the provision of well-coordinated, predicable, and multifaceted aid. 
 
Interviews with NGO members, positioned within the KRI, were undertaken to inquire 
about the provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid. Respondents 
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indicated that the KRG struggled to meet the needs of vulnerable people from the KRI, 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other parts of Iraq, and refugees from Syria, 
because the KRG did not have the capacity or adequate financial assistance to provide 
substantial support to these groups (Representative from international faith based 
organization in Erbil, 2014, Skype). Abubakir noted, “The KRG’s dependency on the 
17 percent federal share of the Iraq’s public budget which is determined by petroleum 
production and sale, positions itself in a difficult situation. The KRG spends about 65 
percent of its operational budget on its employees’ payroll and salaries allowing for it 
to operate and invest with the remaining 35 percent of the budget, which is admittedly 
not enough to address other issues, let alone IDPs and vulnerable groups who sought 
refuge in the KRI” (Dilshad O. Abubakir, USAID/Iraq, U.S. Consulate General Erbil, 
2015, Interview, Skype). IDPs from rural areas had little reason to return to their 
devastated homes of origin since the majority of capacity building and infrastructure 
improvements occurred in urban areas while comparatively little inputs were given to 
revitalize rural areas and indigenous agriculture. In 2014, Daesh took control of large 
swaths of land in Nineveh governorate, one of the highest-producing areas for 
agriculture crops, including the farm-to-market road network and oversaw the 
production of crops such as wheat (Fick 2014). A significant portion of Nineveh 
province, was deeply affected by conflict, thus disrupting domestic production and 
supply and forcing communities to flee their homes (Ali 2015).  
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Conclusion 
Under the Saddam regime, Iraq, including the KRI, followed a state-socialist 
government-led economic model. The tariffs that the Saddam regime enacted, and the 
double sanctions the KRI experienced, one by the United Nations, and the other by the 
Saddam regime, made it difficult for imports to enter the KRI market. After the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, local industries were underdeveloped and struggled to 
compete with Turkish competitors. The almost complete dependency on food products 
imported from Turkey by the KRI was a threat to food security. It was ultimately a 
national security issue which motivated the KRG to proclaim higher taxes on certain 
food items to protect and promote indigenous agricultural products. However, without 
a more robust and diverse economy, a strong and independent local private sector and 
industry, the KRG still found itself a rentier state, completely dependent on oil income 
transfers from Baghdad (Gray 2011, Bozcali 2008). 
 
During the timeframe when interviews were conducted economic security in the KRI 
was severely compromised. The ongoing dispute between Erbil and the central 
government of Iraq, in Baghdad, over the KRG’s plan to directly market and sell their 
own natural resources, especially oil, triggered Baghdad’s refusal to disperse 17 percent 
of the federal budget to the KRG. The failure of Baghdad to transfer the funds to Erbil 
and the subsequent global drop in the oil price per barrel, resulted in the subsequent 
inability of the KRG to pay their debts and the salaries of civil servants including the 
Peshmerga who were at war with Daesh. The withheld payments to the construction and 
contractors supplying services had a negative ripple effect on the local private sector. 
Towards the end of the research timeframe, Baghdad and Erbil came to a temporary 
agreement on revenue sharing of oil exports. Soon after the agreement, Baghdad 
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dispersed a partial payment of $500 million of the total amount owed to Erbil which 
enabled the KRG to pay some of their bills. However, without a complete agreement 
between Baghdad and Erbil, the KRG was unable to facilitate the renewal of economic 
activity (Mamoun 2014). War, the second obstacle to economic security in the KRI was 
a burdensome reality created by the rise of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, which caused many 
people inside Iraq and from Syria to seek refuge in the KRI. The intimidating presence 
of Daesh in northern and western Iraq constituted a major security threat, and left many 
Turkish private sector representatives wondering about the level of security and stability 
in the KRI (Cali 2015, Dombey et al. 2014). The Daesh control over the major road 
going south towards Baghdad disrupted internal trade and increased transportation costs 
for all concerned.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
Introduction  
As was mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, I became interested in 
undertaking this research project because of a “Track II” initiative that I helped organize 
in 2009. I was curious what the increase in economic cooperation between Ankara and 
Erbil meant for human security in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). I wanted to 
understand how to capitalize on the newly established liberal economic framework of 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and how to leverage the Turkish private 
sector to enhance human security in the KRI. Due to the longstanding traditional 
security narrative surrounding Ankara-Erbil relations, this thesis began by discussing 
the academic discourse on conventional security studies. Chapter 2, entitled Review of 
the Literature further highlighted in what way critical security studies, particularly 
human security provided a more holistic perspective of the deepening and widening of 
Ankara-Erbil relations and regional developments over the last decade. The theoretical 
agenda, woven throughout the thesis, was firmly grounded in a broad approach to 
human security, which maintains for the right for individuals to live in “freedom from 
fear and freedom from want” and to live a life of dignity. The concept of economic 
security, one of the seven pillars of human security, served as the main theoretical lens 
of the thesis. The framework that was utilized in this research project included thirteen 
conditions in which to assess the impact of the international private sector on economic 
security in fragile and conflict-affected states. Where the literature on economic security 
had gaps, the arguments and analysis turned to the literatures on development 
economics, peace economics, and peacebuilding. By synthesizing literatures, I aimed 
to widen the discussion on human security, sustainable peace and development and the 
role of the international private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states. Chapter 3, 
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entitled, Contextual Framework highlighted the AK Party’s practice of working closely 
with the Turkish private sector as an extension of its foreign policy in the Middle East, 
particularly in the KRI. The chapter also touched on the growing interdependence of 
Ankara-Erbil economic relations and the liberal business framework that the KRG 
established to encourage the international private sector to operate in the KRI. The two 
empirical chapters provided key insight into the engagement of the Turkish private 
sector in the KRI. Chapter 4, entitled, the Impact of the Turkish Construction Sector on 
Economic Security in the KRI, included empirical data on the construction sector in the 
KRI, the presence of the Turkish construction sector in the KRI and the impact of the 
Turkish construction sector on economic security in the KRI. Chapter 5, entitled, Impact 
of the Turkish Export Sector and Associated Business Initiatives on Economic Security 
in the KRI, comprised on an overview on the KRI’s overdependence on imports, and 
the presence and impact of the Turkish export sector and associated business initiatives 
on economic security in the region. Overall, more than 100 interviews were conducted 
with representatives from academia, civil society, government, media, private sector, 
and the policy community to gain further understanding of the two case studies and 
research questions. 
 
This concluding chapter will review the thesis statement, key objectives of the study, 
the main research questions, and the importance of the dissertation topic. The chapter 
will then review the main body of work, with an analysis of the empirical data, which 
includes an assessment of the measurement of the Turkish private sector’s activity in 
the KRI, from 2004 to 2014, against the economic security indicators. The chapter will 
also provide insight into the possible theoretical implications of the research project 
before moving on to the potential policy implications of the study. Lastly, the chapter 
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will include an overview of recommendations for further research, and conclude with 
the overall relevance of this research project.  
 
Thesis statement and research questions  
Considerable evidence found that a multidimensional economic security framework, 
one that harnessed the presence of the international private sector, had the potential to 
enhance human security in the KRI. In this light, this research project set out to explore 
to what extent has the Turkish private sector had an impact on economic security in the 
KRI? The two case studies sought to answer the following sub-questions: What impact 
has the Turkish construction sector had on economic security in the KRI? And What 
impact have the Turkish export sector and other business initiatives had on economic 
security in the KRI? As mentioned in Chapter 3, entitled, Contextual Framework, the 
discourse surrounding Turkey-KRG relations is predominately framed by a traditional 
security lens or realist approach. Turkey has historically been concerned with the 
possibility of a Kurdish nation emerging within Turkey, or an autonomous region 
materializing on its border; the constant threat of the armed PKK operating from the 
remote Qandil Mountains of the KRI; the internal unrest of its own Kurdish population; 
the insecurity of the Iraqi Turkmen; and, finally, the territorial integrity of Iraq. The 
termination of the United Nations’ economic sanctions on Iraq, and the end of the 
Ba’athist regime’s internal sanctions on the KRI, along with the KRG’s establishment 
of a liberal business environment after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, opened up 
the region to free trade with its neighbors. Turkish companies capitalized on their close 
proximity to the Iraqi market, pent-up consumer demand in the KRI, the trans-border 
mercantile culture of the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds, and the existence of experienced local 
SMEs to progressively expand their penetration of the KRI market (Olson 2006, Barkey 
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2005, Park 2005, Gorener 2008). The Kurdistan Region was recognized as a formal 
federal entity of Iraq in the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. This was an important 
development for Turkey-KRG economic relations because it became easier for Turkish 
companies to negotiate and sign agreements within the legal framework of government 
agencies in the KRG without the need for approval from the central government in 
Baghdad. The determination of the KRG to establish a friendly business and investment 
climate, coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit of the Turkish private sector and the 
normalization of relations between Ankara and Erbil, have resulted in significant 
economic cooperation that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.  
 
Main findings of the thesis  
This research project highlighted Ankara’s progression away from an emphasis on 
traditional security concerns to a significant expansion of diplomatic and economic 
relations between Turkey and the KRG. During the first half of the research project 
timeline (2004-2008), despite good governance challenges, the Turkish private sector 
flocked to the KRI because of the relatively secure environment, the KRG’s experience 
running a de facto independent region and the newly established liberal framework that 
was meant to cater to the international private sector. During the second half of the 
research timeline (2009-2014) there was an enormous spike in the expansion of 
economic cooperation between Ankara and Erbil. However, based on the empirical data 
it appeared that knowledge transfers of technical and professional skills by Turkish 
companies to their local counterparts and labor force in the KRI was not significant. It 
seemed that although Turkish construction and export companies were the biggest 
players in their respective sectors, they did not contribute extensively to local human 
capital development and failed to limit outsourcing of project administration to the local 
  
260 
 
labor force. The failure to seize these opportunities, to develop lasting human resources 
and government competency in project management, was a serious failure. Due to 
ongoing civil wars in Iraq and Syria and the expansion of Daesh in the KRI, continuing 
disputes between Erbil and Baghdad, and the economic and humanitarian crises in the 
KRI, the potential impact of the Turkish private sector on economic security, in the later 
portion of my research timeframe was severely compromised. Therefore, macro 
conditions related to economic security significantly influenced the behavior of the 
Turkish private sector in the KRI.  
 
The economic security framework provided the best qualitative avenue to analyze and 
measure the dynamics between the Turkish private sector and human security in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Analysis of primary data from interviews that were conducted 
for this research project, and secondary data from sources such as journal articles, 
books, data sets, news reports, and observation of developments in the region led to the 
conclusion that the Turkish private sector both enhanced and constrained economic 
security in the KRI during the research period, 2004 to 2014. The Turkish private sector 
appeared to have enhanced some conditions of economic security. For instance, Turkish 
companies led a significant segment of infrastructure recovery and restoration of access 
to basic services in the KRI. Export companies aided in the dismantling of a war 
economy and illegal economic networks by participating in the pre-inspection process. 
Turkish companies provided professional opportunities for people through training, 
skills development and empowerment. The Turkish private sector seemed to have 
constrained some conditions related to economic security. Turkish companies rarely 
contributed to job creation or to the establishment of public and private sector 
employment, wage employment and self-employment. The impact of the Turkish 
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private sector on public-private relations appeared to have had a varied impact. 
Moreover, there were some economic security conditions such as basic income and 
poverty alleviation, rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector, provision 
of microfinance opportunities, clarification of property rights, development of 
productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees and impoverished groups, 
macroeconomic development, and provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and 
multifaceted aid, where the Turkish private sector appeared to have had minimal impact 
if any at all. Due to the KRG’s establishment of a liberal economic framework and the 
lack of requirements for the Turkish private sector to invest in KRI human capital, it 
was largely left to the discretion of these companies to contribute to economic security. 
There appeared to have been no serious intention, on the part of the Turkish companies, 
to prioritize their corporate resources to support the advancement of human/economic 
security in the KRI. The relationship between Turkey and the KRG seemed beyond 
beneficial to Ankara possibly at the expense of socioeconomic development in the KRI 
(Cagaptay, Bache Fidan, Sacikara 2015, Al-Sharikh 2011). The following section will 
synthesize the empirical findings, which included an assessment of the measurement of 
the Turkish private sector’s activity in the KRI, from 2004 to 2014, against the economic 
security indicators. 
 
1. Public-private relations  
The engagement of the Turkish private sector in the KRI appeared to have had a mixed 
impact on public-private relations. Companies from Turkey that engaged in 
construction activities generally communicated directly with consulting firms, rather 
than interfacing with KRG officials. Even if these companies worked with KRG 
ministries, it was usually only at the initiation and completion of projects. Therefore, 
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weak lines of communications between the relevant ministries and representatives from 
the Turkish construction sector compromised the possibility to deepen understanding 
and cooperation between all relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, bureaucratic obstacles 
and challenges created by the government appeared to have contributed to cultural and 
professional misunderstandings between the Turkish companies and the KRG. The 
streamline of the process of applying for a tender and establishment of the pre-approval 
process to qualify and reject, if necessary, companies that were financially or otherwise 
unable to implement and complete a project in its entirety professionalized the 
framework of infrastructure recovery. It is important the KRG supports the development 
of local industry and fosters a political climate that encourages and rewards best 
practices in the construction sector, regardless of the contracting arrangement between 
companies and clients. Labor law regulations, such as a safe working environment, fair 
wage requirements, and health benefits are key to protecting workers and ensuring 
quality jobs in the construction sector in the KRI. Furthermore, it was crucial to 
strengthen the existing judicial system and/or implement a strong and internationally 
recognized legal framework to bestow confidence of the international private sector to 
continue doing business in the KRI. Companies from Turkey that engaged in export 
activities or associated business initiatives had minimal contact with KRG ministries 
and officials. This was a missed opportunity to strengthen public-private relations and 
forge mutual understanding between representatives from these sectors. Instead, 
respondents regularly interfaced with consulting firms, local retail businesses, Turkish 
franchise owners, local suppliers, employment agencies, and workers hired inside the 
KRI. Furthermore, Turkish companies normally utilized local consulting firms to 
expedite the registration process in the KRI.   
 
  
263 
 
2. Basic income and poverty alleviation  
The Turkish private sector appeared to have provided access to basic income to KRI 
employees or subcontractor employees, however this was modest at best, considering 
that a high number of Turkish companies preferred to employ either Turkish citizens or 
expat workers. It seemed construction companies hired laborers such as carpenters, 
electricians, drywall installers, and plumbers on a project basis and therefore, did not 
include them on their formal payroll, thus denying them the vital benefits of the formal 
labor market. The lack of a strict pay scale, including a minimum wage, for both KRI 
citizens and immigrants, enforced by the KRG, increased the likelihood of exploitation 
of the labor force and unfair pay rates. It should have been of upmost importance that 
the KRG establish and ensure that every employee had his own fair salary scale, 
including an established minimum wage, and that employers contributed to the private 
sector-oriented social security and contributions program. Additionally, strong labor 
laws and a well-trained and capable government to enforce these laws are crucial to 
ensure that individuals who are in low income brackets, such as independent contractors 
and day laborers, are not exploited, and that they receive the financial assistance they 
deserve. The Turkish private sector’s impact on poverty alleviation in the KRI was 
minimal, if measurable at all. Only respondents from the construction sector believed 
their projects contributed to poverty alleviation through the payment of social security 
for local employees. Social security ensures that workers do not become destitute upon 
a disability or retirement, thereby preventing workers in those categories from 
becoming a strain on the economy. The payment of social security by Turkish 
employers might have encouraged employees to remain in the private sector workforce, 
instead of seeking political patronage appointments or government make-work jobs. 
There were two main hurdles for employees and employers surrounding the social 
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security system in the KRI. First, the KRG mainly relied on self-reporting by employers. 
Second, the social security system was not automated, making it necessary for 
employees to collect and hold onto past payroll receipts. According to interviews with 
local legal experts and individuals working in the private sector, the KRG needed to 
hold international companies accountable and require them to pay into the social 
security system. According to these experts, some of the laws, such as the social security 
and pensions contributions program, were suitable; however, the application of the law 
was unsatisfactory. Moreover, the government paid for national health care; however, 
it did not cover the costs of the increasingly privatized health care system, resulting in 
a lack of service delivery to the poor and vulnerable groups. In one study, 82 percent of 
medical professionals were generally dissatisfied with health care for the poor and, a 
majority recommended the adoption of social insurance for medical care for the poor 
who were left out of the increasingly privatized medical delivery system (Shabila 2010). 
The following publications are good sources on development in the KRI: Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Iraqi National Development 
Plan, and the National Strategy for Poverty Alleviation (UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-
2001; United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008-2010; United States Government 
Assistance to the KRG 2003-2009; USAID Government of Iraq-Federal Budget 
Process-Investment Budget; USAID-KRG Economic Assessment Report; World Bank 
Public Expenditure and Institutional Assessment). 
 
3. Public and private sector employment, wage employment, and self-employment 
It appeared the Turkish private sector constrained public and private sector 
employment, wage employment, and self-employment. During the first half of this 
research project, from 2004 to 2008, the majority of Turkish companies imported most 
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of their equipment, supplies, and personnel from Turkey to undertake their projects in 
the KRI. The dominant presence of the Turkish private sector in the KRI constrained 
local private sector development due to the greater experience, depth of operations, 
economies of scale, and financial power of Turkish professionals compared to local 
Kurds. As the private sector in the KRI began to emerge and diversify, the Turkish 
corporations began to work more closely with local contractors and distributors by 
purchasing equipment, supplies, and services from local businesses. Many Turkish 
entrepreneurs established shops and trading companies in the relatively safe 
environment of the KRI with the aim not only of managing their activities in the KRI, 
but also in order to launch commercial enterprises into the other regions of Iraq. Large 
Turkish corporations undertook infrastructure projects with relative ease due to 
economies of scale, their experience, and the proximity of Turkey as a source of supply. 
The Turkish companies provided the foundations of a modern business model for local 
KRI businesses to implement and adapt within their own context. However, by not 
hiring a considerable amount of local employees, it appeared it was a missed 
opportunity for Turkish entrepreneurial, technical, managerial, and business skills to 
trickle down to the emerging business community of the KRI. 
 
The dominant neoliberal ideology which envisions a free market economy worked in 
tandem with the state. This worked well when there was plenty of oil money to transfer 
from Baghdad to Erbil and then on to the people through the cadres, business 
partnerships, and patronage of the two dominant political parties. The KRG remained 
the preeminent source of jobs, contracts, scholarships, and land development. In 2014, 
however, the political economy was devastated by the global drop in oil prices, 
Baghdad’s refusal to transfer to Erbil the KRG’s share of the budget, and then the 
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unexpected rise of Daesh and the subsequent permanent state of war along the western 
border of the KRI has rendered a return to the prior state of affairs as very problematic. 
Taking the current state of affairs into consideration, the KRG cannot financially afford 
to continue to provide employment to the majority of the working age population. 
Support for innovative approaches to job creation might provide relief for the KRG and 
mitigate the necessity to hire more civil servants to promote social stability. 
Strengthening labor laws and government social safety nets, the implementation of a 
minimum wage, and increase in private sector benefits could encourage job seekers to 
consider employment in the private sector, rather than expecting employment in the 
public sector. A RAND report indicated, “For civil-service workers in these 
environments, the current private sector wage premium is not enough to offset the value 
of civil-service benefits” (Anthony, Moore, Hilborne and Mulcahy 2014, 7). An 
increase in microfinance opportunities for SMEs and financial assistance for self-
employment initiatives would broaden the scope of employment possibilities. The 
launch of social enterprise hubs and social impact bonds could attract investors, provide 
jobs for “unemployable” persons, and serve as multipliers for social change and 
business development in the KRI.  
 
4. Rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector 
The impact of the Turkish private sector on the rehabilitation and diversification of the 
agriculture sector was nonexistent. As mentioned throughout this research project, the 
KRI was previously known as the “bread basket” of the region. However, the 
destruction of towns and farmlands and forced displacement by the Saddam regime, 
followed by double sanctions – one by the United Nations on all of Iraq, and the other 
an internal sanction imposed by Saddam –  had significant negative consequences for 
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the environment and sustainability of the people living in the KRI (O’Leary 2002). 
Furthermore, many people became completely dependent on UN food assistance, and 
the formally robust agricultural sector was prevented from experiencing a revitalization. 
Agriculture could serve as one of the stronger sectors of the KRG economy, if given the 
right support by the government, international development agencies, and local NGOs 
(KRG, Ministry of Planning 2011, 2013). The KRI has plenty of arable land, as 
compared to the rest of Iraq, and receives plenty of water due to high rainfall, runoff 
from the rugged and snow covered mountains along the borders with Iran and Turkey, 
as well as the tributaries of the Tigris River that drain through the KRI on the way to 
joining the Euphrates River and then to the Persian Gulf (Murthy 2010, 762). In its 2020 
strategic plan for socioeconomic development, the KRG laid out its vision for the 
rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector: “Food security for the people 
of the Kurdistan Region, economic prosperity for farmers, and prosperity through the 
export of our agricultural and food products” (KRG 2013, 29). Considering that the KRI 
is still dependent on imported food commodities and products including fresh produce, 
it is crucial that the KRG continues to invest in the rehabilitation and diversification of 
the agriculture sector. The KRG strategy has been twofold: first, to provide a supportive 
environment for local food production and, secondly, to prevent the inflow of cheap 
food imports. To support this strategy, the KRG increased taxes on certain food imports, 
all the while providing food subsidies and grants to help local farmers compete with 
frequently less expensive foreign products in the market. KRG infrastructure 
development efforts, such as the farm-to-market roads built over the last decade, have 
helped farmers transport their fresh produce items and grains to the market in a timely 
manner. Additionally, the KRG invested in research and development and new 
technologies to enhance food production. The government provided some subsidies and 
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grants to encourage war-displaced farmers to return to farming. Government policies 
emphasized animal husbandry to help revitalize milk production and other aspects of 
the agriculture sector.  
 
5. Infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services 
It was noticeable that the Turkish private sector enhanced infrastructure recovery and 
restoration of access to basic public services in the KRI. Only a little more than a decade 
ago, the KRI was dependent on the central government in Baghdad for the provision of 
most basic services. After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the KRG committed itself 
to either the restoration or building of major infrastructure, such as airports, roads, 
bridges, and power stations, to facilitate self-sufficiency. The formal acknowledgement 
of the KRG as a semi-autonomous region in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution affirmed the 
KRG’s right to manage and upgrade basic services, such as education, electricity and 
energy, health care, housing, social welfare, telecommunications, transport systems, 
water and sanitation systems, and waste removal. According to a Finnish-Swiss report, 
approximately 75 percent to 80 percent of the construction business, be it roads, tunnels, 
silos, dams, housing projects, and major airports, was undertaken by Turkish companies 
(SEM 2012). Two major themes emerged from the interviews with representatives from 
the construction sector. It appeared that projects such as the construction of bridges, 
power systems, and roads directly contributed to infrastructure recovery and the 
restoration of basic services. Second, after or in tandem with the development of 
projects such as major universities and housing complexes, the KRG initiated 
construction activities to support infrastructure recovery and access to basic services 
near the project sites. The opening of additional border crossings to allow goods and 
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people to cross from Turkey to the KRI more easily would prove beneficial to Ankara 
and Erbil economic relations.  
 
The conflict with the Daesh put stress on the KRI’s infrastructure and access to basic 
services. The influx of IDPs from other governorates in Iraq, as well as refugees from 
Syria, increased burdens on the infrastructure and demands for basic services such as 
running water, electricity, and health care in all three governorates of the KRI. 
According to two World Bank economists, “The additional demand for water is 
estimated to be 11 percent over pre-crisis levels. Sanitation is also a major concern, with 
existing gaps now widening – the cost of sectoral stabilization is around $214.3 million 
for 2015” (Karasapan and Kulaksiz 2015).  
 
A rights-based approach to infrastructure development would encompass a 
multidimensional strategy to ensure human security. Research into the role of anchor 
institutions should prove beneficial to understanding the positive impact that hospitals, 
museums, universities, and other institutions provide society (Democracy Collaborative 
2014). Regardless of whether anchor institutions are public, private, or nonprofit, if 
managed properly, they would play a role in broadening economic security in the KRI. 
It does not appear the KRG nor companies operating in the KRI have a streamlined 
process to procure goods and services from the local private sector. Anchor institutions 
can have a dramatic impact on local development in the KRI by streamlining the 
procurement process, building vendor relations with local businesses, and purchasing 
supplies from local social enterprises (Bradley 2013). Adequate consultations with the 
government, private sector and local communities, consistent with a human security 
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approach, would help prevent companies inadvertently from destroying the livelihoods 
and traditions of local people in the KRI in the name of economic progress.  
 
6. Dismantling of a war economy and illegal networks 
It appeared the presence of the Turkish private sector enhanced the dismantling of a war 
economy and illegal networks in the KRI. The implementation of the formal inspection 
process of imported goods by the central government in Baghdad, and reinforced by the 
KRG increased the probability that only products that met the specified criteria would 
enter into the market. The prevalence of legally imported goods from Turkey played a 
major role in the trade gap between Turkey and the KRI. Although the pre-inspection 
process was mainstreamed, it still seemed as if respondents were uncertain about the 
degree of transparency of the overall program.  
 
During the research timeline, remnants of a war economy were still prevalent in the 
KRI. The economic crisis that emerged in 2013-2014 due to the continuing challenges 
of overdependence on oil revenues and budget transfers from the government in 
Baghdad, meant the constraints on the revival and creation of a viable socioeconomic 
and political system in the KRI were almost as great as that which the Kurds faced in 
2004. Furthermore, the advance of Daesh towards the capital city of Erbil, in 2014, 
severely threatened the state and forced the KRG to redirect available funds to the 
security services. Illegal networks emerged again to actively trade with Daesh by 
providing the organization with items it could not produce, in exchange for oil and 
money (Nafeez 2014). Without approximately 80 percent of the KRG’s total revenues 
and the urgent redirection of any existing public funds to the security sector for the fight 
with Daesh, the KRG was overwhelmed and unable to pay for services and salaries on 
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a consistent basis. The Ministry of Natural Resources borrowed approximately $1.5 
billion from the domestic private sector and another $1.5 billion from international 
companies and suppliers by selling its future oil output to keep the economy afloat and 
to pay for the salaries of civil servants including the Peshmerga who were in an active 
battle with Daesh (World Bank 2015a, 21). In 2014, the poverty rate more than doubled 
and unemployment especially among IDPs and refugees living off-camp and young 
Kurds increased significantly. Illegal networks continued to operate and smuggled 
people, fuel, cigarettes, illicit drugs, and weapons from the KRI to Turkey. 
 
7. Expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills development, and 
empowerment 
Even though it was at the discretion of each company whether or not to hire local 
personnel and to provide training components it seemed the Turkish private sector 
enhanced the expansion of opportunities for training, skills development, and 
empowerment. As mentioned in Chapter 3, entitled, Contextual Framework, the Turkish 
private sector has had several decades to develop and meet international business 
standards. Granted, not every business might possess a high level of professionalism, 
but the Turkish private sector is known for providing opportunities for personnel 
through structured training and skills development. Turkish companies operating within 
the KRI, particularly those with global reach, had the opportunity to contribute to human 
capital development by providing structured training opportunities and offer students 
internships and site visits. For instance, Enka Construction, one of the largest companies 
in Turkey, regularly assigned Turkish citizens to its worksites for summer internships. 
This model could be easily replicated for Iraqi Kurdish students on corporate worksites 
in the KRI. Furthermore, linking apprenticeship programs to Turkish firms, which led 
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the majority of the construction work in the KRI, would be a win-win opportunity, add 
lasting value to the operations of Turkish businesses and also prepare workers for the 
new forms of emerging business opportunities in the KRI. Therefore, it should be 
beneficial for relevant KRG ministries to strengthen relations with the Turkish private 
sector and to encourage those companies operating in the KRI to provide opportunities 
for professional skills development.  
 
For some Turkish construction companies, investing in human capital development was 
important and therefore provided structured training components for employees. 
Turkish companies that undertook sophisticated projects, such as Sa-Ra Energy 
(construction of energy transmission lines) and Makyol Construction (Erbil (Hawler) 
international airport), provided structured training components for particular local 
personnel. Other traditional construction companies, such as 77 Construction and 
Contracting Company (Qandeel bridge and approaches highway) or Yuksel 
Construction (Kora-Shaqlawa-Qandeel highway project), paired local unskilled 
laborers with expat employees for supervised on-the-job training. The high percentage 
of local staff job-hopping and low employment continuity, in both construction and 
export sectors, especially after the completion of a project continued to be big 
challenges for all concerned.  
 
Turkish export companies that perceived the KRI as a major market, such as Arcelik 
A.S. and Eti, or were engaged in a highly specialized sectors, such as health (Acibadem 
Healthcare Group), aviation (Atlas Global), or upheld a business model based on 
excellence (Vakko), appeared to invest more significantly in business development and 
the provision of structured training components for local employees in the KRI. Other 
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Turkish companies involved with export activities in the KRI relied heavily on local 
partners to undertake major business activities; therefore, they opted for supervised on-
the-job training, rather than structured training components. The Turkish businesses and 
entrepreneurs displayed a wealth of experience and knowledge, while working in the 
KRI, which provided a model for local businesspeople and professionals to build upon 
in implementing their own style of private sector development. One might hope that by 
interacting with their counterparts from Turkey, local professionals developed their 
entrepreneurial, technical, managerial, and business skills.  
 
The challenge remains how to upgrade the skills of locals seeking employment in the 
private sector, how to subsequently promote employment security and help the 
international private sector reduce their dependence on expat employees. As part of the 
larger education framework, the KRI must continue to expand post-secondary, 
technical, and vocational education and training opportunities. Such initiatives should 
develop curriculums and links to connect the education system to the labor market in 
such a manner to equip students with the skills needed by immediate or emerging 
markets. It is essential for the KRG to establish and financially support an effective 
technical and vocational education and training system and skills-building opportunities 
for human resource development in the KRI. If encouraged, the international private 
sector might help subsidize apprenticeship and traineeship scheme to ensure the 
generation of competent, qualified employees for the business community. A regional 
educational initiative that prioritizes key industries, occupations, and skills for the entire 
labor force – not just for high-earning positions – would promote a more inclusive 
approach to employment generation in the KRI.  
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It is important not to emphasize the increase in education without addressing other 
structural impediments to socioeconomic growth, such as poverty, inequality, and 
exclusion of vulnerable groups in the formal economy. Studies indicate there is a direct 
correlation between poverty and the lack of a quality education, as a significant 
proportion of individuals caught in the poverty cycle are unable to advance themselves 
because other priorities, such as earning a fair wage, take precedence over acquiring an 
education (ILO 2014). An overly skilled workforce, especially unemployed college 
students or graduates unable to obtain compatible jobs, tends to threaten the social 
cohesion of society, especially when disgruntled job seekers resort to crime, political 
violence or migrate abroad. Therefore, the establishment of an initiative similar to the 
AmeriCorps jobs program in the United States could leverage the drive and sincerity of 
young people by creating a generation of leaders with a lifelong commitment to social 
responsibility. Participants in the initiative – college students and recent graduates – 
would partake in training, receive placements with civil society organizations, and 
contribute to the missions of their organizations, as a member of a team. The creation 
of blended inter-generational community centers for adults and children, like Girls and 
Boys Clubs in the United States, would afford an opportunity for people to take part in 
arts and crafts workshops, professional development training, sports activities, and other 
educational activities. Community centers can recruit volunteers through the 
AmeriCorps-like initiative, and offer small grants and/or loans to individuals who are 
eager to undertake a civic action project. These types of programs require social 
organization and community involvement, but can be viewed as threatening to 
governments lacking political legitimacy. 
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8. Development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and 
impoverished groups 
The impact of the Turkish private sector on the development of productive activities for 
ex-combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups appeared to have been minimal if 
at all. Two main themes emerged from the empirical data: the lack of women in the 
formal workplace, and the presence of IDPs and refugees in the labor force. The KRI is 
still a culturally conservative society and women only recently entered certain work 
areas, such as the formal construction sector, long dominated by men (KRSO and 
UNICEF 2011). The construction industry, by its nature, requires hard manual labor 
that has been considered the domain of men in the KRI. Nevertheless, Kurdish women 
have a history of performing manual labor in both urban and rural areas. However, one 
of the major impediments to women working in the construction industry and similar 
business fields is the lack of safe and reliable public transportation to access work sites 
often remote from residential areas. Responsibility for taking care of children also limits 
the flexibility of women to work outside of the home when grandparents are not 
available for child care. Employer-provided worksite daycare is not common in the KRI 
and the Turkish corporations did not provide it for their local employees and neither did 
the KRG require it. Mid to large companies should be required to provide safe modes 
of transportation such as bus services to employees to travel to and from workplaces so 
they were not deterred from joining the workforce. The government, in concert with 
foreign and domestic companies, should also provide tax credits, child care facilities, 
and other benefits to working parents.  
 
The return of people who had taken refuge in Iran, Turkey, and Europe; Kurdish 
refugees from Turkey who may or may not have been associated with the PKK terrorist 
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group, IDPs from other areas of Iraq, including Iraqi Kurds, Turkmen, and both Sunni 
and Shia Arabs, and thousands of Kurdish refugees from Syria placed a heavy burden 
on the host communities in the KRI and overwhelmed the KRG and the international 
aid agencies (Kulaksiz 2015). In 2014, due to the advance of Daesh in Syria and western 
Iraq, Kurdish refugees from Syria and IDPs from Iraq were the most impoverished 
groups in the KRI (World Bank 2015a). Some Turkish companies indicated they hired 
Syrian refugees, thus providing them with opportunities for income generation. 
Representatives from the international development community remarked that it was 
important the KRG strengthen labor laws to ensure IDPs and refugees were not 
exploited or forced to work for lower wages than the local labor force.  
 
9. Provision of microfinance opportunities 
The impact of the Turkish private sector on the availability of microfinance 
opportunities appeared nonexistent. Regulatory challenges with the KRG were the 
primary impediments to providing microfinance opportunities in the KRI. SMEs must 
have access to capital and financial services to operate and grow; without ready 
available capital for investments, it is nearly impossible for SMEs to launch successful 
businesses. Connecting SMEs with regional and international microfinance lenders can 
help resolve the hurdle of acquiring capital for SMEs in the KRI (KRG 2007). 
Furthermore, the provision of microfinance opportunities can build grassroots capacity 
and empower vulnerable groups to participate in economic activities. In particular, 
when women are the beneficiaries of microfinance loans, socioeconomic development 
increases at a higher rate than if men were the beneficiaries. Thus, the provision of 
microfinance opportunities, particularly when geared towards supporting vulnerable 
groups, enhances economic security. In the KRI, the establishment of a leasing 
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mechanism could help finance equipment for SMEs that lack the necessary capital to 
buy equipment. The KRG, Turkish corporations, and international organizations should 
be more proactive in supporting the capital needs of SMEs with microfinancing 
programs. 
 
Promoting entrepreneurship, in particular social entrepreneurship, is a creative 
approach to facilitating business, social engagement, and social services. Social 
entrepreneurs aim to resolve social problems through market-oriented strategies by 
either investing their profits into initiatives that resolve social problems or by the direct 
resolution of social problems through their own business activities. Establishing social 
innovation labs could create an environment for social entrepreneurs to receive training, 
mentoring, and funding to devise strategies to address social problems head-on, rather 
than waiting for the government to resolve them. Considering many households are 
vulnerable to economic shocks in the absence of a proper welfare structure, social 
entrepreneurship can leverage tight resources to create positive social and 
environmental impacts in the KRI. The establishment of a member-based social 
entrepreneurs fund could attract committed investment capital to support impact-
oriented companies. A social entrepreneurs fund should identify strong candidates with 
proven records of success, and then provide them with access to a wide-ranging network 
of supportive resources, advisors, and mentors. In the KRI, the launch of searchable 
databases of professional skills-based volunteers and civil society organizations in need 
of specific expertise would expand the potential impact of such an initiative. This type 
of business initiative should not prove a challenge to the ruling political parties – which 
tend to want to bring most business endeavors associated with the government into their 
patronage systems – since it would be essentially a volunteer and self-funded effort. 
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10. Clarification of property rights 
The impact of the Turkish private sector on the clarification of property rights was 
nonexistent. Two main themes emerged from the empirical data pertaining to property 
rights: titles for housing units, and the process of how land is allocated. Apparently, 
some of the Turkish companies experienced difficulty acquiring titles for housing 
projects. Other housing projects were not completed due to financial problems of the 
main contractor, inadequate capitalization of the KRI funding stream, and or failure to 
perform on the part of Turkish or local subcontractors. It is crucial the KRG strengthens 
the legal framework concerning property rights in order to avoid accusations of abuse 
of power and corruption by government officials.  
 
11. Macroeconomic development and job creation  
It appeared the Turkish private sector had a varied impact on macroeconomic 
development. Over the last decade, the KRG established a liberal and safe business 
environment to attract the international private sector to operate in the KRI. The KRG 
preferred FDI investments in prioritized strategic sectors, such as banking and finance, 
education, health, infrastructure, and oil and natural gas. The Turkish construction 
sector implemented projects, in part, because of the high return on investments and the 
relative ease of doing business in the KRI. Extensive infrastructure projects were 
expected to provide jobs, facilitate the delivery of public services, and diversify and 
strengthen the economy (Shatz et al. 2014). Several themes emerged from interviews 
with respondents from the Turkish construction sector, export sector and associated 
business initiatives. It appeared the establishment of national customs regulations, 
enacted by Baghdad and reinforced by the KRG, increased the export of prequalified 
products from Turkey to the KRI. The streamlining of customs regulations and the pre-
  
279 
 
inspection process also seemed to have contributed to the dismantling of illegal 
networks. The development of the banking and finance sector allowed local customers 
and Turkish companies to manage basic banking operations more easily. However, the 
absence of sophisticated banking options and access to finance was still a significant 
challenge especially for SMEs. The expansion of the insurance sector set a precedence 
for the procurement of coverage such as health insurance, independent of the 
government. Lastly, it appeared that some Turkish construction projects had a lasting 
impact on the local community and economy once they were completed.  
 
The last two years of the research timeline of this project (2013-2014) posed significant 
challenges for macroeconomic development in the KRI. The local economy 
experienced severe shocks as a result of drastic drop in oil prices, Baghdad’s 
withholding of the KRG’s 17 percent share of the Iraqi budget, and the redirection of 
public funds to the security sector due to the armed conflict with Daesh. The local 
private sector was overwhelmed by the dominant presence of the Turkish private sector, 
with its retail stores, trading companies, and management of the majority of large 
infrastructure projects, the decrease in purchasing power of the population of the KRI 
and over dependence on KRG business activities. It appeared Turkish companies 
purchased some equipment from local companies and hired local contractors to provide 
services to the projects. Still, it appeared that the emphasis on establishing a liberal 
business environment for the international private sector might have compromised the 
development of the local private sector. According to one study, “Overall, the KRI 
offers mostly favorable environment to foreign investors but a difficult environment for 
small, local businesses. With the right project, foreign investors can find entry into the 
KRI to be relatively smooth. However, the environment for creating new, small, local 
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businesses appears to be challenging. This could be a barrier to economic development, 
because despite the benefits of large foreign investments, local capital formation is also 
extremely important to long-term growth” (Anthony, Hanseen, Kumar, Shatz and 
Vernez, 2012, 20).  
 
It appeared the Turkish private sector constrained job creation. The KRG established a 
liberal visa policy to attract international private sector investments by eliminating 
barriers to the deployment of corporate workforces from mostly Western countries and 
Turkey. Therefore, despite the requirement to acquire a visa for Iraq, Turkish citizens 
were not required to get a visa prior to their travel to the KRI since the KRG effectively 
managed its own immigration and border control service independent of Baghdad. By 
obtaining short-term visas at KRG ports of entry, Turkish companies could deploy staff 
in and out of the region at relatively low costs and with minimal planning. The Turkish 
impact on sustained job creation for locals was negligible since their companies could 
bring in low-wage workers from South Asia and can utilize the visa-free regime for 
their own citizens for skilled and professional staff.   
 
Respondents from the construction sector acknowledged the value of local skilled 
laborers for their knowledge of local and regional languages. Decades of war, chaos, 
and instability degraded the availability and effectiveness of the education system in the 
KRI to prepare workers for technical, semi-skilled, and managerial positions with the 
international private sector. Therefore, respondents remarked that the development and 
application of comprehensive human capital development policies were essential to 
ensure the construction sector had a positive impact on economic security in the future. 
From the perspective of Turkish employers, the local workforce often exhibited 
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unrealistic salary expectations relative to their level of their work experience. Training 
opportunities were seen as paramount to ensure skilled workers received the knowledge 
required for human capital development. Respondents noted that although local 
unskilled staff may have had a good command of local and regional languages, which 
proved beneficial for Turkish companies, they were often unfamiliar with international 
business procedures and products. Many respondents indicated that the KRI unskilled 
workforce was not large enough to meet the needs of the Turkish construction sector. 
As a result, the majority of respondents noted that their companies hired a mixed labor 
force consisting of local and foreign employees, with only a few Turkish companies 
hiring a majority of non-local employees for projects in the KRI. Furthermore, 
uncertainty over land acquisition and site development, unclear building codes and 
permits, and quality control standards were some of the challenges Turkish companies 
faced while operating in the KRI.  
 
The Turkish construction sector can lead the business community in ensuring that local 
employees have an opportunity to save for retirement, earn a fair wage, and have a safe 
working environment. Like all personnel, low-wage laborers in the construction sector 
deserve a fair wage, a predictable income, benefits, a safe working environment, and a 
regular work schedule. Set work schedules are particularly important for unskilled 
laborers since they often try to maintain multiple jobs to compensate for low wages. 
The long-lasting impact of the Turkish construction sector on job creation was a missed 
opportunity, since neither the Turkish corporations nor the government took substantial 
proactive measures to ensure job creation, enhance the skills and professional 
opportunities of local people in the areas of management and skilled trades. The KRG 
should make sure that investments in infrastructure development result in the 
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employment and training of locals to perform the associated tasks regardless if they are 
unskilled or unexperienced. It is paramount that policies aimed at promoting 
employment are integrated across the bureaucracy, without compromising other 
development goals. 
 
Respondents from the export sector and other business initiatives noted that the value 
of working with local skilled laborers was due to their knowledge of local and regional 
languages. But, they also cited the minimal work experience and a lack of managerial, 
technical, and English language skills as major challenges to hiring employees from the 
local labor market. Respondents noted that local unskilled labor in the KRI often had a 
good command of local and regional languages, but little knowledge of international 
products. The labor market in the KRI was diverse due to the influx of IDPs, refugees 
from Syria, and laborers from low-income countries, such as Bangladesh and the 
Philippines.  
 
Employment services and initiatives, such as MSelect, “Kurdistan Works,” and 
“Kurdistan Careers” tried to educate and pair job seekers with potential employers in 
the private sector. The Ministry of Natural Resources encouraged international 
companies that operate in the oil and gas sector to hire from the local workforce. 
However, the KRG did not streamline requirements for international companies in other 
sectors to employ a certain percentage of locals; thus, the number of positions available 
with these companies remained at the discretion of corporate management (KRG, 
Ministry of Natural Resources). According to some respondents, many of the locals 
working with international companies, including the Turkish companies, were paid less 
and were not employed in key positions; instead they held low-impact positions. Since 
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the Turkish private sector was the biggest player in the region, the absence of 
opportunities with these companies such as internships, apprenticeships, training and 
development, long-term employment, and a career ladder continued to limit workforce 
capacity development, innovation, and job creation among the KRI population.  
 
Job creation is important to economic growth. However, it is morally imperative to 
visualize a new paradigm that allows us to connect people to high-quality jobs. Good 
benefits, training opportunities, family support schemes, a safe work environment, fair 
wages, and professional development are all key factors of a quality job. By developing 
multidimensional human resource strategies, companies minimize costs while 
improving job quality. However, it is also important to challenge the notion that 
education alone is sufficient for obtaining a quality job. An integrated and innovative 
framework that addresses barriers such as needs for child care, home health support, 
sick leave, and transportation to and from workplaces for job seekers – especially 
individuals from vulnerable groups – to acquire and maintain a job would also expand 
employment opportunities.  
 
Integrating social enterprises, which aim at expanding employment opportunities for 
people who are typically seen as unemployable, in socioeconomic development 
strategies could support individuals outside of the formal labor market. Employment in 
social enterprises can provide much-needed work for people with little work experience, 
former soldiers who might not have compatible job skills for private sector employment, 
individuals with past criminal records, people who suffer from trauma and PTSD, and 
individuals who are in need of acquiring further job skills to advance to more suitable 
positions. Social enterprises can range from property care, waste recycling, and 
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landscaping to more sophisticated activities, such as web design and market research. 
Social enterprises can be vitally important to raising working standards if they provide 
employees with a safe and supportive environment, health benefits, and a fair wage. By 
providing an entry point into the formal workforce for people with the abovementioned 
challenges, social enterprises contribute public goods and services to meet some of the 
needs of the community. Oftentimes, after working for a social enterprise, employees 
are prepared to transition to a position in the private sector. Such efforts are important 
for the KRI since they address the needs of vulnerable workers while developing 
businesses that are not dependent on the oil industry or the existence of a robust KRG 
budget. 
 
12. Establishment of social safety nets 
It appeared the impact of the Turkish private sector on the establishment of social safety 
nets in the KRI was nonexistent. It seemed as if respondents thought it was not necessary 
to ensure social safety nets, if their company provided a safe and secure work 
environment. Under the KRG Constitution, Article 20, “the regional government shall 
provide social security benefits in cases of illness, disability, unemployment, or old age” 
(KRG Constitution). In 2009, the KRG, in conjunction with the national government of 
Iraq and the World Bank, created a poverty reduction strategy that recognized the need 
to establish social safety nets for the economically disadvantaged (KRG 2013, 12).  
 
13. Provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid 
It appeared the impact of the Turkish private sector on the provision of well-
coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid in the KRI was nonexistent. Towards the 
end of the research timeframe, the KRG, along with development agencies and domestic 
  
285 
 
and international humanitarian aid groups, struggled to support the influx of refugees 
from Syria and IDPs from other provinces in Iraq, due to the heightened security 
situation, economic crisis, and the shortage of government funds. Donor fatigue towards 
Iraq and the KRI greatly affected the ability of the KRG to afford to meet the immediate 
needs of the refugees and IDPs who sought refuge in the KRI. It was estimated that 
$846 million (3.5 percent of the GDP) was required to stabilize the impact of the 
humanitarian crisis in 2015 (Kulaksiz 2015). More than 243,000 vulnerable IDPs were 
urgently in need of adequate shelter. The government built 26 IDP camps with a 
combined capacity for 223,790 IDPs across the three governorates of the KRI. The KRG 
committed to funding three camps, while the international community was expected to 
fund 20 camps, leaving three camps unfunded (World Bank 2015a). The Disaster and 
Emergency Authority (AFAD), an agency of the Turkish government, built two refugee 
camps in the Zakho and Dohuk areas for IDPs and refugees who fled the brutal rule of 
Daesh in Syria and in Iraq.  
 
Implications of the research findings  
Theoretical implications 
Several important theoretical implications of this study emerged through an analysis of 
the empirical data. Considerable evidence was found to substantiate the argument that 
a multidimensional economic security framework, one that harnesses the presence of 
the international private sector, had the potential to enhance human security. However, 
in order to mitigate threats to human security, the environment in which the 
international private sector interacts with all levels of society must be inclusive and 
equitable. The study highlighted the importance of thirteen conditions such as public-
private relations; basic income and poverty alleviation; public and private sector 
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employment, wage employment, and self-employment; rehabilitation of the agriculture 
sector; infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic services; dismantling 
of a war economy and illegal economic networks; expansion of opportunities for people 
through training, skills development, and empowerment; development of productive 
activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups; provision of 
microfinance opportunities; clarification of property rights; macroeconomic 
development and job creation; establishment of social safety nets; and the provision of 
well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid as channels to enhance human 
security.  
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, entitled, Review of the Literature, the material on 
economic security is sparse, diverse, and often does not specifically define economic 
security as a tenet of human security. Therefore, this study aimed to close the gap in the 
field by synthesizing the key bodies of literature that contribute to the understanding of 
economic security from a human security perspective, namely, development economics, 
peace economics, and peacebuilding.  
 
Furthermore, strategies that take all seven pillars of human security into consideration 
are more likely to reinforce structures and institutions that support a peaceful and 
resilient society in conflict and post-conflict environments (Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2015a). The value of the “positive peace” approach to address structural causes 
of conflict as a means to securing sustainable peace was reiterated throughout the 
dissertation. The negative impact of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria on peace, 
stability, social cohesion, and economic recovery in the KRI underlined the urgency to 
tackle systemic issues and address tensions that lead to armed conflict. Therefore, the 
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extent economic security can be rooted into society is minimal without community 
security, environment security, food security, health security, personal security and 
political security. 
 
The importance the KRG assigned to economic security was certainly dependent on 
surviving the existential threat of Daesh. But, even before the rise of the Daesh threat, 
when oil money from Baghdad was flowing, the KRG placed more priority on 
neoliberal consumerist dreams and the entitlements of the ruling elites over building the 
foundations of a just and viable political economy. Economic security in the KRI, as 
the dissertation highlighted, was severely compromised because of the threat to security 
and stability due to the ongoing civil conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the incursion of 
Daesh in the KRI. The influx of IDPs and refugees from Syria put further financial 
pressure on the KRG to not only devise a plan to financially support its own citizens, 
but also to vulnerable groups seeking refuge in the KRI (Hawramy 2014). The 
dependence on the oil sector and disbursements of the 17 percent of the Iraqi budget 
located the KRG and the economy in a precarious position. This dissertation argued that 
a combined “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” approach to human security 
is more appropriate to mitigate systemic threats to security in fragile and conflict-
affected environments.  
 
Without committed leadership from the private and public sectors and legal provisions 
to ensure that the international private sector contributes to strengthening economic 
security the impact is left to the discretion of individuals companies. The KRG 
established a liberal economic framework, supported by the Investment Law, which did 
not require the international private sector operating in the KRI to contribute to the 
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development of indigenous human capital, such as priority hiring and training of local 
employees, paying into the social security and contributions program, or insuring a fair 
minimum wage and safe working environment. In the absence of KRI regulation and 
supportive policy Turkish companies, from the construction sector, export sector and 
associated businesses, rarely hired locals, preferring to repatriate Turkish citizens or 
individuals from third countries. The failure of the Turkish companies to hire and train 
locals was despite their significant experience in professional development, 
management training, financial literary, marketing and value-chain analysis, which 
could have been a momentous knowledge transfer to the KRI local labor force.  
 
Policy implications  
Based on the empirical data that emerged from interviews with members of the Turkish 
private sector operating in the KRI, as well as a comparative analysis of the empirical 
data from scholarly journals and policy sources, there are significant policy implications 
that can be drawn from this research study.  
 
An excessive emphasis on a singularly focused oil sector, without the prioritization of 
the diversification of the economy and sustainable socioeconomic development, proved 
disastrous, under the stress of war and collapsing oil prices. The financial burden of a 
protracted conflict could not have come at a worse time for the KRG. The Baghdad 
government refused to transfer the 17 percent share of the national oil revenues to Erbil 
because of the ongoing disagreement regarding the KRG’s right to sell oil directly to 
international oil companies. Baghdad and Erbil both faced severe challenges brought 
on by the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars, the drastic drop in oil prices, and the burden of 
supporting new IDPs and Syrian refugees in Iraq and the KRI (Jennings 2014). The 
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aggressive exclusionary attitude and discriminatory behavior of the Baghdad regime 
towards the Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs began to change with the replacement of 
authoritarian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with the more tolerant and inclusive Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi. While al-Maliki’s discriminatory and polarizing polices 
contributed to the lasting legacy of violent sectarianism in Iraq, at least the new Baghdad 
administration was willing to resume the transfers of oil royalties to the KRG that had 
been halted by al-Maliki. Baghdad additionally agreed, at least temporarily, that the 
KRG could directly export oil to Turkey using the new KRG pipeline. However, 
Baghdad and Erbil remain at odds regarding a long-term plan to compensate the KRG 
for exporting oil from the KRI.  
 
The findings from the research project have policy implications for the KRG’s capacity 
to manage the KRI, including the newly acquired contested cities, such as Kirkuk, in 
light of the historical opposition of Baghdad and the influx of refugees from Syria and 
IDPs from elsewhere in Iraq. Because of the Daesh attacks, and the collapse of the Iraqi 
Army in Mosul and adjacent areas, the Peshmerga was able to seize Kirkuk and nearby 
towns that were previously contested or under Baghdad’s control. Severely weakened 
by the rise of Daesh, Baghdad did not demand the withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces 
from previously contested areas. Whether this was just an admission of Baghdad’s 
inability to secure the territories, or a permanent relinquishment of the oil-rich Kirkuk 
area to the KRG, remains to be seen. For the KRG, it means the fulfillment of the 
historical goal of bringing Kurdish rule to all parts of greater Kurdistan located within 
Iraq. But it could also be a challenge to the future stability of the KRG state due to the 
large numbers of non-Kurdish peoples (Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrian Christians) 
brought under the control of the Peshmerga. Questions of war, military occupation, and 
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the unification of Kirkuk are complicated by the presence of IDPs and Syrian refugees 
in the KRI whose welfare has become the responsibility of the overtasked and 
financially strained KRG. 
 
This research project has policy implications for governments that embrace an entirely 
liberal economic framework, particularly in oil-dependent conflict environments. Given 
that the KRG choose to formally enact a liberal economic framework under the 
Investment Law of 2006, the KRI became a completely open market for anyone 
interested in financial engagement in the region. The long-term value of unlimited 
extraction of capital outflows, failure to diversify the economy away from absolute 
dependence on the oil extraction industry, the KRG’s near complete dependency on 
income transfers from the Baghdad government, and the absence of requirements for 
foreign companies to invest in human capital development are problematic to ensuring 
the economic security of the KRI. The shortages of KRG funds to compensate Turkish 
companies for their valuable services jeopardized continued progress towards reducing 
human insecurity in the KRI. The engagement of Turkey’s private sector, particularly 
the presence of the Turkish construction sector, in Iraqi Kurdistan helped to lay the 
groundwork for physical infrastructure development in the KRI.   
 
An over bloated public sector can have a considerable impact on the ability of a 
government to utilize public funds for socioeconomic development. It would prove 
beneficial to the KRG to enact voluntary early retirement schemes or offer to transfer 
benefits for civil servants willing to be employed in the private sector. Strengthening 
labor laws and the private-oriented social security and contributions program could 
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encourage job seekers to look for employment in the private sector, rather than 
defaulting to seemly secure employment in the public sector. 
 
Recommendations for further research topics  
The debate regarding the impact of the private sector on economic security is extensive 
and multifaceted. Exploring the following themes as future research topics can facilitate 
further development targets and strategies concerning economic security.  
 
Community relations  
A few respondents noted the companies they represented interfaced with local 
communities by contributing to local charities, by constructing roads near their projects 
to support the neighborhoods of their workers, and by repairing government buildings 
and schools. Cuneyt Karacasu, noted, “Oftentimes, local communities ask for assistance 
from companies working in their region. For instance, in northern Iraq, locals asked 
Yuksel Construction to pave local roads with asphalt and to repair buildings, such as 
mosques and local government buildings. Yuksel Construction provided the material 
and the labor to undertake these projects” (Cuneyt Karacasu, Yuksel Construction, 
2014, Interview, Ankara). It would be also interesting to investigate whether Turkish 
private sector community outreach efforts instilled a permanent positive image of their 
operations in the KRI. It would also be fascinating to compare projects approved by the 
KRG Ministry of Natural Resources, which encourages companies that sign production-
sharing contracts to partake in corporate social responsibility activities, with the projects 
run by other foreign companies operating in the KRI to discern if government oversight 
ensured there was a more positive impact on socioeconomic development.  
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Expansion of Turkey’s “soft” power in the KRI 
Almost all of the respondents noted that they witnessed an expansion of Turkey’s “soft” 
power in the KRI. Many of the respondents noted that they could communicate in 
Turkish with their business partners or clients in the KRI. One respondent noted that 
many of his local colleagues wanted to practice Turkish with him. Another respondent 
noted that there was an overwhelming amount of Turkish stores and brands advertised 
and displayed on billboards and shopping malls throughout the KRI. One respondent 
noted that he frequently heard Turkish songs playing on the radio in taxis and in stores. 
Several respondents noted that their business partners would often inquire about Turkish 
actors and musicians, such as Ibrahim Tatlises (Candar 2013).xvi It was common to view 
Turkish soap operas, such as “Fatih Sultan Mehmet,” and shows like “Valley of the 
Wolves” on the television in the KRI (Utkan 2011). Respondents indicated that Turkish 
soap operas, music, and brands encouraged locals to learn Turkish, which in turn 
improved their marketability when applying for positions with Turkish companies 
operating in the KRI.  
 
Influx of both skilled and unskilled labor from abroad  
Respondents indicated that there was a considerable influx of both skilled and unskilled 
labor from outside the KRI to the region over the last few years. According to the 
International Organization of Migration (IOM) the KRI experienced a 28 percent to 30 
percent increase in the population, which totaled seventeen percent of the population 
due to the 1.7 million Iraqi IDPs and approximately 250,000 Syria refugees that sought 
sanctuary in the KRI (IOM 2015). The impact of Syrian refugees and IDPs on the local 
labor market was substantial, as both skilled and unskilled individuals were often 
willing to work for substantially less than Iraqi Kurds. Many respondents noted that the 
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companies they represented often hired staff from these communities, in large part 
because they were willing to perform the same duties for lower salaries than the 
members of the local labor force were. It would be interesting to investigate the 
percentage of non-KRI citizens versus KRI citizens who worked for Turkish companies 
operating in the region. Did the presence of Turkish companies exacerbate or mitigate 
this problem? Did Turkish companies exploit the availability of cheaper labor by hiring 
IDPs and/or Syrian refugees instead of Iraqi Kurds?  
 
Personal security detachments  
Even though respondents indicated that the KRI was a relatively secure and safe region 
prior to the rise of Daesh, especially when compared with other governorates in Iraq, 
some international firms chose to utilize personal security detachments to protect their 
senior-level employees. A few Turkish representatives indicated that their companies 
preferred to recruit members of their local labor force to serve as guards as they believed 
they would remain loyal to the company. One respondent argued that an individual 
working for a private firm might compromise his position if he were offered sufficient 
financial incentives to disrupt company operations from disgruntled individuals or 
terrorist groups. It would be interesting to see how security services have contributed to 
the security of the international private sector as it has expanded across the KRI during 
a period of increased civil conflict and terrorist activities. 
 
Repatriated Iraqi Arabs and Kurds 
Some respondents mentioned that they greatly benefited from working with repatriated 
Iraqi Arab and Kurdish employees. Respondents indicated that in particular, repatriated 
Kurds, possessed strong language skills and the level of professionalism expected for 
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employment with international corporations. One respondent noted that many 
professionals from the Kurdish diaspora were highly talented individuals with an 
aptitude for languages, displayed high-levels of professionalism and had an in-depth 
understanding of the local culture. Suleyman Civil, commented, “They speak several 
languages, are educated, and have a lot of experience working in the private sector” 
(Suleyman Civil, 77 Construction and Contracting Company, 2014, Interview, 
Istanbul). Erdal Yenigun, noted, “Iraqi Kurdish repatriates helped complete our project 
because of their high-level of education and practical knowledge. They also acted as 
mediators among the project team” (Erdal Yenigun, Yenigun Construction, 2014, 
Interview, Istanbul). One company representative argued that the project would not 
have been completed if it had not been for the leadership of the repatriated employees. 
Mete Gurel, noted, “The Kurdish diaspora has contributed to the professionalism of the 
workforce” (Mete Gurel, Dogan Holding, 2014, Interview, Istanbul). Another 
respondent noted that since he began working in the KRI a decade ago, he noticed an 
influx of young professionals return from the diaspora in Europe. One respondent 
commented that he even interfaced with some European Kurds in the KRI, with whom 
he had previously met in Europe. According to one report, thousands of people have 
returned to the “KRG area from Europe, particularly from the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Germany and Sweden” (SEM, 2012, 61). The KRG dedicated a section of the 
“Kurdistan Works” site – a website dedicated to promoting employment in the private 
sector – to the Kurdish diaspora and repatriates. Research into what motivated expat 
Kurds to return to the KRI, and a comparison of their professional skills with those of 
local professionals, would shed light on the readiness, motivation, and training needs of 
the diverse KRI workforce.  
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Vulnerable groups 
There is room for further research regarding the inclusion of vulnerable groups in the 
formal labor market. Respondents from the construction sector noted the private sector 
entities they represented rarely hired women. One company representative mentioned 
that the main contractor that his company worked for did not allow women to work on 
the project whatsoever. He further commented that he had to alert the client when 
female staff from Turkey came to the worksite. It would be interesting to learn more 
about why more men than women tended to be employed in the construction sector 
particularly on worksites. Was this because few women possessed the technical 
knowledge or professional experience required to work in the construction sector? 
Alternatively, did few women work in the construction sector because cultural traditions 
did not allow women to work in majority male work settings? It would be interesting to 
analyze the official figures on women who are employed in the private sector, and what 
hurdles exist that prevent their participation in the private sector workforce. 
Furthermore, examining strategies to ensure women’s participation in the formal labor 
force – such as free housing on the worksite, child care, employer provided transport, 
and other employment benefits – might provide insight into how to encourage female 
job seekers to consider a position in the private sector. Civil society organizations such 
as the Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative and the Hiwa Foundation that promote 
gender equality and women’s empowerment in the KRI might be good efforts to include 
in any research going forward.  
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Final observations  
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, entitled, Review of the Literature, the traditional 
security narrative fails to address the structural causes of conflict, asserts the state is the 
main referent to be secured, and assumes that the state should provide security. 
Furthermore, the traditional security discourse surrounding Turkey-KRG relations 
neglects to acknowledge the deepening of economic interdependence between Ankara 
and Erbil over the last decade (Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). In contrast, this study 
aimed to challenge thinking on the concept of security and emphasizes the 
interconnectedness of human insecurities. The human security narrative emphasizes the 
individual as the referent object to be secured, which in turn empowers individuals, 
communities, and societies to transform their own environment. By combining the 
concepts of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” a broad approach to human 
security recognizes the cross-sectoral impact of universal problems such as poverty, 
armed conflict, environmental degradation, and economic crisis. This research project 
advocates a holistic approach to conflict transformation and peacebuilding by focusing 
on the concept of “positive peace,” which tackles the deep rooted causes of conflict 
rather than “negative peace,” which is simply noted as the absence of conflict. 
Considerable evidence found that a multidimensional economic security framework, 
one that harnessed the presence of the international private sector, had the potential to 
enhance human security in fragile and conflict-affected states. The likelihood of a 
positive impact of the international private sector on human security increased if just 
and equitable economic conditions existed in the local context.  
 
During the research period, 2004 to 2014, it appeared the Turkish private sector both 
enhanced and constrained economic security in the KRI. The Turkish private sector 
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enhanced some conditions of economic security. For instance, Turkish companies 
undertook a significant segment of infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to 
basic services in the KRI. Export companies influenced the dismantling of a war 
economy and illegal economic networks by participating in the pre-inspection process. 
Some Turkish companies provided professional opportunities for people through 
training, skills development and empowerment. The Turkish private sector also 
appeared to have constrained some conditions related to economic security. Turkish 
companies rarely supported job creation or to the establishment of public and private 
sector employment, wage employment and self-employment. The impact of the Turkish 
private sector on public-private relations appeared to have had a mixed impact. 
Moreover, there were some economic security conditions such as basic income and 
poverty alleviation, rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector, 
development of productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees and impoverished 
groups, provision of microfinance opportunities, clarification of property rights, 
macroeconomic development, and provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and 
multifaceted aid, where the Turkish private sector appeared to have had little impact if 
any at all. Due to the KRG’s pursuit to create a liberal economic framework for the 
international private sector and the lack of requirements for the Turkish private sector 
to invest in human capital development, it was largely left to the discretion of these 
companies to enhance economic security.  
 
In the KRI, economic development expanded at a monumental pace over the last 
decade. On a macro level, the provision of public services and public works such as 
schools, hospitals, water supply systems, and roads appears to have taken the KRG 
down a successful path to combat poverty and enhance economic security. However, at 
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a micro level, the economic boom had some negative aftershocks, including a severe 
rise in housing costs, struggle for local workers to find employment with foreign 
companies, difficulties faced by the local private sector to operate in an emerging 
market economy in which the rule of law and commercial regulation was also in infant 
stages, and the woeful neglect of what could be a productive and self-sufficient local 
agriculture sector. Doing business as usual allows income and gender disparities, social 
exclusion, employee exploitation, and poor working conditions to continue. Investing 
in human capital through the advancement and education of the local workforce is 
crucial. An enormous opportunity will be lost if the KRG fails to leverage the 
international private sector – in particular, the Turkish private sector – to contribute to 
the enhancement of economic security. Ensuring foreign companies hire a minimum 
percentage of local employees, provide training opportunities and a minimum and fair 
wage, and contribute a social good in exchange for the use of land rent-free, could 
enhance the engagement of the international private sector in the KRI in the short to 
long term.  
 
The KRG cannot afford to provide the majority of employment opportunities, especially 
in times of economic and humanitarian crises. There must be a serious build down of 
the bloated and inefficient workforce of government employees. However, a dramatic 
cut in public sector jobs, may well be a political risk that the KRG leadership will not 
want to take. Therefore, such a radical change in policy would have to be coupled with 
strong KRG support to a concurrent growth of opportunities in the private sector. 
Critical to that growth opportunities are much better training and workforce 
development effort in all professions and at all levels of skills. The KRG, in cooperation 
with the business community, should begin an intentional policy of privileging and 
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training the indigenous labor force including IDPs and refugees, to rapidly replace 
foreign workers, such as professional engineers, technicians, skilled trades, service 
workers and day laborers. The last decade of interdependent relations with Turkish 
corporations should serve as a good platform for future success and continued 
collaboration for Turkey and the KRG.  
 
In 2014, the existential threat of Daesh, concurrent with a drastic reduction in oil 
revenues due to reduced global oil prices, as well as the continuing burden of housing 
and feeding approximately 2 million IDPs and refugees, were all problematic to the 
human security of the KRI. A World Bank report indicated that the economic and 
humanitarian crises had a significant impact on the economy, which contracted by up 
to 5 percent. The poverty rate more than doubled, from 3.5 percent to 8.1 percent. It was 
estimated that it would take between $66.5 million and $107.8 million in 2015 to bring 
poverty in the KRI down to pre-crisis levels. Stabilization costs – the additional 
spending needed to restore the well-being of KRG residents – were estimated to be 
about $1.4 billion, or 5.6 percent of the KRG’s non-oil GDP (Karasapan and Kulaksiz 
2015, World Bank 2015a). It appears unlikely IDPs and refugees will be able to return 
to their original homes in the near future. Therefore, it is essential the KRG not only 
immediately receive its obligatory portion of the Iraqi federal budget, but receives an 
expanded amount to reflect the relocation of approximately 1.7 million Iraqis that have 
fled to the KRI for refuge. The KRG has struggled financially to administer services to 
not only its own citizens, but to a significantly large group of IDPs and refugees. It is 
imperative Baghdad and Erbil resolve their political dispute over hydrocarbon policy 
and jointly address human security needs, in order to preempt subsequent violent 
struggles over political power and resource allocation in the future. 
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In the current economic crisis and conflict environment, we cannot expect KRG leaders 
to allocate a significant amount of resources to enhance human security. However, if 
the KRG is unable to devise and implement a sustainable strategy to tackle threats to 
human security, the effects of the surrounding protracted crises will worsen. Therefore, 
the KRG must urgently adopt and execute an economic security framework that 
includes both monetary and non-monetary factors to make sure socioeconomic 
development remains on track. A human security approach that emphasizes the 
empowerment of individuals and groups, social integration, and the economic 
independence of household units can help strengthen the resilience of the KRI in times 
of both peace and war. The research undertaken by the Middle East Research Institute, 
based in Erbil, on the vulnerability of the economy and private sector reform is 
commendable. A discussion about how the KRG can better utilize the Investment Law 
and other private sector-related regulations to ensure the Turkish private sector 
enhances and not constrains economic security in the KRI should prove beneficial. 
Turkish businesses must understand that by providing better business models, 
operational strategies, clear job descriptions, decent job opportunities, fair wages, 
benefits, safe working environments, and opportunities for professional development 
for individuals from the local labor market will likely witness higher returns, a wider 
loyal customer base, and overall better performance. There are serious political and 
economic risks facing the KRI; however, striving for excellence will allow the KRG to 
devise innovative approaches to address the root causes of conflict and ensure that the 
pillars of peace are built on a strong foundation. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Interview Question Example: Turkey-Based Interview 
1. Did the project have an impact on public-private relations? 
 How did the company come up with the idea to develop the project?  
 How closely did the company work with the local authorities in developing and 
implementing the project? 
2. Did the project have an impact on the provision of basic income and poverty 
alleviation?  
 Did the company hire any local staff to help with the project? 
3. Did the project have an impact on public and private sector employment, wage 
employment, and self-employment? 
4. Was there a rehabilitation and diversification of the agriculture sector? 
5. Did the project have an impact on infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to 
basic services? 
6. Was there a dismantling of a war economy and illegal networks? 
7. Was there an expansion of opportunities for people through training, skills 
development, and empowerment? 
8. Were productive activities for ex-combatants, returnees, and impoverished groups 
developed? 
9. Was there a provision of microfinance opportunities? 
10. Were property rights clarified? 
11. Did the project have an impact on macroeconomic development and job creation? 
12. Were social safety nets extended do to the project? 
13. Was there a provision of well-coordinated, predictable, and multifaceted aid? 
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Appendix 2: List of interviewees (in order of newest interviews to oldest)  
 
Interview 1: Bilal Wahab, Lecturer, American University of Sulaymaniyah, November 
20, 2015, Istanbul. 
Interview 2: Bilal Demirler, Director of Operations, Faruk Medical Center, November 
13, 2015, Istanbul.  
Interview 3: Alex Munoz, NYU Field Project Director, Center for Peace and Conflict 
Resolution Studies, Volunteers, Duhok University, September 10, 2015, Istanbul.  
Interview 4: Ala Ali, Consultant, UNDP, September 10, 2015, Istanbul. 
Interview 5: Choman Hardi, Dr., Assistant Professor, Chair, American University of 
Sulaymaniyah, September 10, 2015, Istanbul.   
Interview 6: Roger Guiu, Research Fellow, Middle East Institute for Research, July 23, 
Skype Interview. 
Interview 7: Peace and Development Consultant, New York University, June 1, 2015, 
Istanbul. 
Interview 8: Bob Sicina, American University, May 19, 2015, Telephone Interview.  
Interview 9: Aydin Selcin, Former Consul General of Turkey in Erbil, April 21, 2015, 
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Interview 75: Halil Dilek, Vice President – Special Projects, STFA Construction Group, 
July 25, 2014, Istanbul. 
Interview 76: Aydin Toprakli, Iraq Project Manager, Kalyon Construction Sanayi ve 
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Endnotes  
i The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or PKK, is an internationally recognized terrorist 
organization. 
ii In 1991, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 688, the U.S., U.K., France, 
and Turkey launched Operation Provide Comfort to protect and provide humanitarian 
assistance to mostly Kurds who had fled to the Iraqi border with Turkey.  
iii Daesh does not represent mainstream Islam; therefore, I choose to use the Arabic 
name “Daesh” throughout this dissertation. 
iv On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) voted 264-251 
on a ruling that would have authorized American troops to launch an invasion of Iraq 
from Turkey. Under Turkish parliamentary rules, a majority of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) present needed to vote “yes” for the ruling to pass. Since 19 PMs 
abstained, the measure failed by three votes (Martin 2012, 232-233).  
v The U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed by President George 
W. Bush in 2008. Under the SOFA U.S. combat troops were to withdraw from Iraqi 
cities by June 30, 2009 and all U.S. combat forces were to leave Iraq by December 31, 
2011.  
vi  According to Kirisci, the term “Anatolian Tigers” is used for cities located in 
Anatolia, which experienced an economic boom in the 1980s.  
vii  In 2009, the Kurdistan National Assembly was renamed the Kurdistan Region 
Parliament.  
viii Note that the spelling of Sulaimani is only used with reference to the University of 
Sulaimani. Otherwise, the city is spelled Sulaymaniyah throughout the dissertation 
unless referring to a specific reference.  
ix 2,012.28 million ID = 1,729.06 million USD on September 24, 2014.  
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x Foras means “opportunity” in Arabic.  
xi Exchange rate taken on November 29, 2015 www.xe.com  
xii 2,012.28 million ID = 1,729.06 million USD on September 24, 2014.  
xiii 5 million ID = 4,365 million USD on December 27, 2014.  
xiv 25 billion ID = 21,825,000 USD on December 27, 2014.  
xv The KRG’s official languages are Kurdish and Arabic. The two most widely spoken 
dialects of Kurdish are Sorani and Kurmanji with Gorani and Zaza being spoken in 
smaller numbers. In addition, Assyrian Neo-Aramaic, Chaldean, Neo-Aramaic and 
Turkmani are spoken in the KRI.  
xvi Ibrahim Tatlises, born in Sanliurfa, Turkey, is a Turkish folk singer and former actor 
with Kurdish origin. Tatlises, also a businessman, led several construction projects in 
the KRI. In November, 2013, labeled the “Diyarbakir encounter,” Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, KRG President Masoud Barzani, Ibrahim Tatlises and 
Kurdish singer, Shivan Perwer, whose music was banned and fled Turkey in 1976, came 
together in Diyarbakir to promote the peace process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
